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INTRODUCTION 
Arms Trans fe r s have b e e n , s ince the end of World War I I , 
a major Ins t rvment of U.S . f o r e ign p o l i c y . At t h e h e i g h t of 
the co ld War, they were r e l a t i v e l y n o n c o n t r o v e r s i a l b u t 
growing g l o b a l market of weapons, make t h e arms t r a n s f e r s 
a s i± i j ec t of concern f o r s e v e r a l members of Congress , 
government o f f i c i a l s and some segments of p i Jb l ic , On the 
one hand. P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r t r i e d to l i m i t the sa3e of arms 
t o the t h i r d World by a d o p t i n g a s e r i e s of u n i l a t e r a l 
r e s t r a i n t s on U.S. arms e x p o r t s and by i n i t i a t i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s 
wi th t h e S o v i e t Union, p r e s i d e n t C a r t e r b e l i e v e d t h a t arms 
S a l e s cou ld c o n t r i b u t e t o r e g i o n a l i n s t a b i l i t y end i n c r e a s e 
the r i s k of war. On the o t h e r hand. P r e s i d e n t Reagan viewed 
arms s a l e s a s necessa ry t o p r e v e n t the S o v i e t Union and i t s 
a l l i e s from d e s t a b i l i z i n g the ba l ance of power i n v a r i o u s 
r e g i o n s and t h r e a t e n i n g t h e s e c u r i t y of Amer ica ' s f r i e n d s 
and a l l i e s . 
The r e c e n t change i n U.S . p o l i c y has renewed the deba te 
over arms s a l e s and the c o n t r i b u t i o n they make t o U.S. i n t e r e s t s 
th roughou t the wor ld . 
Th i s s tudy b r i e f l y o u t l i n e s the fo l lowing a s p e c t s : 
Enhancement of s e c u r i t y of : in i ted S t a t e s and i t s f r i e n d s 
and a l l i e s by s e l l i n g a rms , what d i p l o m a t i c advan tages 
accrue t o the United S t a t e s from i t s arms e x p o r t ? 
- i l -
What are the economic benef i t s from s e l l i n g arms to 
o ther coun t r i es ? . 
Chapter one represents the U.S. arms a id and 
policy ob jec t ives . Chapter two i s a review of U.S. 
arms t r a n s f e r policy during the postwar per iod . I t 
examines in d e t a i l the policy assumptions and object ives 
of the Car te r and Reagan admin i s t r a t ions . Chapter three 
descr ibes the der i s ion making process for U.S. arms s a l e s . 
Chapter four ou t l ine the U.S. arms aid and supplies to the 
Third World and a l l i e s , / 
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C h a p t e r - I 
APMS AID AND U,Sf DEFENSE POLICY 
ARMS SALES AND U.S^ SECURITYt To p r o v i d e t h e S e c u r i t y 
of i t s p e o p l e i s t h e mos t i m p o r t a n t r e s p o n s i b l i t y of a 
n a t i o n - s t a t e . And f o r a c c o m p l i s h i n g t h i s g o a l , t h e U n i t e d 
S t a t e s used s e v e r a l m e a n s . As one of t h e means , t h e U n i t e d 
S t a t e s h a s e n t e r e d i n t o a number of c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y 
a r r a n g e m e n t s w i t h o t h e r n a t i o n s . Through t h e s e a r r a n g e m e n t s ^ 
i t h a s c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e r e g i o n a l and g l o b a l s t a b i l i t y 
by p r o v i d i n g a c o u n t e r t O ' . S o v i e t a g g r e s s i o n W o r l d w i d e . 
S e c u r i t y a s s i s t a n c e and i n p a r t i c u l a r a rms s a l e s , a r e an 
I n c r e a s i n g l y i m p o r t a n t d i m e n s i o n s of U . S . p o l i c y , wh ich 
s e e k s t o e n s u r e t h e s e c u r i t y of f r i e n d s and a l l i e s and 
t h e r e b y e n h a n c e i t s own. 
Through s e c u r i t y a s s i s t a n c e m e a s u r e s , such a s a rms 
s a l e s , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s e n v i e s a l l i e s t o u n d e r t a k e 
r e g i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s -ttiat i t would a t h e r w i s e h a v e t o 
a s s u m e . The s a l e of arms t o a l l i e s i s an a l t e r n a t i v e t o 
d e p l o y i n g U . S . t r o o p s i n t h e r e g i o n , ' p r o p o n e n t s o f arms 
s a l e s c i t e S e v e r a l e x a m p l e s , G r e e c e and Turkey p e r f o r m 
d u t i e s c r i t i c a l t o U . S . s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s by p r o t e c t i n g 
t h e S o u t h e r n f l a n k of NATO, Turkey o c c u p i e s a s t r a t e g i c 
p o s i t i o n c o n t r o l l i n g a c c e s s t o t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n from 
t h e B l a c k Sea and f a c e s t h e S o v i e t Union o v e r t h e l o n g e s t 
l a n d bo i rde r o f any NATO c o u n t r y . With modern arms t h e s e 
count r i es can ef fec t ive ly counter Soviet moves to 
the South Without the presense of U,S, t roops , 
A s imi l a r case can be made <5or Pakis tan , given 
i t s s t r a t e g i c locat ion and the guroximate Soviet t h r e a t 
in Afghanistan, A strong, confident Pakis tan capable 
of withstanding Soviet in t imidat ion i s e s s e n t i a l to 
p r o t e c t U,S, and free world i n t e r e s t s in the area 
consequently, the United S ta tes i s exploring options 
for modernizing Pakis tani forces to d e t e r Soviet 
aggression in t ha t area . 
Arms sa les t o Taiwan are another example where the 
United S t a t e s promted se l f - su f f i c i ency and regional 
s t a b i l i t y . Self suff ic iency, however, i s not a j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
for unres t ra ined arms s a l e s . According to one observer, 
"the ro le of arms sa les in supporting American secur i ty 
must be highly cont igent , because i n t e r e s t s ou t s ides 
Europe a re d iverse /condi t iona l and i n c o n s i s t e n t " , Unfortunatly 
advocates of r e s t r a i n t "often do not take se r ious ly the 
r e c i p i e n t ' s m i l i t a ry requirements, and sea p r o l i f e r a t i o n 
of weaponry as a counter-productive indulgence t h a t may 
p r e c i p i t a t e the united S ta tes in to s e l f d i s t r u c t i v e 
1, jane A, Coon, deputy a s s i s t a n t s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e for 
Near Eastern and South Asian a f f a i r s , "Aid to Pakistan*,* 
statement before subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, April 27, 1981, Department of Sta te Bu l l e t in 
June, 1981, p , i 3 *" 
2 
involvements in c o n f l i c t , " 
Arros Sales a re a l s o ire cognition t h a t nat ions have 
t h e i r own l eg i t ima te secu r i ty needs t ha t require an 
adequate defense aga ins t regional adversar ies . Security 
aas i s t ance "furnishes t ang ib le evidence of U.S. support 
for t h e i r independence and t e r r i t o r i a l in tegr i ty^ thus 
3 de te r r ing poss ib le aggression.** 
Although the United S ta tes ha« become increslngly 
aware of i t s i n a b i l i t y to jxjlice the World alone, i t 
continues to have a major i n t e r e s t in the survival of 
other n§t ions ,Mainta ining t h e i r s t rengths serves U.S. 
m i l i t a ry i n t e r e s t by promoting regional s t a b i l i t y and 
reducimg the p o t e n t i a l fo r d i r e c t U^S. involvement. Ihese 
nation should be independently capable of de te r r ing a t t a c k s 
from t h e i r neighbours, "Rie a ss i s tance provide to Biailand 
for example, helped b o l s t e r I ha i resolve in the face of 
Soviet-supported Vietnamese forces posi t ioned along i t s 
4 Eastern border . 
2. Richard K. Bftlts, "The Tragicomedy of Arms Trade con t ro l " 
In t e rna t iona l s e c u r i t y , Vol.5, No.l , Summer 1980, p.82 
3 . James L, Buckley, under secre tary of s t a t e for secur i ty 
a s s i s t a n c e , sc ience , and technology, fFY,1982 secur i ty 
Assisatance Bequest" Statement before the sub-committee 
on In t e rna t i ona l s e c u r i t y and science e f f a i r s of the 
House Foreign Affai rs Committees, March 19,1981, JDeptt, 
of S t a t e ^ j | L l e t i n . I6ay 1981, p,63 
4 . Ib id . 
The Nixon doctr ine es tab l i shed arms sa l e s and 
the t r a i n i n g of indigenous minitary forces as a s u b s t i t u t e 
for U.S. prewense. Supplying aims to f r iendly forces was 
economically l e s s burdensome and p o l i t i c a l l y l e s s cont ro-
ve r s i a l than deploying American troops in o ther count r ies* 
Arming f r iends and re ly ing japon t h e i r tcoops could produce 
l a rge r arm^a - a t lower c o s t . South Korea, for exarciple, 
can maintain twenty trooi.3 for tlie cos t of one U.S. so ld ie rs 
5 Turkey can maintain twelve. 
Under Reagan Administration, arms are again seen as 
as " in t eg ra l component of our global defense pos tu re , " Sales 
to a l l i e s and fri-3ndly Third World na t ions are seen as 
complementing U,S, m i l i t a ry forcess . Consequently, the 
United S ta t e s i s not only rebui lding i t s own mi l i t a ry 
s t rength but a l s o giving a t t en t ion to the s ecu r i t y needs 
of i t s f r iends and a l l i e s "whose s t rength and support a re 
7 
major p i l l a r s of our own couuitry'', 
Egypt plays a p ivo ta l role in support of U,S, i n t e r e s t s 
as the major forc^ for Arab moderation in the Middle East , 
Egypt has i t s own secur i ty needs as we l l . I t must provide 
5. Cited in David J , Louscher, "The Rise of Mi l i t a ry Sales 
as a U. S, Foreign Assistance Ins t rument ," Orbis, V©. 20 
No.4, Winter 1977, p .957 . 
6. Buckley, "FY 1982 Secur i ty Assistance Regulation", J>.63, 
7 . I b id . 
security for i t s al ly Sudan, for the Nile River as as 
economic l i f e l ine , for Egypt's Coaat Lines, and 
par t icular ly for the Suez canal, Ihere are also 
o 
external threats from Libya and other sources. Arms 
sales will allow Egypt to modernize i t s forces increase 
i t s confidence, and match I s r a e l ' s strengtii . By aiding 
Egypt's military modernization, the United States 
contibutes to regional s t a b i l i t y and encourages continuation 
of the Camp David peace process. 
Opponents of arms sales argue that high arms level 
are deestatj^lizing. As president Carter put i t , "The v i r tua l ly 
unrestrained spread of conventional weaponry threatens 
Q 
s t ab i l i t y in every region of the World", Proponents points 
out tha t this assessment is only pa r t i a l l y correct because 
the existence of arms within a region does not by I t se l f 
created ins t ab i l i ty . I n s t a b i l i t y resu l t s from unequal 
strength between adversaries. Key to regional s tab i l i ty 
are the, raaintanance of regional arms balances, diplomatic 
efforts to reduce tensions aid resolve differences peace-
fully. High levels of arms can be s tabl iz ing as long as 
a real or perceived balance i s maintained. The Middle 
East and persian Gulf were not "made vola t i le by the 
(arms) transfer; rather, the transfers were prot.ipted by 
8. Ibid. 
0 
.. 10 the v o l a t i l i t y " . 
Proponents have often c i t ed the access to mi l i t a ry 
operat ing bases overseas as another b e n i f i t of arms s a l e s . 
F a c i l i t i e s on permanent b a s i s are needed to support 
forward-deployed U.S. fo rcess . This adds c r e d i b i l i t y to secu-
r i t y a l l i a n c e s .and maintains a U.S. presense in various 
reg ions . F a c i l i t i e s in Europe a r e avai lable under NATO, 
agreement. Arms sa les to Spain haye been t i e d to continued 
access by U.S. foircess to bases in th^t a rea , which i s of 
g rea t importance to maintaining the U.S. defense posture 
in Europe,In the Phi l ippines^ arms a s s i s t ance i s regarded 
a s quid pro quo for the use of Clark Air Bases, Subic Naval 
Base, and r e l a t e d U.S, f a c i l i t i e s . I^ese bases a re c r i t i c a l 
to America's remaining on Asian and pac i f i c power and to 
the p ro jec t ion of U.S. power in to the Indian Ocean.* 
In South West Asia, the United s t a t e s i s seeking 
m i l i t a r y access to s t r a t e g i c a l l y located f a c i l i t i e s . The 
United s t a t e s w i l l upgrade, in exchange, p a r t s and a i r f i e l d s 
in Oman for i t s own purposes and for Oman's permanent use 
with a $ 1-1.5 b i l l i o n m i l i t a r y construct ion program, 
Oman's p o s i t i o n overlooking the s t r a i t of Hotomiz a t the 
mouth of the Persian Gulf makes i t a key fac to r in 
America's Pers ian Gulf posture.Arms sa les to Somalia have 
10. B e t t s , o p . c i t . , p . 8 7 . 
11 . "Congressional p resen ta t ion :Secur i ty Assistance Programs, 
tY 1982V in U.S.Congress,House Represantatives,correnittee 
on Appropriat ions,subcomit tee on Foreign operat ions and 
Eelated Agencies, Foreign Assistance and Relation prograns 
Appropriat ions for 1982, 97th cong . I s t , sess , l "981 ,par t 6, 
p-»7S7. _^ /fli.^ «si¥. 
Improved the chances t h a t American Mi l i t a ry forcess wi l l 
be able to use p e r t f a c i l i t i e s in t h a t country to enhance 
access to the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean and have improved 
the a b i l i t y of the United S t a t e s to counter growing Soviet 
Naval s t r eng th in the a r e a . 
In addi t ion,Cie United S ta tes de s i r e s cooperat ive 
m i l i t a r y arrangements with countr ies t h a t can enhance the 
pro jec t ion of itW *^ power and support j o i n t mi l i t a ry 
operat ions during c r i s i s . Providing arms and support 
ensures t h a t the l o g i s t i c p ipe l ine would already be in p lace , 
f a c i l i t a t i n g rapid response by U.S. m i l i t a r y forces i n to 
an area . Thus regional secur i ty can be enhanced by mutual 
b e n i f i c i a l defense r e l a t ionsh ips t h a t provide common 
equipment to U.S. a l l i e s , 
ARMS SALES AND FOREIGN POLICY;Arms s a l e s are an added 
element t h a t can sa t i s fy U.S. Foreign pol icy ob jec t ives . 
These ob jec t ives may be long las t ing or recen t ly derived 
from a change in j.T(*egional ailigigment or i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l 
regimes* Arms sa l e s may provide p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e , e i t h e r 
po t en t i a l or a c tua l , or they may produce d i r e c t leverage 
over a r e c i p i e n t ' s behaviour in ongoing e v e n t s . 
The United States design influence from ac t ions t i ia t 
a r e symbolic, such as demonstration of f r iendship toward 
Pro-U.S na t ions or Independent nat ions in i t s p o l i t i c a l 
o r i e n t a t i o n . Influnce could r e s u l t from _ ab expression 
of ideo log ica l support for a regime tha^ i s favourable t o the 
United S t a t e s bu t facing domestic i n a b i l i t y . Special 
relationships that can evolve not only are mutually 
beneficial po l i t i ca l ly , but also can preempt the 
competition's attempts to gain influence. The appearance 
of closeness between the United States and the recipient 
may send appropiate signals to third par t ies , such as 
the Soviet Union. 
arms sales provide leverage to achieve specific 
goals. They can bring pressure on the recipient to 
pursue cetain national pol ic ies or to a l t e r i t s behaviour. 
Sometimes greater leverage resul t s from the threat of 
withholding arms than from continuing to supply them. 
This is especially true where an agreement to provide 
arms had been previously established. I t has been suggested, 
for example, tha t the united States used i t s control over 
I s rae l i military supplies and spares in the 1973 Kiddle East 
War to pressurize Israel to cease military action after 
cutting off the Egyptian Thrid Army, 
The United States has used both Egypt and Israel 
to modify the i r positions and agree to a peace settlement. 
In addition, to maintaining I s r ae l i strength. President 
Carter agreed to provide arms to Egypt, The sale of arms 
to ggypt encouraged a trou^bled Sadat to continue to work 
toward the Camp David accords. 
Conventional arms sa l e s have provided the leverage 
to dissuaded countr ies l i k e South Korea, and Iran from 
developing nuclear weapons. The United S ta t e s threatened 
to cut off s a l e s to South Korea i f i t bought a nuclear 
fuel reprocess ing p l an t , I ran was simply to r e t a in i t s 
12 open-ended commitment of s a l e s from the United S t a t e s , 
Access to conventional weapons reduces the l ike l ihood 
t h a t a r e c i p i e n t would r e s o r t to nuclear weapons. Reducing 
the incen t ive f o r acquir ing nuclear weapons by providing 
soph i s t i ca t ed conventional artnes is seen as being more 
e f fec t ive than r ig id enforcement of safeguards, 
^ e United S ta tes can offer , a t reasonabXe p r i c e s , a 
wide ran^e of soph i s t i ca t ed , maintanable weapons t h a t 
would not only enhance the mi l i t a ry capab i l i ty of 
r e c i p i e n t s bu t a l so provide f l e x i b i l i t y not offered by 
nuclear weapons. Conventional weapons are needed to 
de te r conventional c o n f l i c t . Making these weapons ava i lab le 
does not guarantee aga ins t the r e c i p i e n t ! developing 
nuclear c a p a b i l i t i e s . To deny conventional systems 
necessary to maintain regional balances and na t iona l 
s e c u r i t y , however, could c r e a t the wrong incen t ive . Deprived 
of U,S, equipment, the insecure nation might take the 
12, L e s l i e H. Gelb, "Arms SaJ.es", Foreign Policy No,25, 
Winter 1976-1977, P.12, 
iu 
13 
necessary s teps to produce nuclear weapons, 
ECONOMIC BENIFITS OF ARMS SALESi Arms sa les earn foreign 
exchange and imi)rove the U.S. balance of payments. In 
i960* s the United Sta tes sold arms to European a l l i e s 
to o f f se t the cos ts of American troops committed to 
NATO, In 1970*s the United Sta tes vigorously pursued 
arms sa les to Persian Gulf countr ies to recoup do l l a r s 
spent on o i l . Today, the world arivs market i s even more 
l u e r a t i v e , as s ign i f i can t foreign exchange earnings 
Occrue to the United S t a t e s , 
Arms sales made up 3,1 percent of t o t a l U.S. exports 
in 1979 (0,2 percent of a $ 2.4 t r i l l i o n GNP), Though 
often dismissed as having l i t t l e r e l a t i v e value with 
respect t o t o t a l economic a c t i v i t y , arms t rans fe rs in 
14 absolute terms ($ 5,6 b i l l i o n in 1979) a re s i g n i f i c a n t . 
Arms sa les can be used t o ensure access t o c r i t i c a l 
raw mate r i a l s , such as Middle East O i l . Saudi Arabia and 
other count r ies in the region would be r e l u c t e n t to 
i n t e r u p t the sa le of o i l to the United States given t h e i r 
r e l i ance on American arms, mi l i t a ry and c i v i l cons t ruc t ion . 
13, See, Richard Burt, "Nuclear P ro l i f e r a t i on and the 
Spread of New Conventional Weapons Technology", In 
Newman and Harkary, Arms Transfers in the Modern World, 
PP.80-108, 
14, -U.S Arms Control and Disarmanent Agency, World Mi l i t a ry 
Expenditxires and Arms Transfers 19 70-1979, P. 123, 
li 
spaire p a r t s , t e c h n i c a l s e rv i ce s , and t r a i n i n g . The 
r e l a t i o n s h i p explains in p a r t why almost one-half of 
United S t a t e s ^ sa l e s go to the Hkiddle Eas t . This i s in 
con t r a s t t o the s i t u a t i o n in 1973, when United S t a t e s 
had l i t t l e arms leverage t o exe rc i s e . During the o i l 
errbargo, the Shah of I ran supplied both the United S ta tes 
and I s r a e l with o i l ( t o the displeasure of h i s Arab OPEC 
par tners) in p a r t l^ecause of h i s spec ia l arms r e l a t i o n s h i p 
with the United S t a t e s . 
A , number of s tudies have shown t h a t arms sales 
increase employment, l^e Congressional Badget Office (CBO), 
for example,analyzed the roacroecnomics e f f e c t s of s a l e s , 
using 19 76 PMS of $ 8,2 b i l l i o n as the base l i n e , (FMS as 
i d e n t i f i e d a t th%t time cons t i tu t ed over 90 percent of 
U,S, arms s a l e s ) , Assuming a complete ban on sa l e s of 
1977, by 1981 there would have been 350,000 fewer jobs 
in p r i v a t e indust ry than i f FMS had continued a t the 
constant 1976 r a t e , A study by the Labor s t a t i s t i c s in 
1977estimated t h a t foreign mi l i t a ry s a l e s in 1977 provided 
277,000 j o b s . Industry o f f i c i a l s es t imate t h a t for every 
$ 1 b i l l i o n of arms s a l e s , more than 30,000 jobs a re 
c rea ted d i r e c t l y and 60,000 more a re c rea ted in r e l a t ed 
15. Congressional Budget Office, The Effect of ForeJLgn 
Mi l i t a ry Sales on the U.S. Economy, (Washigton, D.C.j 
CBO, Staff Working Paper, Ju ly 23, 1976), P . l . 
16, Andrew j . P i e r r e , ^ e Global P o l i t i c s of Arms Sa les , 
Pr inceton, M.J. PrincBton Univers i ty P res s , 1982, P.26, 
1^ 
a c t i v i t i e s , ^ ^ 
Another bene f i t of arms sales r e s u l t s from cost 
savings from economics in expanding production. These 
savings are passed on to bjiyers in the form of a lower 
u n i t cos t of each item produced. These lower un i t costs 
Bay permit the Uniteel S t a t e s to buy needed weapons in 
numbers t h a t were previously unofferdable, 
Anns sa les generate overhead savings , Biat i s , 
ce r ta in fixed c o s t s , which do nfct vary with the volume of 
s a l e s , a re passed on to the buyer. 
Research and Development (R&D) expenses are an 
eas i ly i d e n t i f i a b l e saving from foretLfK s a l e s . They are 
typ ica l ly incurred e a r l y i n the systems acquis i t ion 
process and would be borne t o t a l l y by the United S ta tes 
in the absense of s a l e s abroad. The U.S. goveimment can 
recoup a por t ion of these expenses by a t t ach ing a prorated 
surcharge to the pr ice of these weapons and overseas, 
Althoug other savings are more d i f f i c u l t to measure, they 
nonetheless con t r ibu te to covering systems un i t cos t . 
Foreign sa l e s may generate savings by absorbing 
a por t ion of the cost of expending or acce la r t ing a 
part icxi lar production run t h a t would otherwise have been 
17. "Arms Sales Pol icy" , in U.S. Defence Policy: Weapon 
StatAgy and Commintments7 (Washington, D.C. Congressional 
1980) , P.94, 
r e q u i r e d t o s a t i s f y U.Sg inven to ry requ i rements impl i c i t l y , 
a g r e a t e r t han equal share of the non recu r r i ng c o s t of 
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new t o o l i n g i t passed on to t h e fore ign bstyer . 
S t a n d e r d i z a t i o n of equipment among f r i e n d s and 
a l l i e s , a p a r t i c u l a r l y t i m e l y i s sue fo r NATO c o u n t r i e s , 
can be a b e n e f i t of arms s a l e s . Prom t h e European p e r s p e c t i v e 
s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n has g e n e r a l l y meant the purchase of U.S . 
m i l i t a r y goods . Despi te e f f o r t s to r e v e r s e the t r e n d , the 
19 U.S. s h a r e of s a l e s i n 1976 t o a 9,4 to 1 l a t i o in 1980. 
One can a l s o argue t t e t i f the Uni ted S t a t e s does no t 
s e l l arms, then another count ry w i l l do so and wdl l scap 
t h e economic rewards , 
U.S. ARMS TI^ ANSFERS AND STRATEGIC ACCESS: ffhe p r e v i o u s postwa 
and c u r r e n t developnent of the r e l a t i o n s h i p betjween U.S , 
b a s i n g f a c i l i t i e s and arms t r a n s f e r s has o f c o u r s e , been 
d i s t i n c t from t h e Sov i e t e x p e r i e n c e . In the immediate 
wake of World War I I and a t t he onse t of t h e c o l d war, t h e 
United S t a t e s and i t s a l l i e s were provided an ex | jans ive 
g l o b a l b a s i n g system by c o l o n i a l reramants, through 
a l l i a n c e s and economic and m i l i t a r y a i d r e l a t i o n s h i p , and 
g e n e r a l l y , as a consequent of the force deployments 
emerging from World War I I . 
18 . C .B .O . , Budgetary Savings t o t h e Department of Defense 
R e s u l t i n g from Fore ign M i l i t a r y S a l e s , Washington, D.C. : 
C .B .O. , S t a f f Working Paper , May 24, 1976, P P . 3 - 5 . 
19 , " S e n a t o r s Propose Agency t o S e l e c t NATO's Arms", 
A v i a t i o n Weak & Sjpaee Teehnoloov. May 10, 1982, P . 2 1 . 
1* •t 
The United States i s , of couse, ava i led of 
numerous f a c i l i t i e s in Western Europe through i t s 
NATO a l l i a n c e . Some of these , however, as indica ted 
during the 1973 war, may not be ava i l ab l e for purposes 
not d i r e c t l y connected with NATO, t h a t i s , an t i -Sov ie t 
defense. The Turkish-Greek imbroglio over Cyprus has 
a l so ind ica ted the precar iousness of some U.S. base 
f a c i l i t i e s , ce r ta in ly to the ex t en t t h a t t h e i r continued 
use depends heavily on a continu- i t y flow of arms supplies 
to the hos t count r ies . By and l a r g e r however, the 
continuing U.S. securi ty r e l a t i o n s h i p with Western Europe 
(of which arms t ransfers i s one aspect) does assure some 
Solid s t re iAgic assets which are usable for a wide range 
of puposes and cont ingencies . 
The United States i s a l so s t i l l able to make use 
of some f a c i l i t i e s in areas ou ts ide Europe cont ro l led by . 
i t s c lo se t e s NATO, a l l i e s , hence rou t ine ly avai labe for 
most purposes. Most notable here are Greenland (owz»ed by 
Denmark), the Netherland A n t i l l e s , andBri t i sh possessions 
including Ascension I s land , the phonix i s l a n d s , and the 
Is lands of Turks, Caicos, and s t , Lucia in the Caribbean 
Ascension i s po t en t i a l l y valuable as a s tag ing point 
and as a base for Svurreillance a c t i v i t i e s with respec t 
to cont igencies in Southern Africa or in the South A t l a n t i c , 
Around the I n d i a n Ocean, U.S. arms t r a n s f e r s 
have been used t o ma in t a in s c a t t e r e d enc laves of s t r a t e g i c 
access t o match t h e expanding Sov ie t ba s ing network, 
most n o t a b l y i n Oman, Kenya, and S ingapore , 
The growing U.S. supp ly r e l a t i o n s h i p with Kenya, 
i n c l u d i n g the t r a n s f e r of P-5E f i g h t e r a r i c r a f t , has 
al lowed f o r con t inued U .S . naval v i s i t s t o Mombasa and 
fo r p o s s i b l e use of Kenyan a i r f i e l d s fo r s t e g i n g P-3 
20 Orion S u r v e i l l a n c e f l i g h t s over the Ind i an Ocean, 
In South Asia and i n t h e p a c i f i c the United S t a t e s 
ma in ta ines a r i n g of biases around t h e Asian mainland, and 
most a re backed up by c o n t i n u i n g arms-supply r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 
The r e c i p i e n t s inclvide S ingapore , Tha i l and , the P h i l i p ^ n e s , 
A u s t r a l i a , Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. Singapore does 
n o t p r o v i d e major f a c i l i t i e s b u t a l low r e g u l a r t r a n s i t of 
m i l i t a r y a i r t r a n s p o r t and P-3 f l i g h t s , as well as naval 
21 
maintanance f a c i l i t i e s . The major bases are a t Clark Ai r 
Base and Subic Bay i n the P h i l i p i n e s , Okinawa, v a r i o u s a i r 
b a s e s i n Korea and J a p a n , and now in wes te rn A u s t r a l l i a , a l l 
sx:^ported by b r o a d e r m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p ( inc lud ing 
arms s a l e s ) , a s w e l l a s e s s e n t i a l i d e a l o g i c a l a f f i n i t y . 
20, "Kenya Of fe r s New F l e x i b i l i t y t o U,S. Indian Ocean 
P-3 P a t r a l s y B a l t l a o r e Sun, J u l y 3o, 1976, r e p r i n t e d 
iri U.S, ^''aval I n s t i t u t e Proceed ings 102 (1976) , 
2 1 , Neuman and Harkavy, ftp, ci^t. 
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C h a p t e r - I I 
U. S , ARMS AID SINCE WORLD WAR I I 
Arms t r a n s f e r s t o o t h e r c o i a n t r i e s have been a ma jo r 
a n d c o n t i n u i n g i n s t r u m e n t of U.S . f o r e i g n p o l i c y , s i n c e 
World War I I , Arms e x p o r t s have t r a d i t i o n a l l y t ^ken two 
fo rms : g r a n t a i d and weapons s a l e s f o r c r e d i t o r c a s h . 
From World War I I u n t i l l t h e mid 1960s a rms t r a n s f e r s 
were a c o n t r o v e r s i a l component of U . S . n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y 
p o l i c y I t was g e n e r . - l l y a c c e p t e d t h a t weapons e x p e r t s n o t 
o n l y w e r e h e l p f u l t o r e c i p i e n t c o u n t r i e s b u t c o n t r i b u t e d 
t o U . S . S e c u r i t y as w e l l p r o v i d i n g weapons t o a l l i e s and 
f r i e n d s waS^ j u s t i f i e d by t h e p e r c e i v e d S o v i e t t h r e a t and 
c o n s t i t u t e d a key e l e m e n t of U . S . c o n t a i n m e n t p o l i c y . 
The s i t u a t i o n b e g a n t o c h a n g e , h o w e v e r , i n t h e l a t e 
1 9 6 0 s , A l t h o u g h a rms t r a n s f e r s c o n t i n u e d t o p l a y a p r o m i n e n t 
r o l e i n U . S . f o r e i g n p o l i c y , i n c r e a s i n g r e l i a n c e on weapons 
e x p o r t s by s u c c e s s i v e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s b e g a n t o c a u s e c o n c e r n 
among members of c o n g r e s s and s e g m e n t s of U. S,. . p u b l i c . Not 
o n l y was t h e volum^i of arms t r a n s f e r s r i s i n g s t e a d i l y , b u t 
t h e weapons s o l d a b r o a d were becoming more s o p h i s t i c a t e d . 
Whereas a rms t r a n s f e r s had p r e v i o u s l y b e e n d i r e c t e d a l m o s t 
e x c l u s i v e l y toward European a l l i e s and o t h e r c l o s e f r i e n d s 
of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , p r e d o m i n a n t l y i n ^the form of m i l i t a r y 
a s s i s t a n c e g r a n t s , more and more t r a n s f e r s i n 1970s 
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were made to th i rd world coun t r i e s through government-
to government s a l e s . 
By the mid -1970s Congress had began to exercise 
g rea te r control over U.S. arms t r a n s f e r s , although the 
primary r e spons ib i l i t y for s e t t i n g arms export policy 
s t i l l resided with the p r e s i d e n t . The c a r t e r policy 
sought to l i m i t u n i l a t e r a l l y U.S. arms sa les to the 
Third World and to nego t i a t e s m u l t i l a t e r a l r e s t r a i n t s 
with other major arms s u p p l i e r s . The Reagan adrronistration, 
however, hai® abandoned ^ majori ty of the object ives of 
the c a r t e r pol icy. I t has ins tead emphasized what i t sees 
as a global t h rea t p©sed by the Soviet Union, a t h r ea t 
tha t requires the United S t a t e s to supply airms to i t s 
f r iends and a l l i e s to ensure mutual s e c u r i t y . 
Background; The United S t a t e s ranked t h i r d in arms expor t s , 
before World War I I , behind Prance and Great Br i t a in , 
However, with the s t a r t of second World War, Arms t r ans fe r s 
became a major instrument of U.S. foreign pol icy. The f i r s t 
s tep taken towards t h i s was the rev is ion of the Neu t r a l i t y 
Act, in 1939, which l i f t e d the leagal prohib i t ion aga ins t the 
sa le of arms to b e l l i g e r e n t s and permitted the "Cash and Carry 
1. Geoffery Kemp, With Steven Mi l le r , "The Arms Transfers 
Phenomenon," in Andrew j , P i e r r e , e d . . Arms Transfers 
and American Foreicp Pol icy , New York: New York Universi ty 
Press , 1979, P .21 . 
2 
concept to preva i l during War time, 
U.S. government found addi t ional ways to aid tlie 
Al l i e s desp i te America's "neutra l" s t a t e s , a f t e r rev i s ion 
of N e u t r a l i t y Act. Ifc expanded i t s role as a suppl ier of 
arms and defence service as the war esca la ted in Europe, 
Pres iden t RosseveltsGreat destroyers - for - bases deal 
with Great B r i t a in a f t e r the German invasion of France 
in 1940, In March 1941, Congress passed the l end- leases 
programme, e s t ab l i sh ing the United Sta tes as the arms 
supp l i e r for the a l l i e s forces . Under l end- lease , arms 
worth tens of b i l l i o n s of do t l a r s were t ransfered to the 
A l l i e s between 1941 and 1945, 
Also during World War I , United S ta t e s had been a 
major arms supp l i e r , bu t the volume of t r ans fe r s had become 
slackened during the i n t e r war period. However, arms 
t r a n s f e r s programmes, a f t e r World War I I , continued under 
the U,S, St ra tegy of containing communist expansion. The 
Trumen Doctr ine, enunciated in 1947, was designed t o provide 
United S t a t e s Assistence to countr ies threatened by the 
Soviet Unions* The pol icy was i n i t i a l l y a response t o 
communist g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t y in Greece and Soviet pressure 
2, Defense I n s t i t u t e of Securi ty Assistance Management (DISAM), The Management of secur i ty Assis tance, Wright-
pa t t e r son APB, Ohio: Defense I n s t i t u t e of Securi ty 
Assis tance Management, 1981, P .p .1-22, 
3 . I b id , 
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on Turkey to gain j o i n t control over the Dardanelles, 
The enactment of public law 75, providing m i l i t a r y a id 
to Greece and Turkey, marked the beginning of m i l i t a r y 
4 
a s s i s t a n c e programmes. 
More weapons were exported to United S t a t e s ' s 
European a l l i e s with the formation of NATO in 1949. 
In the same year Congress passed the Mutual Defense 
Assistance Act, which formalized and expanded m i l i t a r y 
aid commitments to the Ph i l ipp ines , Greece and Turkey, 
and the Repvoblic of China, The a c t was passed to 
demonstrate U, S, commitment to the newly formed NATO 
a l l i ance and was designed to cover U.S. m i l i t a ry a s s i t ance 
to NATO a l l i e s and other f r iends of United S t a t e s , 
The majority of U.S. arms t r a n s f e r s were made, 
"free of charge under the name of Mi l i t a ry Assistance 
Programme (MAP), mainly to NATO a l l i e s and other coun t r i es 
seen as threatened by communism. In the immediate postwar 
years , $ 32 b i l l i o n mi l i t a ry aid were made out of which 
$ 4,5 b i l l i o n , $2,2 b i l l i o n , $2.3 b i l l i o n , $ 1.5 b i l l i o n 
and $ 1.1 b i l l i o n received by France, Turkey, I ta ly ,Greece 
4. I b i d . , PP.1-25. 
5. William H, Lewis, • 'Po l i t i ca l inf luence: The Diminished 
capac i t y , " in ' s t ephen i* . G. Neuman and Robert E, Harkavy, 
e d s . , Arms Transfers in the Modern World, New York: 
Praeger , 1979, P,188. 
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and the United Kingdom respec t ive ly . The Belgium and 
Nether lands received about $ 1 b i l l i o n each. 
In U.S. foreign pol icy , the use of arms t rans fe rs 
became an Instrument in response to perce ivea threa tss to 
the United S t a t e s , and i t s Western European a l l i e s , What-
emerged according to one observer , was "a mi l i t a ry s t r a t egy 
of de ter rence ; i t s foreign policy counter p a r t was containme 
and mi l i t a ry a s s i s t ance was to be the mora t o r of the NATO 
7 
a l l i a n c e " . 
The Policy of m i l i t a r y ass i s tance a lso expended to 
other geographical regions , in the 1950s and ear ly 60s with 
the expansion of the po l icy of containment (of communism), 
Events in the middle Eas t and Far East were causing a 
reass£sment of U.S. arms t r ans fe r s po l icy . Egypt's tu rn , 
in the mid 1950s, to the Soviet bloc for arm^^ The outbreak 
of war in Korea in 1950, and increas ing U.S. involvement 
in the Indochine toward the end of the decade resu l ted in 
a sh i f t in the d i r ec t ion of weapons expor t s . U,S, Foreign 
«ld pol icy was broadened from support only for i t s a l l i e s 
to support for o ther na t ions as wel l . Thus from 1©50 to 
1965 the primary r e c i p i e n t s of U.S» arms exports were 
6, Debating the d i r ec t i on of U.S. Foreign Policy: 1979-1980. 
High School Deb?t Analysis , Washington, D.C.: American 
Enterpr ise I n s t i t u t e , 1979, p.3o« 
7. Lewis, " P o l i t i c a l inf luence" , p .189. 
France, West Germany, I t a l y , Turkey, Taiwan, and South 
Korea, 
The Shif t in arms t r ans fe r s from t r a d i t i o n a l a l l i e s 
of the United States to Third World Countries in South e a s t 
Asia and the Middle East continues through out the 1960s, 
In the mid- 1960s a change was made in the form of U.S. 
arms expor t s . The U.S. s ecu r i t y ass i s tence changed from 
MAP grants to arms sa l e s under Foreign Mi l i ta ry Sales 
(EMS) programmes. 
In the Fiscal year 1961, mi l i t a ry aid was twice as 
l a rge as sa les while by the 1966, the Sales f igures were 
9 double those for mi l i t a ry aid (excluding South Vietnam), 
In response to the unsuccessful U.S. mi l i t a ry involment 
in Vietnam, Pres ident Nixon, in 1969, es tab l i shed new guide-
l i n e s for U.S. secur i ty a s s i t ance po l i cy . The Nixon doctr ine 
declared t h a t the United S ta tes would respec t i t s t r e a t y 
commitments and continue to help i t s f fr iends and a l l i e s 
through m i l i t a r y and economic a s s i t a n c e , bu t i t would 
"look to the nation d i r e c t l y threatened to assume the primary 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of providing the manpower for i t s 
8, Paul C. Wamke, With Edward C, Luck, "American Transfer: 
Pol icy and process in the Executive Branch", in Andrew J , 
P i e r r e , ed . , -knas Transfers arflAmerican foreign Bolicy, 
New York: New York Univers i ty , 1 ^ ^ : , p . I9t>. ~ 
9, I b i d . , p . 1 9 7 . 
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defense. «10 
The use of grant military aid continued to decline 
in 1970s, The number of countries jreceiving U.S. military 
assistance declined from 58 in FY 1966 to 46 in FY 1975, 
Meanwhile, the number of arms sales recipients increased. 
In FY 1966, 59 nations recieved FMS deliveries; by FY 1975 
the number wqs 74, Commercial deliveries also increased, 
from 51 countries receiving arms from U.S, companies in 
FY 1966 to 77 in FY (Fiscal Year) 1974, "''^  
Some members of Congress, in the latter half of the 
1960s, began to question U.S, arms transfers policy. With 
enactment in 1968 of the foreign Military Sales Act, Congress 
required administrations to emphasize foreign policy consider-
ations in their arms Sales Policies, The act prohibited arms 
Sales to governments that engage in human rights violations 
12 
or impede social progress. The increasing sophistication 
of weapons sold by United States and the value of arms 
transactions was rising dramittically. Those factors remained 
10, Qpnqressional Research Service, changing perspectives 
on U,S, Arms Transteirs Policy, Report to the Sub committee 
on International security and Scientific Affairs of the 
Committee o6 Foreign Affairs, U.S, House of Representative 
Sep4;ember 25, 1981, p,5, 
11, AS cited in Warnke, "American Arms Transfers policy and 
process in the executive branch," pp.198-99. 
12, Congressional Research Service, changing perspectives on 
U.S. Arms Transfer Policy, p.4, 
2o 
a source of concerns among members of congress and the 
publ ic itxi the 1970s, 
Many analysts thought t h a t arms s a l e s agreements in 
the Nixon and Ford Administration were made haphazardly 
and without due considerat ion for long-term s t r a t e g i c 
i n t e r e s t s . The Arms control and Disarmament Agency was 
r e g u l a r l y excluded from any p a r t i c i p a t i o n in decision 
making process^ i n s p i t e of i t s having s t a t u t o r y respons i -
13 b i l i t i e s , p res ident Nixon in 1972 i n s t ruc t ed the bureaucrac 
t o honour v i r t u a l l y a l l requests from the government of Iran 
for conventional arms, thereby circumventing the formal 
review process . S imi lar ly Pres ident Ford decided during 
1976 P r e s i d e n t i a l compaign to s e l l I s r a e l mi l i t a ry equipments 
14 t h a t had previously been banned. 
13, This i s discussed in some de ta i l ed in Du ucer L, Clarke, 
The p o l i t i c s of Arms controly The Role and ef fec t iveness 
of the u , s . Arms control and Disarmament Agency, New York: 
Free Press , 1979, PP.89r94, -
14, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Rela t ions , 
U.S. mi l i t a ry Sales to I r an , Staff Report to the Sub-
committee on Foreign Assistance, 94th Congress, 2nd Sess; 
J u l y 1976, p . 4 l ; and Andrew j . P i e r r e , The Global Po l i t i c s 
of Arms Sales , Pr inceton, N . j , ; Pr inceton Universi ty Presj 
1982, p , 4 8 . 
Z't 
In response, congress passed in 1974 the Nelson 
Amendment to ti\& m i l i t a ry ass i s tance b i l l . The amendment 
required the Pres ident to repor t mi l i t a ry s a l e s of $ 25 
mil l ion or more and gave congress 20 days to Veto them 
by passing a cocurrent reso lu t ion of d isapproval . 
Although Congress had been exe ic i t i ng au thor i ty over 
govt, a id but u n t i l l then i t had none over govt, approved 
s a l e s . With passage of the Nelson Amendment, i t secured 
vpto power over major arms sa les as we l l . 
The i n t e rna t i ona l secur i ty Assistance and Arms Export 
Control Act was the most s ign i f i can t Piece of Legis la t ion 
dealing with arms t r a n s f e r s since the enactment of the 
Mutual Securi ty Act, This measure was designed to s h i f t the 
ejnphasis from s e l l i n g arms to con t ro l l i ng the sa les of arrrs 
and i t include spec i f i c congressional guidel ines for U.S. 
ar-Tis Sales pol icy. 
The Act emphasized publ ic d i sc losure and review 
procedures. With the Arms Export Control Act, Congress 
-etained the r i gh t to veto proposed Arms Sales and the 
period of time was extended from 20 days to t h i r t y days 
during which proposed s a l e could be vetoed. Congress took 
many add i t iona l s teps to control arms t r a f f i c . A c e i l i n g 
15, Richard Whit t le , "cont ro ls on Arms s a l e s l i f t e d After 
Fai lure of Garter Policy to Reduce Flow of Weapons'/ 
Congressional Quar ter ly Weekly Report, April 10,1982, p, 798, 
16, Congressional Research Service^ changing perspectives on 
U, S, Arms i^ransfer po l icy , pp. 6-9, 
Zo 
was placed on commercial Arms Sales: Sales to non KATO 
count r ies in excess of $ 25 mill ion were required to 
occur on a government to governrrient b a s i s . President was 
requi'red to subrrTit to" members oF" c^ngre'ss^ quarterly^ 
information on arms t r a n s f e r s , U.S. mi l i t a ry ass i s t ence 
and Advisary Groups (MAAGs) in foreign countr ies were 
r e s t r i c t e d ; MAAGs were reduced in s ize and scope of 
act ion with regard to t r ans f e r s of mi l i t a ry equipment; 
and secur i ty ass i s tance was withheld from countr ies 
whose governments engage in human r i gh t s v io l a t i ons . 
The Car ter Administrat ion: 
The e l e c t i o n of Jimmy Carter in 1976 represented 
an aff i rmat ion of the congressional i n i t i a t i v e s to l i m i t 
the sa l e of U.S. Arms overseas . On May 19,1979, Pres ident 
Carter announced h i s arms Sales Pol icy, s t a t i n g tha t 
conventional arms t r ans f e r s would be viewed as an 
"exceptional foreign pol icy imple-nent, to be used only 
in ins tances where i t can be c l e a r l y demonstrated t h a t 
the t r a n s f e r con t r ibu tes to our nat ional secur i ty i n t e r e s t s " . 
The c a r t e r pol icy es tab l i shed cont ro ls on t ransfers t o 
a l l na t ions except member countr ies of NATO, Japan, 
Aus t r a l i a , and New Zealand, The controls were bi'^ding 
"unless ex t raord inary circumstance's necess i t a te a p r e s i d e n t i a l 
except ion, or where I determine t h a t countr ies fr iendly to 
26 
the United Sta tes must depend on advanced weaponary to 
o f f se t quan t i t a t i ve and other disadvantages in order to 
17 maintain a regional ba lance" , 
e a t e r ' s bas ic gu ide l ines , as expressed in h i s 
' 18 statement of May 1977, were as follows. 
* The United S ta t e s would not introduce newly 
developed advanced weapons system i n t o a region xinti l l 
they were opera t iona l ly deployed with U.S. forces . 
* The United S ta tes would not be the f i r s t suppl ie r 
to introduce in to a region newly developed, advanced 
weapons systems tha t vrould create a new or s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
higher combat c a p a b i l i t y . This was infended t o discourage 
regional ar.-ns competition based on the acqu i s i t i on of 
higher l eve l s of weapons technology, 
* The United S ta t e s would reduce the do l l a r volume 
of new commitments. For FY 1978, a c e i l i n g was s e t a t 
$ 8.4 b i l l i o n , an 8 percent decrease from f i s ca l year 1977 
in new commitments to nonexempt n a t i o n s . Excluded from the 
c e i l i n g were non-weapons r e l a t ed se rv ice such as mi l i t a ry 
cons t ruct ion and U.S. commercial arms t r a n s f e r s . 
17. "President Carter Announces Policy i>n Transfer of 
Conventional Arms", Department of State" Bu l l e t i n , 
June 15, 1977, P,625T" 
18, Ib id , 
2/ 
* Human r i g h t s within r ec ip ien t countr ies would be 
a considerat ion in future secur i ty ass i s tance programme, 
and the economic impact of arns t r ans fe r s to countr ies 
to 
receiving U.S. economic a s s i s t ance was alsoj^be taken in to 
account. 
* The United Sta te would not permit development or 
s ign i f i can t modification of advanced weapons system sole ly 
for export , 
* The United s t a t e s would not perroit co-production 
agreements for s i g n i f i c a n t weapons, equipment and major 
components \vitb th i rd c o u n t r i e s . 
* The United S ta te would not permit the t ransfer of 
U.S. weapons to t h i rd c o u n t r i e s . This s t i pu l a t i on was l a i d 
down to avoid "unnecessary b i l a t e r a l f r i c t i on cause by 
l a t e r denials '*. 
* The "burden of persuasion" for a sale rested on 
proponents, not opponents, of an arms s a l e , 
* An attempt would be made to remove the economic 
incent ives for arms s a l e s , such as lower per uni t costs 
for Defense Department procurement of s imi la r items. 
* U.S. Goveimment employees were forbidden to help 
arms- salesmen abroad without express author iza t ion from 
Washington. 
^o 
* An attempt would be made to reduce In te rna t iona l 
arms t r a f f i c through m u l t i l a t e r a l nego t i a t i ons . 
Car ter guidel ines did provide c r i t e r i a to judge 
reques t s for arms but in prac t ice arms sa l e s were not 
an "exceptional" implement of foreign pol icy , nor did 
19 the d o l l a r ceil 'ying r e su l t ed in reduced arm s a l e s . 
One of the e««nt ia l components of the c a r t e r 
admin i s t r a t i on ' s arms t r a s f e r policy was i t s i n i t i a t i v e s 
for multi lateral^ r e s t r a i n t among the major arm supp l i e r s . 
Administration o f f i c i a l s were sent to major cooperation in 
reducing arms t r a n s f e r s , includino European agreement not 
to take advantage of U.S. u n i l a t e r a l r e s t r a i n t by s e l l i n g 
the arms the United S ta te might refuse to s e l l , 
UL 
In March 1977, the Secretary of State,Cyry Vance, 
discussed conventional arms t r ans fe r s during the f i r s t 
v i s i t to Mascow. 
The United S ta tes and Soviet Union agreed to s e t 
up a b i l a t e r a l working group to address t h i s subjec t . 
In December 1977 in Washington, F i r s t session of tie 
Conventional Arms t r a n s f e r (CAT) t a lks was held . 
19. P i e r r e , The Global p o l i t i c s of Arms Sa les , pp.57-58. 
Seventeen exceptions were made to the guidel ines by 
the Carter admin is t ra t ion . See congressional Research 
Service , changing prospect ives on U.S. Arms Transfer 
Pol icy , pp.25-26, 
z 
The U. S.fe delegation explained the Carter Adminis t ra t ion 's 
policy on arms t r ans fe r s and out l ined the idea of mul t i -
l a t e r a l r e s t r a i n t . The Soviet viewed the Session as 
explora tory and Sought c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the Carter 
, . 20 po l icy . 
Five months l a t e r , in May 1978 in Hels inki , the 
second round of t a lks was held . The Soviet delegation 
agreed a t t h i s session t h a t arms t r a n s f e r s were a ser ious 
problem t h a t required fur ther d iscuss ion. They also presented 
d ra f t p o l i t i c a l - l e g a l c r i t e r i a for defining permissible and 
non permiss ible arms t r a n s f e r s . The United Sta te suggested 
mi l i t a ry and technical guidel ines for weapons exports 
s imi la r to the u n i l a t e r a l guidel ines tha t the adminis t ra t ion 
21 had adopted, united S t a t e s , in t h i s session of nego t i a t ions 
l inked CAT ta lks to the 1972 agreement of Basic Pr inc ip les 
of Relation between the United S ta tes and the Soviet Union 
and the Agreement of 1973 on the prevention of Nuclear war. 
These agreement had "sought to spe l l out ru le s necessary to 
s u s t a i n * ! and promote Cooperative Relations between the 
two iSuper powers and t o avoid s i t u a t i o n s t ha t might lead 
22 
to nuclear War", At the end of second session a j o i n t 
20. I b i d . , p.287 
21. Ib id . 
22. Barry M. Blech man, Janne E, Nolan, and Alan p l a t e , 
"pushing Arms", Foreign pol icy , no,46, spring 1982, 
p.142, 
m 
Com'unique were issued which stated that "these meetings, 
being a component of Soviet - American n^ ^^ gotiations on 
cessation of the arms race, are held in accordance with 
23 the Basic principle of Relations. 
By the end of Second session it was evident that 
substantial progress was possible, so a third round of 
talk was scheduled two month later. But there were 
differences within the government over U.S. approach 
to the negotiation. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
(ACDA) gave emphasi?^ on technical issues and wanted to 
minimise political Aspects of talks. ACDA wanted to established 
a list of weapons where transfer could be limited or prohibi-
ted, in place of dealing with foreign policy aspects of arms 
transfers. ACDA wanted that "the objectives of the talks 
would be to limit specific weapons World wide, taking into 
account the differences between various regions, rather 
than to limit all weapons transfers to individual regions 
24 
with exception for specific weapons". 
But the 8tat5 Department officials viewed foreign 
policy aspects of CAT talks/more important than the technical 
issue of arms transfers restraint. They also felt that if 
23. Ibid.,p.143. 
24. Ibid., p. 145, 
3x 
the t a l k s were to have concrete r e s u l t s , i t w i l l be 
de s i r ab l e to discuss t r an s f e r s to s p e c i f i c regions 
r^ther-thAn on con t ro l l ing t r ans fe r s of spec i f i c 
25 
weapons system world wide. U.S. o f f i c i a l hoped t h a t 
one outcome of the negot ia t ions would be a b e t t e r 
mutual understanding of Soviet and American object ives 
in the Third World as a ba s i s for r egu la t ing t h e i r 
a c t i v i t i e s in t ha t p a r t of the world. 
During the Third Session of CAT t a l k s , p res ident 
Car ter follov/ed the p o l i t i c a l approach, advosated by 
the S ta te Department, In t h i s session the U.S. delegation 
pressed, the case for d iscuss ing arms t r a n s f e r s to spec i f i c 
regions of tension and a l so atteapt*d^to s e t m i l i t a r y 
guide l ines for weapons expor t s . The USSR ©nphasized the 
need to e s t a b l i s h legal p r inc ip les governing arms t r a n s f e r s . 
Both the coun t r i e s , f i n a l l y , agreed t o establishaii' legal 
p r i n c i p l e s and technical gu ide l ines . The Soviet Union a l so 
agreed to disucss arms t r ans fe r r e s t r a i n t s for p a r t i c u l a r 
reg ions . By the end of t h i r d meeting a 3rd p a r t frame work 
was agreed upon for arm t r ans fe r r e s t r a i n t . 
Included in t h i s frame work were p o l i t i c a l l ega l 
c r i t e r a by which to judge po ten t ia l r e c i p i e n t s , rr»ilitary-
technica l c r i t e r i a l im i t i ng the export of ce r t a in weapons 
25, P i e r r e , The Global P o l i t i c s of Arms Sale , p.287. 
sys tems , and p lans f o r implementing t h e s e g u i d e l i n e s 
26 
m s p e c e f i c r e g i o n s . 
In p repa r ing f o r the fou r th round of n e g o t i a t i o n s , 
in Mexico c i t y , eheduled in December 1978, the Department 
of s t a t e proposed th rough d i p l o m a t i c channe ls t h a t the 
d i s c u s s i o n begin wi th two r e g i o n s : L^ t i n America and 
Sub-saharan Afr ica , S o v i e t Union accep t ed these p r o p o s a l s 
and sugg&sted that west Asl^ and East Asia also be 
d i s c u s s e d . This p r e s e n t e d a problem f o r American p o l i c y 
makers, because West Asia i n c l u d e s I r a n and East Asia 
i n c l u d e s South Korea and China, Some American o f f i c i a l s 
s a i d t h a t d i s c u s i n g arms t r a n s f e r r e s t r a i n t in West Asia 
might f u r t h e r xandrmine t h e a l r e a d y u n s t a b l e p e l i t i c a l 
s i t u a t i o n in I r a n , American o f f i c i a l s a l s o wanted t o make 
U. S, arms S a l e s t o South Korea a s u b j e c t for n e g o t i a t i o n s 
wi th t h e Sov i e t Union*, Some o f f i c i a l s were concealed t h a t 
such d i s c u s s i o n could i n t e r f e r e with the n e g o t i a t i o n then 
underway t o normal ize r e l a t i o n s wi th Pek ing , P r e s i d e n t 
C e r t a r , t h e r e f o r e , i n s t r u c t e d U. S, d e l e g a t i o n s t o l i m i t 
ba rgdning w i th the Sov ie t s , to L a t i n America and Sxab-saharan 
Afr ica and t o walk out of the n e g o t i a t i o n s i f o t h e r r e g i o n s 
were i n c l u d e d . 
26, Barry M, Blechman, J a n n e E , Nolan, and Alan p l a t t , 
"pushing Arms" Fore ign p o l i c y n o . 4 6 , Spring 1982, 
p , l 4 7 . 
Jv) 
But the fourth session did not end in agreement, 
only lega l and tjechnical c r i t e r i a were d i scusses . The 
CAT nego t ia t ions were over withou-'- considering regional 
i s s u e s . 
The conventional arms t rans fe rs ta lks f e l l shor t 
of t h e i r objec t ive of l imi t ing the arms sa les of the 
other major supp l ie r na t ions . Reasons for the fa i lu re 
of the CAT t a lk s were the general de t e r i o r a t i on of Soviet 
- American r e l a t i o n s a t the t ime. Uni la te ra l r e s t r a i n t 
t h a t the United S ta tes was applying to i t s arms t r a n s f e r s . 
The Sovie t s , for a l l i n t e n t s and purposes, were nego t ia t ing 
27 in a "cost free environment ", Dissention within the 
Car te r adminis t ra t ion and the r e su l t i ng indecision on 
how to approach the quest ion af m u l t i l a t e r a l r e s t r a i n t s 
on arms t r ans fe r s a l so contr ibuted to the f a i l u r e of CAT. 
The U, S, s t r a t egy seemed to f luc tua te between the forei(„gr\ 
policy approach I. advocated by the s t a t e department and 
the t echn ica l arms control approach preferred by ACDA. 
Oncd the Pres ident decided in favour of other diplomatic 
and s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s ; such as s t a b i l i t y in Iran and 
normalizat ion of r e l a t i o n s with China, the f l e x i b i l i t y 
of the American negot ia t ing s t ra tegy V6s severely l im i t ed . 
27. Michael D. Saloman, David J , Louscher, and Paul Y 
Hanm'Ond, "Lessons of the Carter Approach to Restraining 
Arms Transfers , "Survival , September/October, 1981, 
p . 2 0 3 . 
a-i 
S e v e r a l o f f i c i a l s of t h e f o r m e r C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
have p r o v i d e d t h e f o l l o w i n g r e a s o n ^ f o r f a i l u r e of CAT 
t a l k s j " I n 1978 C a r t e r made two c o n t r a d i c t o r y d e c i s i o n s : 
f i r s t ; t h a t CAT s h o u l d b e a p o l i t i c a l r a t h e r t h a n a 
t e c h n i c a l n e g o t i a t i o n : s e c o n d , t h a t t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s upon w h i c h i t wou ld imp inge were t o o 
s e n s i t i v e t o d i s c u s s w i t h t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , Thds c o n t r a d i c t i o n , 
28 
a b o v e , a l l , a s s u r e d t h e f a i l u r e of CAT", 
C a r t e r P o l i c y of u n i l a t e r a l r e s t r a i n t met w i t h mixed 
s u c c e s s . His g u i d e l i n e s d i d p r o v i d e c r i t e r i a t o J u d g e 
r e q u e s t s f o r a r s , b u t i n p r a c t i c e a rms s a l e s were n o t an 
" e x c e p t i o n a l " implement o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y , n o r d i d t h e 
d o l l a r c e i l i n g , which was d e s i g n e d t o impose q u a n t i t a t i v e 
29 
c o n t r o l , r e s u l t - ' i n a rms s a l e s . T h r e e ma jo r l a c u n a i n 
d o l l a r c e i l i n g , f i r s t t h e c e i l i n g d i d n o t a p p l y t o m i l i t a r y 
" s e r v i c e s " which i s an e s s e n t i a l p a r t of U . S . f o r e i g n m i l i t a r y 
s a l e s ; s econd commerc i a l arms e x p o r t w e r e l e f t o u t , *^ 
of c e i l i n g e n t i r e l y ; T h i r d , Arms S a l e s t o t r e a t y a l l i e s 
30 
were e x l u d e d from t h e c e i l l i n g . A c c o r d i n g t o some c r i t i c s 
d o l l a r c e i l i n g was l e a s t s u c c e s s f u l a s p e c t * of c a r t e r ' s 
Programme, which s t i m u l a t e d more d i s c u s s i o n and l e s s 
31 
c o m p r e h e n s i o n then any o t h e r p a r t o f t h e p o l i c y . 
2 8 , Blackman, N o l a n , and p l a t t " P u s h i n g Arms" , p , 148 , 
2 9 , P i ^ C i e , o p . c i t . , &p 5 7 - 6 0 . 
3 0 , I b ^ . 
3d 
I n s p i t e of s h o r t c o m i n g s , t h e ^ a r t e r p o l i c y , a s 
i m p l e m e n t e d , made t h e i n t e r n a l d e c i s i o n - making p r o c e s s 
32 
on arms s a l e s more r i g o r o u s and s y s t e m a t i c . 
Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ; 
C o n t r a r y t o pre:g^jd|ent C a r t e r ' s b i d t o c o n t r o l 
U . S . a rms s a l e s a b r o a d , t h e Reagon a d m i n i s t r a t i o n u s e s 
arms S a l e s a s key f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n s t r u m e n t . p r e s i d e n t 
R e a g o n ' s f i r s t o f f i c i a l s t a t e m e n t on t h e m a t t e r , on J u l y 8 , 
1981 u n d e r l i n e d t h e need f o r f l e x i b i l i t y i n a rms s a l e s 
and f o c u s e d on t h e use of arms s a l e s t o c o u n t e r t h e S o v i e t 
g l o b a l c h a l l a n g e . 
A c c o r d i n g t o t h e d i r e c t i v e i s s u e d b y P r e s i d e n t Reagon, 
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s mus t " n o t o n l y s t r e n g t h e n i t s own m i l i t a r y 
c a p a b i l i t i e s , b u t b e p r e p a r e d t o h e l p i t s f r i e n d s and a l l i e s 
t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e i r s t h r o u g h i h e t r a n s f e r of c o n v e n t i o n a l 
a rms and o t h e r forms of S e c u r i t y a s s i t a n c e " . The Reag<»n 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n v iews arms t r a n s f e r s a s an " e s s e n t i a l 
e l e m e n t of i t s g l o b a l d e f e n s e p o s t u r e and an i n d i s p e n s a b l e 
33 
componen t of i t s f o r e i g n p o l i c y " . 
3 2 , P i e r r e , o p . c i t . , p p . 5 9 - 6 2 , 
3 3 , " C o n v e n t i o n a l Arms T r a n s f e r P o l i c y " , D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e 
B u l l e t i n , Sep tember 1 9 8 1 , p , 5 1 . 
0 0 
The p o l i c y of Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n does n o t have 
r i g i d g u i d e l i n e s . R e q u e s t f o r U .S . arms w i l l be e v a l u a t e d 
" c a s e by c a s e " w i t h " h i g h p r i o r i t y " w i l l be g i v e n t o 
major a l l i a n c e s p a r t n e r and t o t h o s ^ c o u n t r i e s w i t h w h i c h 
34 t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a s c o o p e r a t i v e S e c u r i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
The g o a l s o f ar^.s t r a n s f e r s i n t h e Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
a r e : 
* to help to enhance defense production c a p a b i l i t i e s 
and eff ic iency of United S t a t e s , 
* to demonstrate the enduring i n t e r e s t t h a t the United 
S ta tes has in i t s f r iends and a l l i e s "and t h a t i t 
w i l l not allow them to be a t a mi l i t a ry disadvantage" 
* to help de te r aggress ion by enhancing prepardeness of 
f r iends and a l l i e s , 
* to " fos te r reg ional and in t e rna l s t a b i l i t y ^ Thus 
encouraging peaceful reso lu t ion of disputes and 
evalut ionary change 1* 
* to support e f f o r t s t h a t " fos te r the a b i l i t y of our 
forces to depl^ and operate with those of our f r iends 
and a l l i e s " , thereby s t renthening our mutual s ecu r i t y 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 
34, Pierre, pp.cit. 
a ; 
t o i n c r e a s e m i l i t a r y e f f e c t i v e n e s s by improving 
U n i t e d S t a t e s ' s a b i l i t y i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h i t s 
f r i e n d s and a l l i e s " t o p r o j e c t power i n r e s p o n s e 
t o t h r e a t posed by m u t u a l a d v e r s a r i e s " . 
The aeagon d i r e c t i v e s began b y s t a t i n g t h a t t h e 
U n i t e d S t a t e s must p u r s u e a " S o b e r , r e s p o n s i b l e , and 
b a l a n c e d a m s t r a n s f e r p o l i c y , a p o l i c y t h a t w i l l a d v a n c e 
xanited s t a t e s n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y a s s i t a n c e and t h o s e of 
i t s f r i e n d s and a l l i e s . The U n i t e d S t a t e s n o t o n l y d e p e n d s 
t h e i n t e r e s t of " f r e e v o r l d " b u t a l s o m u s t b e r e a d y t o 
s t r e n g t h e n i t s f r i e n d s and a l l i e s by t h e t r a n s f e r of 
35 
c o n v e n t i o n a l arms and o t h e r form of s e c u r i t y a s s i s t a n c e . 
Wi th r e s p e c t t o o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r r e s t r a i n t among major 
arms s u p p l i e r , t h e Reagon a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , made t h e o b s e r v a t i o n 
t h a t t h e s e had b e e n " l i t t l e o r no i n t e r e s t i n arms t r a n s f e r 
l i m i t a t i o n s m a n i f e s t e d by t h e S o v i e t Union o r t h e m a j o r i t y 
o f o t h e r a rms p r o d u c i n g n a t i o n s " I n t h e a b s e n c e of s u c h 
i n t e r e s t , "The U n i t e d S t a t e w i l l n o t j e o p a r d i z e i t s own 
s e c u r i t y n e e d s t h r o u g h a procramme of x a n i l a t e r a l r e s t r a i n t , " 
I n o r d d r t o i n c r e a s e f l e x i b i l i t y i n t h e s e l l i n g of a r m s , 
s e v e r a l i m p o r t a n t s t e p were t a k e n i n Reagqn a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 
3 5 , P i e r r e , og^ jc i t , p , 6 3 
3 6 , C o n v e n t i o n a l Arms T r a n s f e r P o l i c y , The w h i t e House , 
J u l y 9, 1 9 8 1 . 
3o 
The a p p r o v a l s f o r t h e s a l e of a rms were now coming 
t h r o u g h a day where a s i t was a v e r y cumbersome and 
37 t ime consuming p r o c e s s d u r i n g C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 
The f l e x i b i l i t y was d e s i r a b l e t o a c h i v e and enhance 
p a r t i c u l a r f o r e i g n p o l i c y g o a l s . And b e c a u s e of t h a t o n l y 
t h e " C l a r k Amendment"- wh ich p r o h i b i t s m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e 
t o t h e a n t i m e r i s t f a c t i o n s i n Angola - and t h e "Symington 
Amendment" - which p r o h i b i t s m i l i t a r y a s s i t a n c e t o t h e c o u n t r i e 
t h a t do n o t r e f r a i n from d e v e l o p i n g n u c l e a r weapons , were 
r e p e a l e d and u l t i m a t e l y p a s s e d by t h e C o n g r e s s . 
The b a s i c d i f f e r e n c e l i e s i n t h e p e r c e p t i o n of U . S . 
i n t e r e s t s and t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t arrr.s t r a n s f e r s have t o 
t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . P r e s i d e n t Reagan , a s a p p o s e d t o P r e s i d e n t 
C a r t e r ' s v i ew , d i d n o t wee arms s a l e s a s a c a u s e of p o l i t i c a l 
i n s t a b i l i t y and t h o u g h t i t a s a means t o m a i n t a i n p e a c e w i t h i n 
t h e i r c o u n t r y a s w e l l a s r e g i o n a l s t a b i l i t y . . The Reagan 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s u n d e r s t a n d i n g was t h a t t h e S o v i e t t^nion i s 
t he l a r g e s t s u p p l i e r of t h e arms t o t h e T h i r d VJorld and 
t h e r e f o r e , t h e U . S . a rms s a l e s a r e n e c e s s a r y t o c o u n t e r 
t h e S o v i e t t h r e a t , i t a l s o c o n s i d e r s a " v i t a £ , v i a b l e , 
i m a g i n a t i v e (arms) i n d u s t r y as an i n t e g r a l p a r t of U . S . 
38 d e f e n c e and for^iia.^i p o l i c y " 
3 7 . A v i a t i o n Week and S p a c e T e c h n o l o g y , J u n e 29 1981 , p . 2 9 , 
3 8 . As c i t e d i n W h i t t l e , " C o n t r o l s on Arms S a l e s " , p . 8 0 2 . 
a; j 
There are more spec i f ic diffences between the 
c a r t e r and Reagan arms sa l e s p o l i c i e s . An important 
one focus on the use of arms t rans fe r s as an instrument of 
foreign po l i cy . The Car ter policy s t a t ed t h a t anas 
t r a n s f e r s were to be an "exceptional implement of 
foreign po l i cy , " but the Reagan adminis t ra t ion views 
V7eapd)ns t r ans fe r s as "an e s s e n t i a l element of i t s global 
defense posture and indispensable component of i t s foreign 
po l i cy" . 
The two adminis t ra t ive a l so d i f fe red on co-pcoduction 
agreements. The Carter pol icy prohibi ted co-operat ion 
agreements for " s ign i f i can t weapons, equipment, and major 
components" with exceptions confined to a " l imited c lass 
of i t ems" . The Ragon policy s t a t e s t h a t reques t for 
co-production agreement w i l l be given "spec ia l s c ru t iny" , 
bu t does not p roh ib i t them. 
With, regard to the issue of human r i g h t s . The Reagon 
Administration has discouraged i t arms s a l e s pol icy in 
c o n t r a s t to C a r t e r ' s e f f o r t s "to promote and advance" 
respoects for human r i g h t s in rec<-'ipienti c o u n t r i e s , " 
The Carter policy also included a number of q u a l i t a t i v e 
c e s t r i c t a o n s on U,^. arms t r a n s f e r s . P res iden t Car ter 
Prohibi ted" the development of s i g n i f i c a n t modification 
of advanced weapons systems solely for export" ; the Reagan 
pol icy have no such p roh ib i t i ons . Car te r , however, did 
'tU 
eventua l ly allow the development of the FX f igh te r 
spec ia l ly for e x p o r t ) . Unlike Carter pol icy, the Reagan 
d i r e c t i v e s does not prohib i ted the sale or coproduction 
of newly developed advanced weapons systems u n t i l l they 
were "operat ional ly deplbyecl with the U.S. forces" . Another 
d i s - s i m i l a r i t y i s tha t the Reagan d i r e c t i v e does not bar 
the United S ta tes from being the f i r s t to introduce new or 
more advanced weapons in to a region. 
The c a r t e r adminis t ra t ion attempted t o reduce commerical 
arms sa l e s by discouraging American o f f i c i a l s abroad from 
a s s i t i n g U.S. arms saies-men. In a d i r e c t i v e popularly 
named "The Leprosy l e t t e r " , U.S. government o f f i c i a l were 
baned from helping U.S. arms manufactures abroad without 
express author iza t ion from Washington, The Reagan adminis-
t r a t i o n has taken the opposite view: U.S. o f f i c i a l s overseas 
were in s t ruc ted t o extend the same cour t e s i e s to American 
firms s e l l i n g arms as <b o ther bus iness r ep re sen ta t i ves . 
Pres ident Carter a l so attempted to remove the economic 
i n c - i t i v e s for arms s a l e s , such, as lower per un i t cos t s 
for Defence department procurement of s imi la r i tems. The 
Reagan pol icy s t a t e s t h a t arms sa l e s can "help to enhance 
United S ta tes defense production c a p a b i l i t i e s and e f f e c i -
ency". 
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Fina l ly , with regard to the issue of mu l t i l a t e r a l 
arms s a l e s r e s t r a i n t . The Garter adminis t ra t ion made an R 
e f fo r t to achieve mt i l t i l e t r a l r e s t r a i n t among other major 
arms supplier^.The Carter adminis t ra t ion a l so made u n i l a t e r a l 
r e s t r a i n t to s e t anal example for o ther arms suppliers as i t 
e 
t r i e d to i n i t i a t e multi lateral negot ia t ions on the subjec t , 
at tempts a t m u l t i l a t e r a l negot ia t ions with United Sta tes*s 
NATO a l l i e s gavo way to unsuccessful b i l a t r a l t a lks with 
the Soviet Union, In c o n t r a s t to Car ter administration* The 
Reagan adminis t ra t ion i s wi l l ing to l i s t e n to the proposals 
of o the r s , but says i t i s unwilling to Jeopardize U, S, 
i n t e r e s t s through a po l icy of Uni la te ra l r e s t r a i n t . 
CHAPTER-III 
U. S, ARMS SUPPLIES-ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
D e c i s i o n t o s e l l o r o t h e r w i s e t r a n s f e r weapons o r 
t e c h n o l o g i e s a r e most o f t e n b a s e d on m u t u a l s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s , 
and may a l s o b e d e s i g n e d - t o e f f e c t t h e w o r l d o r r e g i o n a l 
g e o - p o l i t i c a l b a l a n c e , t i p p i n g i t i n f a v o u r of t h e U n i t e d 
S t a t e s , c a r r i e d a s t e p f u r t h e r , t h e t r a n s f e r o f weapons 
o r t e c h n o l g i e s ' may be v i ewed a s a " p e n e t r a t i o n mechanism" 
t h a t a d v a n c e s American f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n t e r e s t s by t y i n g 
t h e r e c i p i e n - t s t a t e t o t h e U n i t e s s t a t e s f o r s p a r e p a r t s , 
t r a i n i n g p rog rammes , and even l o n g t e rm l o a n s , i n a d d i t i o n 
s t r a t e g i c e x p o r t s and arms s a l e s s t r e n g t h e n t h e n a t i o n a l 
economy b y i n c r e a s i n g d o m e s t i c p r o d u c t i o n , e a r i n g f o r e i g n 
e x c h a n g e and r e d u c i n g t h e xini t c o s t o f w e a p o n s s y s t e m s 
t o t h e U n i t e s s t a t e s and i t s e c u r i t y a s s i s t a n c e r e c i p i e n t s 
t h r o u g h e c o n o m i c s o f s c a l e . I n d e e d , t h e C o n g r e s s h a s 
c h a n g e d t h e f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t w i t h ' p l a c i n g a h i g h p r i o r i t y 
2 
on e x p o r t which would s t r e n g t h e n t h e economy. 
The U n i t e d S t a t e s u s e s s t r a t e g i c e x p o r t s and arms s a l e s 
a s l e v e r s t o advance t h e n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t by c o u p l i n g e x p o r t 
d e c i s i o n s t o s e c u r i t y a s s i s t a n c e and f o r e i g t j m i l i t a r y s a l e s 
1 . L a r r y M, W o r t z e l , " U . S . Technology T r a n s f e r P o l i c e s and 
t h e M o d e m a i z a t i o n of Ch inas Armed F o r c e s " , Affian Suirvey 
Vo. XXXVII, N o . 6 , J u n e 1987 . 
2 , E x p o r t A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Act o f 1979 , S e c t i o n 2 (3 ) Renewed 
«nd amended by p u b l i c Law 9 9 - 6 4 , J u l y 1 2 , 1 9 8 5 , t h e 
E x p o r t A d m i n i s t r a t i o n A c t of 1985 . 
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programs to developing and cementing r e l a t i o n s with 
other c o u n t r i e s . 
Another goal of U. S* p o l i c i e s government the 
t r ans fe r of weapons, technology, and s t r a t e g i c commodities 
i s to improve t i e s with i t s a l l i e s , pr imar i ly in North 
At lant ic Treaty organiza t ion , bu t a lso In such places 
as South Korea, by f a c i l i t a t i n g " r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , 
s t andard iza t ion , and i n t e r ope rab i l i t y (RSI) **, of 
equipment and procedures, 
U.S. arms sa les have been the subject of congress-
ional l e g i s l a t i o n begining with Mutual Secur i ty Act of 
1954, Congress e s t ab l i shed a v a r i e t y of r e s t r i c t i o n s 
and condi t ions for grant a i d . Foreign Mi l i t a ry Sales 
(iMS), and o ther secur i ty a s s i s t a n c e programme by passing 
the Foreign Assistance Act in 1961, FMS r u l e s were l a t e r 
incorporated in to the Foreign Mi l i t a ry Act of 1968. T i l l 
1976, Gommercial Sales of Mi l i t a ry equipment remained 
under the purview of the Mutual Security Act, In 1976, 
commercial sa les of m i l i t a r y equipment along with FMS, 
were made subject to the In t e rna t i ona l Securi ty Assistance 
and Arms expor t control Act (AECA), Mi l i t a ry grant a id 
"3, On RSI See Richard D, Delauer, "Armaments Co-operation 
with our A l l i e s " , Singal (October 1984)t 45, 47-8, 
Also see Jan Feldroan, "co l labora t ive production of 
Defense equipment with NATO, "The Journal of s t r a t e g i c 
s tud ies (Sep 1984), PP. 282-300. 
"ft 
and other secur i ty ass i s tance programs continue to 
be regulated by the Foreign Assistance Act. Itie 
Arms Export Control Act has been amended anually 
since 1977. 
Under the Export Administration A«t of 1979, 
now replaced by the expor t Administration Act of 1985 
(EAA) (publ ic Law 64-99, July 12, 1985)^ the pres iden t 
has the au tho r i t y to use export control for foreign 
policy or na t iona l s ecu r i ty purposes a f t e r considering 
the impact of these con t ro l s on the economy, and only 
to the ex ten t necessary to ensure t ha t an expor t makes 
no s i g n i f i c a n t cont r ibu t ion to oth^r coun t i r e s t h a t 
would prove determental to t^e na t iona l s e c u r i t y , ©le 
Department of Conunerc.e exerc i ses control over s t r a t e g i c -
commodities and technologies , bxit must consul t with the 
Department of Defense (DOD), Suspected v i o l a t i o n s of the 
EAA are inves t iga ted by the office of Export Enforcement, 
Department of Commerce, and the U.S. customs se rv ice , 
which have s t a tu to ry enforcement a u t h o r i t y . Commodities 
and technologies covered by the provis ions of the EAA 
are genera l ly referred to as "dual use technologies" -
those t h a t are primari ly intended for c i v i l use, but 
have m i l i t a r y app l i ca t ion . 
The Secre ta r i es of commerce and Defense maintain 
a l i s t of EAA-covered goods and technologies with m i l i t a r y 
a p p l i c a t i o n , which i s ca l l ed the commodity cont ro l l i s t 
-iO 
{cr.h) . The in tent of the CCL i s t o ensure t h a t no 
commodites are exported tha t might con t r ibu te to a 
country ' s mi l i t a ry c a p a b i l i t i e s in a manner t ha t i s 
4 harififul to U.S. nat ional s e c u r i t y , A p a r a l l e l l i s t 
of munitions (cal led the U.S. Munition l i s t ) , the 
export of which i s also con t ro l l ed , i s maintained by 
the Department of Defense and S t a t e . 
Both the Munitions l i s t and CCL correspond with 
sec re t l i s t developed in consu l ta t ion with U.S. a l l i e s 
and are derived from a DOD l i s t of c r i t i c a l technolgies" 
thAt would make a s i n g i f i c a n t con t r ibu t ion to the mi l i t a ry 
po t en t i a l of any coiontry or combin^ion of count r ies and 
tha t may prove determental to the s e c u r i t y of the United 
S t a t e s . * The bas ic l i s t i s c a l l ed the ••DOD Mil i ta ry 
c r i t i c a l list**, and i s often re fe r red t o as the "MCTI.**. 
The Artna Export Control led Act (ABCA) regula tes the 
export of defense a r t i c l e s and services from the United 
S t a t e s . The Act requires t h a t persons ( inc luding co|3poration) 
enganged in the export or import of defense a r t i c l e s and 
services r e g i s t e r with the S ta t e Department; and tha t such 
4 , Caspar W. Weinberger, The Technology Transfer Controlled 
Programme; A Repart to the 98th Congress, Second Session, 
U.S. Department of Defense (Pebru^yy 1984), pp .5-11, 
5, D.D. Direct ive 2042.2, ••Interftational Transfers of 
Itechnology, Goods, Serv ices , and Munit ions", January 17, 
1984, Enclosure 3, -. 83 -1 , 
4o 
exports be licensed by th^t department in consultation 
w i ^ the DOD, The AECA supersedes the authority of the 
President, 
Vl 
The Mujjltions l i s t s designates defense a r t i c l e s and 
survices cont ro l led under the AECA, The code of Federal 
Regulations enumerates the a r t i c l e s sub lec t the r e s t r i c t i o n , 
U.S. Arms exports take several forms, the major ones 
being grant aid and s a l e s for cash or c r e d i t s . The mi l i t a ry 
a s s i s t ance programi (MAP), which provides grant aid to 
o ther na t ions \inder the foreign ass i s tance Act, was the 
primary vehic le for U.S. arms t ranfers in the 1950's and 
ear ly 1960 's , Arms sa l e s have ajbsequentlv replaced grants 
as the primary arms t r a n f e r mechanism. 
By 1981, there were only four MAP r e c i p i e n t countr ies 
i . e , Spain, Portugal , P h i l i p i n e s , and Sudan, The Reagdn 
adminis t ra t ion in i t s f i s c a l year 1982 Congressional 
p resen ta t ion Document proposed that no new MAP mater ial 
programs be i n i t i a t e d unless there were exceptional 
c i r c u ^ t a n c e s . ^o remain e l i^^Mk^for grant a s s i s t ance , 
MAP r e c i p i e n t have <b agree with cer ta in condi t ions . Mo 
ass i s t ance w i l l be provided to a country tha t se i zes . 
6, ^he Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S. Code 2751 e t Seq. 
See 27778 (a) through ( c ) . 
7. Defense I n s t i t u t e of Secur i ty Assistance Management (DISAM) 
the Management of Secur i ty Assistance (Wright-patterson 
AFB, Ohiox defense I n s t i t u t e of Secur i ty ass is tance 
Management, 1981, P«24-
^ / 
n a t i o n a l i z e s , o r expropr ia tes U.S. p roper ty ; no ass i s tance 
can be provided to communist cont ro l led c o u n t r i e s ; the 
rec^ i p i e n t must permit continuous observat ion of the 
use of Tl.s-rsupplied m i l i t a r y items by r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 
of the United s t a t e s ; and the r e a i p i e n t s must r e f ra in 
from enga4[ing or preparing to engage in aggress ive 
mi l i t a ry ac t ion aga ins t the United S t a t e s o r o ther count r ies 
g 
receiving American a id . 
The most of U.^, arms t rans fe rs today c o n s i s t of 
S a l e s . Each request from foreign government for American 
arms must pass throughaj a complex jreview process t h a t can 
take from a few month to few years to complete (F igure-1) , 
All, ar-Tis sa l e s requests are irevieved by o f f i c i a l s in a t 
l e a s t two major departments of the excut ive branches. All 
sales having a value of $ 14 mil l ion or more for major 
defense equipment, $ 50 mil l ion or more for a l l o ther 
defense a r t i c l e s and seirvices, and $ 200 mi l l ion or more 
for desian and cons t ruc^on sexrvices raust be reported t o 
Congress, which has the power to Veto, 
EXECUTIVE BRANCHt Within the executive branch, numerous 
department aid agencies a r e involved in the process of 
reviewing sa les of U.S. m i l i t a ry equipment and s e r v i c e s . 
8. I b i d . , P .24-3 . 
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The main or p r inc ipa l p a r t i c i p a n t s . in the review 
process ar« the Department of Defense (DOD) , the 
Department of S t a t e , the Aims Control and Oisarmament 
Agency (ACDA), and the National Security Council (NSC) 
s t a f f . The c e n t r a l i n t e l l i g e n c e Ac^ncy (CIA), the 
Agency for In t e rna t iona l Development (Aio) , the office 
of Management and Budget (0MB) , and the Treasary and 
Commerce Department may a l so bcome involved in reviwing 
spec i f ic c a s e s . Many o f f i c a l s within each of these 
organisa t ion w i l l f requent ly pa r t i c ipa t e in the review 
proceiis. Up to twenty s ignature clearance may be required 
on a s ing le arms sa les request before Congress i s no t i f i ed 
9 , 
of a proposed s a l e . 
Each of the department and agencies involved w i l l 
have var ied I n t e r e s t s and vievpoints t h a t w i l l determine i t s 
pos i t ion on a potent lonal «a l ^ . Many concerned are 
Inev i tab ly addressed from these prospect ives in the review 
process ; for examples, the secur i ty i n t e r e s t of Ignited 
S t a t e s , I t s a l l i e s , and i t s close f r i ends ;U,S , f inanc ia l , 
commercial, and resource i n t e r e s t s ? the strengtiti of the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p be-tveen the potent lonal r e c i p i e n t and the United 
S t a t e s ; the r e c i p i e n t ' s r a t e with respec t to U,s. global 
9 , Jo.L.Husbands,"How the uni ted s t a t e s Makes Foreign 
M i l i t a r y sa le s? In Stephlne G, Nei»nan and Robert E. 
Harkavy,eds, Arms Transfers In the Modem World, 
New York: praeqer Publ i shers , 1979,p.158. 
o U 
o b j e c t i v e s ; and the importance of the s&le t o the over a l l 
b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i onsh ip and to the m i l i t a r y balance in the 
re levant region. 
Arms sa les cons i s t s o$ two typesj foreign mi l i t a ry 
sa les (PMS) and commercial s a l e s . FMS are t ransac t ion between 
governments, the U.S. government buyina items from American 
firms and t r ans fe r r ing thwn to the r e c i p i e n t government for 
cash or c r e d i t . Commercial sa les occur between American 
companies and foreign qovernments, the U.S. government e i t h e r 
approving or disapproving requests for expor ts l i c e n s e s . 
There are genarally five bas i c s teps in FMS t ransac t ions : (1) 
the request by a foreign government o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rgan iza t i 
for data on a US Mi l i t a ry item or services (2) the i n i t i a l 
review of the request by the S ta te Department, DOD, and other 
agencies followed by a decis ion to approve or deny re lease 
of the data j (3) the formal request i n i t i a t e d by the foreign 
government to purchase the equipment: (4) the formal review 
process within the executive branch and the acceptance or 
r e j ec t ion of the request : (5) Congressional review, i f 
requi red , and s a l e . In some ins tances , the foreign government 
may choose to by—pass the f i r s t two s t e p s . 
10. "paul. Y, Hammond, David J , Louscher, and Michael D, 
Sol Oman, "Controll ing U.S. Arms Transfers : The ESmerging 
System", Orb i s , Vol.23, No.2, Summer 1979, P.328. 
;]i 
Many foreign govts prefer the FMS type of sale 
for major weapons system not only because the Deoartment 
of Defense puts together a complete defense package for each 
transactions, but also because FMS provide foreigns governments 
the some legal protection as the noD in contracting agreements 
with American ccmpanles. 
Officials of foreign governments initially because 
interested in purchasing Americans Arms and military •'=iervices 
by attending air shows and weapons displays by American arms, 
by contacts with American manufactures, sales representatives, 
or U.S. military advisers, or by a study conducted by DOIX 
12 Survey, The interest in acquiring American arms may also 
reflect satisfaction with earlier.arms purchases or a desire 
to develop closer relations with the United States. 
Foreign", governments can obtain information - commonly 
referred to as classified information -, the unauthorized 
disclosure of which damage the national security, which 
includes weapons and other forms of Munitions, data and 
manufacturing techniques. 
The president established the guidlines for identifying 
and protecting such information in Executive order 12356 of 
11, DISAM, The Management of Security Assistance, PP.11-1, 
and 11-2. 
12, JO.L, Husbands, op,cit.^ P.161. 
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13 April 2, 1982 , Guidelines for the re lease of c l a s s i f i e d 
information to foreign s t a t e or organisa t ion on s e t for th 
in a National Securi ty Decision Memorandum t h a t ass ings 
the s e c r e t a r i e s of s t a t e and Defense J o i n t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
for c o n t r o l l i n g divclesure 6£ inforroation. C lass i f i ed 
information i s a nat ional a s s e s t d i sc losure of which must 
be c o n s i s t e n t with the \3,S, foreign pol icy c^ jec t ives and 
m i l i t a r y s ecu r i t y requirements and mus-t serve a sr)ecific 
diplomatic or mi l i t a ry na t ional purpose. The United Sta te 
does not disclos..-e c l a s s i f i e d information unless the 
r e c i p i e n t agrees to maintain i t s secrecy, i s judged t o 
so, and meets such the same c r i t e r a as t h a t in the AECA. 
Foreign governments can obtain information about 
American arms by submitting to the S ta te Department a l e t t e r 
of Request (LOR) for planning a review data (P&R) and or 
for p r i c e and a v a i l a b i l i t y data (P&A), P & R data c o n s i s t 
of genral information on the cos t and c a p a b i l i t y of weapons, 
p & A data provide de ta i led Information needed t o siitwnit a 
formal o f fe r to buy. 
Request for information on American arms on divided 
in to three groups; f i r s t major defense requirement ( for -
example, sh ip s , a i r c r a f t s tanks)s Second, a l l o ther defense 
13. Larry M, Wortzel, o p . c i t , p .620. 
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a r t i c l e s and some seirvices, (for example, spare parts , 
amunition and training) : and third, design and construction 
services (for example, building a i r f i e lds and other defense 
infras t ructure) . 
The decisions to release data i s carefully considered, . 
because a request for arms can be easily turned down at this 
point in the process than l a t e r when the request becomes 
formal. At th is early stage, the e l i g i b i l i t y of requesting 
nations for FMS purchases i s determined by the part icipants 
in the review process. They also see to i t that wheter 
military item or services for sale are avai lable . Itiey 
ensure that the prospective sales conforms to the policy 
guidelines of the current administration. They also take 
into account the res t r ic t ions and controls in the Arms Export 
Control Act, and other pertinent l eg i s l a t ion . 
The release of P & R and P & A data by DOD can occur 
only with s ta te Department approval af ter a review bv 
off icials in the Bureau of pol i t ico-mi l i ta rv Affairs, (P^.M,), 
the concerned regicxial bureau dLn the Department of State^ 
and ACOA, in Accordance with DOD. 
Foreigns goverments can make requests through several 
channels, d i rect ly to a U.S. Ambassadar or his po l i t i ca l 
counselors, to the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Groups 
(MAAG) in the country or to defense a t t a c h e ' s , to off ic ials 
v ) t 
in Washington, Though th^ir^embassies , or to studv 
teams and s a l e s r ep re sen ta t ives of p r iva te companiec. 
Foreign government may sometimes make d i r e c t reqiiest 
to the pres iden t or s ec re t a ry of s t a t e . 
Request for information are d i r ec ted to the s t a t e 
Department. The Bureau of p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y Affairs 
s o l i c i t s the views of The responsible o f f i ces with the 
State Deprirtment, DOD and the ACDA. i f the re i s any 
objection to the request wi th in o f f ices , the decision 
i s defeored to higher S ta te nepartment and DOD,officials 
or, in spec ia l cases , t o the white House, I f the request 
i s approved, then the data a re re leased. The issuance of 
the d a t a ; i s often perceived by p o t e n t i a l r e c ip i en t s as 
an ind ica t ion tha t the United Sta tes i s prepared to s e l l * 
If the -foreign governments .finds the data s a t i s f a c t o r y and 
decided to purchases arms through IMS, i t must siibmit a 
second reques t for a l e t t e r of offer and Acceptance (LOA) 
from the U.S. government s t a t i n g tha t the United S ta tes 
14 in mi l i t q ry to make the s a l e . The request for an LOA 
is processed through the same channels as the i n i t i a l 
request for information noted above and represents a 
formal request to purchase mi l i t a ry hardware. No LOA can 
be issued without S ta t e Department approval . The LOA i.*? 
14. JO.L. Husband, o p . c i t . p . 162, 
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wri t t en by the re levant mi l i t a ry s e rv i ce . In cases where 
equipment or services of a l l three m i l i t a r y branches are 
involved, each one p a r t i c i p a t e s in d ra f t ing the LOA, 
Request to purchasse American arms under FMS and 
commerical s a l e s from NATO coun t r i e s , Japan A u s t r i l i a , 
and New Zealand are general ly not con t rdve r s i a l because 
these coun t r i e s have been the r e c i p i e n t s of the majority of 
s a l e s , although recent years there have been except ions . 
The Sta te Department processes sa les reques t s for defense 
items and serv ices to these count r ies and a l so authorized 
such s a l e . The i n i t i a l review processes may occur within 
the s a l e s of f ices of the mi l i t a ry se rv ices and weaoons 
requests are subjected to inter—»gency review of other 
of f ices express i n t e r e s t s . 
Request from a l l o ther foreign governments can be 
con t rove r s i a l because of the country involved, the 
15 equipment recruested, or to amount of the proposed s a l e . 
Al l these fac to rs contr ibuted to controversy over the Sale 
in 1981 of Air borne Warning and Control System (AWAC3) 
a i r c r a f t and other defense items to Saudi Arabi , Request 
from these covintries usual ly recieve a more extensive 
intergency review then those in f i r s t ca tegory . 
15, JO,L, Husband, o p , c i t , p ,163. 
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Request for arms s a l e s frcxn coun t r i e s in the 
second categor ies are repor ted to PM and the office of 
In te rna t iona l Secur i ty Affa i r s in DOD; These two offices 
ac t as primary managers and coordinators of the review 
t h e i r departments, PM a l s o serves as the Coordinator of 
the intergency reviews wi th in the execut ive branch. 
The i n i t i a l reviews i s conducted by the / regional /of 
the State Departmentr Addi t ional review and analys is may 
involve ACDA, the Defense Secur i ty Assis tance Agency 
(DSAA) , s a l e s off ices wi th in the mi l i t a ry seirvices, th^ 
Defense In te l legence Agency, the CIA, the Jo in t chiefs of 
s taf f , and the office of the under s ec re t a ry of s t a t e for 
secur i ty a s s i s t ance , sc i ence , and technoloay. Each off ice 
has i t s own spec ia l i n t e r e s t s and responds accordingly. 
The d i r ec to r of the Bureau of P o l i t i c o - M i l i t a r r a f f a i r s 
ac t s on behalf of the s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e in most arms 
sa les dec is ions . More con t rove r s i a l cases are reffered to 
the seciretary of s t a t e and poss ib ly to the National 
Security counci l , (NSC), 
The Arms Transfer Manaoetent Group (AOMG) i s an 
advisory body to the s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e concerned with . i 
the pol ices and procedures for a l l conventional arms 
tranijfers. The AT>t*1Q i s cha i red by the under secretary of 
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s t a t e for secur i ty a s s i s t ance and includes represen ta t ives 
of the S t a t e ; Defense, and Treasury departments; the j o i n t 
chiefs of s ta f f : ACDA; the National Secur i ty Council, the 
Agency for In t e rna t i ona l Development; CTA; and office of 
Management and Budget. The ATMG tnay <Uc&rolne cont rovers ia l 
s l a e s . 
The NSC's Senior i n t e r departmental group (SIG) dea l ing 
with foreign pol icy Issxies advises the National Security 
Coiincil on arms s a l e s . 
Arms sa l e s recjuests rcirely generate enough controver§y 
to Warrant a meeting of the SIG and the NSC, The chairman of 
the SIG i s the deputy sec re ta ry of s t a t e , and i t s other 
members include the deputy secre tary of defense, the president* 
na t iona l secur i ty advlfles, the Chairman of the j o i n t ch ie f s 
of s ta f f , and the d i r e c t o r of cen t ra l i n t e l l i g e n c e . The 
d i r e c t o r of ACDA p a r t i c i p a t e s in SIG meetings devoted t o 
arras s a l e s i s s u e s . 
The Pres ident p a r t i c i p a t e s in the review process ohly 
for the roost con t rove r s i a l s a l e s . He may follow the reconftnd-
at ion of the NSC, the AOMG, or the sec re t a ry of s t a t e , or he 
may request a sumnary of the pos i t ions of the departments 
and agenoles before making h i s dec i s ion . 
LEGTSLATIVE BRANCH t The Congressional i n t e r e s t in arms 
sa l e s grew with the r i s e in t h e i r volume and r e f l ec t ed a 
J^ack of confidense in the executive ±>ranch's decision-making 
process . 
Al l major defense-related sa les must be reported to 
congress . Major defense equipment valued a t $ 14 mil l ion 
or over o ther defense a r t i c l e s or s e rv i ces valued a t $ 50 
mil l ion or over, and design and cons t ruc t ion se rv ices valued 
a t $ 200 mi l l ion or over a re considered major s a l e s subjec t 
to the Nelson Amendment in the Arms Export Control Act, 
That amendment permits Congress to block a major s a l e i f 
in 
i t passes a concu»-rent reso lu t ion w i t h / t h i r t y days( f i f t een 
days for NATO and other a l l i e s ) a f t e r eec ieving formal 
t 
n o t i f i c a t i o n of the intended sale from the^Executive branch. 
In p r a c t i c e . Congress recieves informal n o t i f i c a t i o n of 
proposed sa l e s twenty days in advance for coun t r i es o ther 
17 then members of NATO, Japan, and New Zealand, 
The In te rna t iona l s ecu r i ty Ass i s t an t - a i d Arms Export 
ContrtJl Act was the roost s i gn i f i c an t p iece of l e g i s l a t i o n 
deal ing with arms- Transfers since the enactment of Mutual 
Secur i ty Act, I t sought to " s h i f t the focus of U.S. arms 
16, AAdrew J , P i e r r e , 'Ae Global P o l i t i c s of Arms sa les , 
princeton«Nii;.J«» Princeton Universi ty p r e s s , 1982, 
P. 50. 
17. I b i d . 
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sa les pol icy from t h a t of s e l l i n g arms s a l e s to 
18 con t ro l l ing arms sa l e s and expor t s . 
Congress a l s o rec ieves qua r t e r ly r epor t s on a l l 
LOas for major defense equipment valued a t $ 1 mil l ion 
or more. The congress ional review may Ihe warned by the 
President i f he dec lares t h a t "an emergency e x i s t s which 
requires the proposed expor t in the na t iona l secur i ty 
19 i n t e r e s t s of the United S t a t e s . " 
The Leg i s l a t ive branch i s no t i f i ed of major arms 
sa les through the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the 
Senate Foreign Relat ions Committee, These committee may 
hold hearings on the proposed s^^le i f they conclude tha t 
such a review i s warranted. Each committee then submits 
i t s recomendation to the fu l l House or Senate Congress has 
never passed a concurrent reso lu t ion to defeat a s a l e ; The 
proposed sa le of AWACS a i r c r a f t to Saudi Arabi in 1981, 
however, did a t t r a c t considerable oppos i t ion . Although the 
House Voted to block the s a l e , the Senate approve i t by 
a Vote c2 52-48, Every adminis t ra t ion s ince the passage of 
the Nelson amendment in 1974 has quest ioned the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y 
of congress ' s power to veto a proposed sa le by concurrent 
r e so lu t i on . The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of the l e g i s l a t i v e Veto 
i s now being considered in the covurts. The supreme court 
18, U.S. Conq; Senate, Comp. on foreion Rela t ions , ISA and 
AECA of 1976, Report on S.3439, 94th Cong. €nd se s s . 
May 14, 1976, p . lO, 
19. Arms Export control Act, as amended in 1981, Sec.36 
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has agreed to review a case unrelated to arms sa les 
but the outcome may e f f ec t the power of congress to block 
20 
ar.ns Sales by concurrent r eso lu t ion . - Pas t Congressional 
opposi t ion to proposed arms sa les has usua l ly been headed 
off through compromise with the Executive branch. P res iden t 
Ford, for example, to win the approval of congress, agreed 
to s e l l immobile r a the r than mobile to Hawk miss i l e s to 
Jordan in 1975 and to l i m i t the number of Maverick mi s s i l e s . 
t o Saudi Arabi in 1976. In some cases t he execut ive branch 
has withdrawn formal n o t i f i c a t i o n of a sa le r a t h e r than 
r i s k congress ional r e j e c t i o n . 
Congress, however, cannot make U-S, po l icy on arm 
t r a n s f e r s . This i s the job of the executive branch , Congre'ss 
has given i t s e l f the r i a h t to make individual arms t r a n s f e r s 
subject to i t s d isapproval , r a ther than the r i g h t to approve 
sa l e s to foreign coun t r i e s before they are completed, 
A formal LOA i s issued to the purchasing country i f the 
proposed arms sa le survives the ^Executive and Leg i s l a t i ve 
reviews. The sa le s t i l l may not be consunmated, however, i f 
20, A three-Judge Panel of the U.S. C i r c u i t Court of Appeals 
in Washington, D.C,, ruled in January 1982 tha t the 
L e g i s l a t i v e veto was unconst i tu t ional i s a case involving 
the p r i c i n g of na tu ra l gas. The Sup^me Court has agreed 
to review a narrower , but s imi lar case involving a 
pos i t i on of immigration low. See Loura A, Kieman and 
Fred Brar-bash, "Court Declares Veto by Congress Uncons-
t i t t t i o n a l / Washington pos t , January 30, 1982, 
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too much time was e l a p r e d between t h e i n i t i a l r e q u e s t and 
f i n a l approva l o r i f r e s t r i c t i o n p l aced on t h e s a l e are 
unaccep tab le t o the pu rchas ing c o u n t r y . The s a l e i s 
complete on ly a f t e r t h e LOA has been s iqned bv U.S. 
21 
o f f i c i a l s and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the f o r e i g n government. 
The d e c i s i v e r o l e i n formalAting U.S. arms s a l e s 
p o l i c y Can on ly be under taken by the p r e s i d e n t . 
COMMERCIAL SALES i Commercial arms s a l e s , a l though take 
p l a c e between arms manufactures and f o r e i a n government, 
they a r e reviewed by t h e U.S . g o v t . The s t a t e Depar tment ' s 
o f f i c e of Munit ions Con t ro l (OMC) has p r imary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
for over see ing comroeipcial s a l e s . CMC must submit an adv i so ry 
opin ion before da ta on t h e arms o r s e r v i c e s r e q u e s t e d a 
r e l e a s e d , A e x p o r t LiC ense must be i s s u e d fo r the a c t u a l 
s a l e , i t s coun te r p a r t i n DOD, PM, and ACDA a r e involved 
i n rev iewing proposed commerical s a l e s . The Na t iona l 
Aeronau t i c s and space A d m i n i s t r a t i o n (NASA) , t h e Federa l 
Avia t ion Admin i s t r a t ion (PAA), the Department of Energy, 
and o t h e r government o f f i c e s may be n o t i f i e d i f the s a l e 
22 i s of i n t e r e s t t o them. 
2 1 , JO,L . Husbands, o p . c i t . p , 1 6 7 , 
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D^ 
The OMC w i l l disapprove a cormiercial sale 
request upon object ion by PM, the regional bureau in 
s t a t e , ACDA, o r DOD. OMC i s responsible for seeking 
a reso lu t ion of the i s sue through the same interagency 
process followed for d i spu tes over IMS. No export l i c ense 
i s issued u n t i l l a l l r e se rva t ions are removed. 
Congress musfc be n o t i f i e d ef a l l proposed conmercial 
sa les of major defense equipment worth $ 14 million or 
moire and of a l l o ther s a l e s of m i l i t a r y item and serv ices 
valued a t $ 50 mil l ion or-morei "Notification*mu^t be sent 
to Congress 'Hiirty days before the issuance of an export 
l i cence . The same procedure followed by the l e g i s l a t i v e 
branch in reviewing IMS i s followed in reviewing a 
commercial s a l e . The l i c ense i s issued only i f congress 
does not adopt a concurrent reso lu t ion wi thin t h i r t y days 
blocking the s a l e . 
A d o l l a r c e i l i n g previously ex i s t ed for cotwnerical 
s a l e ; a l l sa le above i t had to be FMS. The do l la r c e i l i n g 
was repeated in 1981, and some o f f i c i a l s have speculated 
tha t the cu r r en t mix of s a l e s (about 10J6 are com«er<Bi»l) 
wi l l , change somewhat as an increas ing nxnnber of t r ansac t ions 
become commercial s a l e s . 
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MAJOR LEGAL RESTRICTIONS! Existing legislation places 
a number of major restrictions on foreign military sales. 
It covers the types of countries eligible to purchase 
American weapons and military services, the conditions 
under which sales are made, and the types of weapons 
that can be said country-specific restriction have 
occasionally been legislated. 
Major restrictions in the Arms Export Control Act 
23 include the following: 
The President must determine that sales with strengthen 
the security of the United State and promote World peace 
before he can declare a country eligible to purchase 
American arms (Sec,3 (4) (1) ). 
* Country purchasing U,S« arms must agree not to transfer 
the arms to another country without the prior consent of the 
United States; such consent must be reported to Congress 
(Sec.3 (a) (2) and 3(b) ). 
* Arms sales are made only to enhance th° internal 
security end self-defense capability of a recipient or to 
promote regional or collective defense arrangements consistent 
with the United Nations Charter (Sec.4) . 
23. Arms Export Control Act as amended in 1981/ Sec. 36 
(b) (1) (a). 
* Export-Impart Banking financing of U.S. arms 
sa les to less-developed count r ies i s p roh ib i t ed , (sec, 32) 
* Arms sa les cannot be ma<ie to l e s s developed count r ies 
t h a t d i v e r t U.S. economic or t h e i r own resources to 
purchase arms to the ex ten t t h a t such mi l i t a ry expenditurels 
i n t e r f e re with t h e i r development (Sec ,35) . 
* Consequences for arms control must be considered when 
e'valv-ating a l l arms sa l e s (sec.42 (a) (3) ) . 
* C o n g r e s s must be a d v i s e d b e f o r e c o - p r o d u c t i o n Or l i c e n s e d 
p r o d u c t i o n a g r e e m e n t s f i n a n c e d u n d e r t h i s a c t a r e c o m p l e t e d ; 
t h e p r o b a b l e i m p a c t o f s u c h a g r e e m e n t s on employment and 
p r o d u c t i o n i n t h e U n i t e d s t a t e s m u s t b e p r o v i d e d t o C o n g r e s s 
( s e c . 42 (b) ) . 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CONTROI, ON EXPQRTt U n i t e d S t a t e s 
i s a l s o bound t h r o u g h b i l a t e r a l and m u l t i l a t e r a l a g r e e m e n t s 
t o a r e g i m e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n t r o l s on t h e e x p o r t o r 
t r a n s f e r o f t e c h n o l o g i e s , w e a p o n s ^ g o o d s , and s e r v i c e s . The 
c o o r d i n a t i n g commitee f o r M u l t i l a t e r a l E x p o r t C o n t r o l (COCOM) 
a c t s , among U n i t e d S t a t e s c l o s e s t a l l i e s , a s a c o n s u l t a t i v e 
body which c o o r d i n a t e s c o n t r o l s on e x p o r t s t o communist 
c o u n t r i e s . COCOM c o n t r o l s a r e deteimnined b y t h e U . S . , J a p a n , 
and t h e N o r t h ' A t l a n t i c T r e a t y O r g a n i z a t i o n (NATO) a l l i e s . 
0 0 
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minus I c e l a n d and S p a i n . 
COCOM m a i n t a i n s t h r e e l i s t s o f i t e m s s u b j e c t t o a g r e e d 
m u l t i l a t e r a l c o n t r o l s - t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l ( I n d u s t t i a l ) l i s t , 
t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l M u n i t i o n s L i s t , and t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Atomic Energy l i s t - p a r a l l e l i n g U ,S , d o m e s t i c c o n t r o l 
m e c h a n i s m s . A l t h o u g h t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n had b e e n r e l a t i v e l y 
i n a c t i v e , i n r e c e n t y e a r s i t h a s t u r n e d i n t o a v i a b l e 
25 
c o n t r o l mechan i sm. 
T h e r e f o r e , U n i t e d S t a t e s i s n o t f r e e t o make u n i l a t e r a l 
d e c i s i o n s , b e c a u s e of e x i s t i n g I n t e r n a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t , 
e i t h e r t o e x p o r t s t r a t e g i c goods o r t o e n t e r i n t o c o o p e r a t i v e 
a g r e e m e n t s w i t h conanunis t c o u n t r i e s w i t h o u t c o n s x i l t i n g i t s 
a l l i e s . 
2 4 . L a r r y M, W o r t z e l , A s i a n S u r v e y V o l , 2 7 , N o . 6 , o p . c i t . 
P . 6 2 0 . ~ 
2 5 . T a i b a t S . L i n d s t o r m , ""Devising F a i r a n d E f f e c t i v e 
T e c h n o l o g y E x p o r t C o n t r o l s , •• Defense Manaq<iment 
J o u r n a l ( f i r s t Q u a r t e r 1 9 8 5 ) , P . 5 
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Chapter- IV 
U.S. ARMS AID AND SUPPLIES 
U.Sj Arms Aid To the Pilrd World 
Primary goal of U.S. policy toward the Third World 
Has been and i s to maintain and strengthen regional 
s tab i l i t y ( i . e . a non-war prone condition) that encotirages 
mutually benef ic ia l p o l i t i c a l , economic and cultural 
relations between the United States and other countries, 
in real World of p o l i t i c s , foreign and domestic 
pol ic ies can not be neatly separated since each realm 
necessarily impinges on the other. This i s true for the 
United States as well as for the analler countries of the 
Third World which have received military assistance from 
Washington. 
There are several factors which make arms sales and 
other forms of weapons transfers to the Third World of 
particular concern today. These factors are :- major 
changes occuring in the structure of the international 
market in the past 100 years; Several transformation in 
supplier motivation for trading in arms, which have under-
gone, are now a mtdtifaoted se t of some what confl ict ing 
1. Debbie j , Gerner, Arms Transfers to the Third World ; 
Research on patterns, causes and e f f e c t s . International 
Interaction Vol.10, 1983, PP. 5-37. 
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themes which are d i f f i c u l t for supplier and recipient 
nationsto sort out; the uncertainity of the e f f e c t of 
these changes on the overall extemalt security and 
s t a b i l i t y of the Biird World; uncertainity of e f f ec t s 
arms transfers are having on the international characteri-
sation of the recipients nations. 
I t i s possible to identify six re la t ive ly d i s t i n c t 
phases through which the modem arms trade has passed. 
During the f i r s t phase - the Pre World War I - only 
"small amis* were sold to any nation or group which 
wanted and could e f fort them - vinknown about the possible 
e f f e c t of arms Sales. 1920s and 1930s« The inierwar years, 
present the second main period, and i s characterised by a 
s h i f t from exclusively private arms sa les to some govern-
mental involvement and by the passage of a great deal of 
l e g i s l a t i o n of l imiting the arms trade. This Set a 
foundation of control whitK s t i l l e x i s t today, through 
in greatly modified form. 
The year just before and during I I World War 
represented a major s h i f t in the natiure of the aims trade 
and contJributedthe Third phase, us. l i f t e d i t s ban on the 
sale of weapons to be l l igerantsto allow the transfer of, 
American destroyers to Great Britain. 
The passage of the 1941 l e n d - l e a s e Act made such 
t r a n s f e r s t i l l e a s i e r , and soon the U.S. was providing 
large q u a l i t y of ndl i tary hardware t o the a l l i e d na t ions , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y . Great B r i t a i n , USSR and France, The ear ly 
a s s i s t a n c e the United S ta te s t o the a l l i e d force in World 
War I I ushered in the establishnnent of a new pattern in 
the modern era , the use of arms t r a n s f e r s by one nation 
to another as an in tegra l and enduring instrument of 
Foreign p o l i c y . 
Fourth period of Arms t r a n s f e r began a f t e r the end 
of World War I I and extended through the 1950s. The major 
n a t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y the United S t a t e s and Great Br i ta in 
had huge surpluses of usable armaments and were roozre than 
w i l l i n g t o supply them to a l l i e s ^ o f t en as outr ight grants , 
Olie U.S. as part of i t s co ld war containment p o l i c y , was 
the l e a d e r during t h i s per iod , supplying, weapons not only 
t o European nation where U.S, troops were s t a t i o n e d but 
lat^jer in small amounts t o Chiang Kai-Shek»s forces in 
China, and to other nat ions in which the United S t a t e s 
percieved i t s s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t t o tite a t s t a k e . These 
inc lude , Greece and Turkey, Iran , Indonasia , the newly 
independent p h i l l i p i n e s . South A f r i c a , South Korea and 
2 Japan, 
2 , SIPRI, Tear Book 1975, 
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Fif th phase was a t r a n s i t i o n period which l a s t e d 
from around I960 u n t i l 1 the 1973 Arab-Israel War and the 
Oil ennbargo,continuing the pattern began in the l a t e 
1950s, the arms trade s h i f t e d from among the i n d u s t r i a l i z e d 
nations t o predominantly between developed and Third World 
coxaitries . This Plow of arms to Third World nat ions was 
accompanied by a movement toward the majority of t ransdct ions 
taking the form of s a l e s or co-production agreements rather 
than grants or aid« These a l s o arose a renewed concern in 
the Third World about the e f f e c t s of mi l i tar i sm on arms 
suppl iers and r e c i p i e n t s . Increased U.S. involvement in 
South East Asia accentuated these concerns, 
The g r e a t e s t changes in the arms market have occured 
i n the present phase. This period can be character i sed by 
three t r a i l s : - a tremendous upsurge in both the q u a l i t y 
and qtiantity of arms s o l d to the Thirti World, an increase 
i n the nuiA>er of nat ions wi th the c a p a b i l i t y of supplying 
weapons and the increased importance of economic fac tors 
in determining arms s a l e s . Obiviously the growth in the 
arms trade has been astronomical p a r t i c u l a r l y in the Third 
World. Roughly 75% of Major conventional weapoms traded 
now go to the Third World. Between 1977 and 1980, three 
imports were valued a t near ly $ 40 b i l l i o n (measured in 
3 
constant 1975 dollarsX. And since the recipient* nations 
3, SIPRI, Year Book 1981, p.110 
are now genera l ly customers rather than b e n e f i c i a r i e s of 
m i l i t a r y grants they have more control over what weapons 
they o b t a i n , o f ten t h i s means demanding - and rec iev ing -
modem t o p - l i n e mi l i t ary equipment r ight of f the production 
l i n e which i s v i r t u a l l y i n d e n t i c a l t o t h a t used by the 
supp l i er n a t i o n s . 
Middle Easti 
Among the Third World, the Middle East , i s the primary 
arms importing axea, with a long and a c t i v e h i s t o r y of 
t r a n s f e r s . Between 1976 and 1980, 46% of major weapons 
s e n t t o the Third World went to t h i s area . I n f a c t , the 
a 
e i g h t I t ev ie s t thirti World importing c o u n t r i e s between 
1970 and 1979, seven were Middle Eastern co i in tr ies ; Iran, 
Libya, I s r a e l , Syria , Saudi ^rabia, Iraq and Jordan. 
The united S ta te s s e l l e s nearly $ 10 b i l l i o n worth 
of major weapons system a year , and weapons s a l e s cover 
about f i v e percent of a l l U.S. expor t s . About $ 3 b i l l i o n 
worth of these arms go t o the Middle Eas t , or roughly 
one Third of a l l U.S. annual arms s a l e s . This current ly 
g ive s Ithe U.S. about a 20 percent share of d e l i v e r i e s 
5 
t o the Middle East arms market. 
4 . I b i d . 
5 . U.S. Middle Eeast Aid; Some q\jest ion. Defense and Foreign 
A f f a i r s 14 (6 ) ; June 1986, tP . 15-18, 
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This trend in U.S. market share i s s t ead i ly downwards, 
Hie U.S. had over 30% of the Middle East arms d e l i v e r i e s 
during 1977-1980, and 40% during 1973-76. Further the 
share in new aggrements i s for werse. The U.S. had a 46% 
share of a l l new agreements during 1973-76. I t had a 29% 
share during 1977-80, and only a 17% share during 1981-84.^ 
This r e f l e c t s a s t ead i ly acce l e r a t i ng Arab tendency t o 
turn to o ther arms supp l i e r s . 
This loss of market share has a number of causes bu t 
the p r inc ip le cause i s undoubtedly U.S. i n a b i l i t y to s e l l 
weapons t o Arab World because of congressional s e n s i t i v i t y 
over the po ten t i a l t h r e a t to I s r a e l , and broader Arab 
react ion to U.S. p o l i t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c ' t i e s to I s r a e l . 
I t has cos t the U.S. about $ 1.5 - 3.0 b i l l i a i annually 
7 
since 1981. 
Arms are only part of the U.S. military Sale to the 
Middle East, however, and the total volume of U-S, military 
exports includes construction, other equipment, services 
etc. These is no precise way to estimate the total amount 
of such military export, since there is a strong incentive 
not to report the sale of any goods or services that do 
not require licensing. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
get rough estimate of the value of such sales by examin^ 
6. Ibid. 
7. Ibid. 
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the re levent aspec ts of the U.S. secur i ty a s s i s t ance 
programe, and by adding the t o t a l of FMS d e l i v e r i e s , 
PMS const ruct ion d e l i v e r i e s , MAP aid , and commercial 
arms l icenses^ 
Data published by the Defense Secur i ty a s s i s t ance 
agency ind ica te t h a t EMS de l ive r i e s to the Middle East 
have recent ly averaged airound $ 4 b i l l i o n a year; Mi l i ta ry 
ass i tance progranine d e l i v e r i e s have decl ined to l e s s than 
$ 10 mil l ion a year and are not a s i g n i f i c a n t component 
of recent U.S. mi l i t a ry Sales , although t h i s i s somewhat 
misleading sa l e s t o the Middle East a l l worth about $ 6 
g 
b i l l i o n a year , or 1,6% of a l l U.S. expor t s in 1984 d o l l o r s . 
Middle E a s t ' s arms sa l e s has been the more controver-
s i a l and more cen t ra l to U.S. foreign pol icy than any o ther 
region* of the World, This region can be defined geographi-
c a l l y as s t rech ing from Morocco a t the Western t i p of North 
Africa through the cere Middle East area running from 
Egypt through the levant to the pers ian Gxilf. The core 
area of the Middle East and persian Gulf has b-:?«n among 
the most v o l a t i l e regions of the worlds during the pas t 
decade. I t has been the crucible for e t h n i c , t r i b a l 
r e l i g i o u s c leavages , , t e r r i t o r i a l d i spu t e s , i r r e d e n t i s t 
8, Ib id , 
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s t rugg le s and regional r i v a l r i e s . I t has a l so become 
c e n t r a l t o U.S. foreign and defense pol icy planning and 
v i t a l t o the i n t e r e s t s of the Western a l l i a n c e . Because 
of the Soviet Unions involvement in the region and i t s 
e f fo r t s to undermine regimes f r iendty t o the United S ta tes 
and the West, the region has a l s o become a centerpiece in 
East-west competition. 
Any considerat ion of major arms s a l e s reques ts from 
the Midd?e East gets entangled in complex foreign policy? 
defense and domestic p o l i t i c s . I t would be des i rab le of 
course t o weigh each reques t for tJ.S. m i l i t a r y ass i t ance 
or arm '^ s a l e s on purely l oca l or reg iona l grounds, but 
Soviet involvement, in th i s - region, p a r t i c u l a r l y among 
rad ica l s t a t e s makes t h i s impossible. The reg ional i ssues 
themselves a r e complex and subject t o sudden change. To 
cope with the crosscut lng i n t e r n a l , r eg iona l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
i s sue s , the United S ta tes has cons i s t en t l y pursiaed some 
bas ic foreign and defense policy ob jec t ives t h a t have 
9 Included. The following. The f i r s t in the fundamental 
comnitment to the ex is tence and secur i ty of I s r a e l . Second, 
the U.S. has sought to prevent Arab I s r a e l armed c o n f l i c t , 
not only to s a^gua rd I s r a e l but a l s o t o avoid a d i r e c t 
confrontat ion in the area with the USSR, Which would have 
9, Richard G. Lugar, U.S. Arms Sales And The Middle Eas t , 
Journa l of In t e rna t iona l Affairs 40 ( 1 ) ; Summer 1986, 
pp .23-31 . 
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global implication. Third the continued flow of Oil 
from the Middle east has been a v i ta l in teres t , which 
took on greater significance during the 1970s as the 
Wests dependence on o i l ftorn the area grew. Fourth, 
the U,S, has sought to l imi t Soviet influence and 
presence in the region because of the high geopoli t ical 
stakes. These considerations have led the U.S. to play 
a major role in the region through diplomacy, and through 
economic and military forms of ass is tance . 
As regards Iran the fai lure to think through ful ly 
the repereassions and poss ible costs of the maximum 
transfer of arms to Iran was a principal aspect of the 
debacle of U.S. policy in that country and may have 
contributed to the creation of condition that led to the 
overthrow of the shah, Iran for quite a few years was the 
largest recipient of U.S» arms and yet thete was no carefully 
foxnnulated U.S. policy on arms sales to Iran or the Persian 
Gulf s t a t e s , th i s i s revealed by the fact that for years 
the American bureaucracy was unable to agree upon an 
authoritative document on the subject. I t was widely 
xanderstood that the U.S, had a major interest in a 
pro-western and strong Iran, because of the strategic 
location of th i s resource - rich country on the underbelly 
of the USSR, and a link be-t»een the Hear East and South 
Asia, The contineous flow of o i l was v i t a l to the economies 
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of the West. ITie sale of arms to Iran, dt was understood, 
would help ensure the friendly relations upon which the 
si:^ply of o i l depended and would be a form of insurance 
against p o l i t i c a l ins tab i l i ty in the country and region 
as a whole. I t would also help to repycle the large amounts 
of petro dol lars which were paying for the o i l , 
DoLibts about the wisdom of arms sa l e s to Iran were 
viwed in the Congress and in the press, and were known 
to e x i s t in comers of tht U.S. government, but tiiey were 
not allowed to challenge the exist ing pol icy . 
The approach of the Nixon and Pord administrations 
was-^et in May 1972 when the President and Secretary of 
s tate k iss inger assured the Shah during the ir v i s i t to 
Iran that the U.S, would s e l l them Any non-nuclear weapons 
system he wanted. I t should be noted that i t was before 
the o i l c r i s i s and the onset of the r i s e in the price of 
Oi l , Ostensibly, the thinking at the time was that witii 
the Bri t i sh with drawing from the Persian Gulf, Iran was 
to become i t s new "protector". This a l so f i t in well with 
the Nijion doctrine of placing greater rel iance upon 
regional powers and their military force. When Iran's 
o i l revenues mvoltiplied, begining a year and a half 
10, U,S, Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 
U.S. Military Sales to Iran, Staff Report to the sub-
committee on Foreign Assistance, 94th Congress, 2Bd 
sess ion , July 1976, p ,41 . 
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l a t e r and leading t o the enormous arms purchases, the pol icy 
was not reviewed. 
This meant, in e f f e c t , that the U.S. was Impl ic i ty 
accept ing Iran's own percept ion of t h r e a t t o i t s s e c u r i t y . 
I t a l s o accepted Tehran's assessment of the amount and 
l e v e l of s o p h i s t i c a t i o n of the mi l i t ary weapons i t s forces^ 
would require . U n t i l l 1977 there was l i t t l e i n c l i n a t i o n 
t o sugges t r e s t r a i n t s on I ran ' s buying s p r e e , t o quest ion 
s p e c i f i c requests or t o d i s c u s s with Iranian o f f i c i a l s 
the nature of t h e i r s t r a t e g i c requirements. In h i s memories 
Kiss inger t e l l s that Nixon ordered t h a t " in the future Ira 
anian request shoxjdd not be "second-guessed" , 
In h i s l a s t years in po%#ers, where Iran was accumula-
t i n g even larger and more advanced q u a n t i t i e s of arms, he 
came to regard the U.S. a s a l e s s c e r t a i n a l l y , America 
w<as seen as so consumed by the Vietnam experience as t o 
make i t unre l iable in the long-have compet i t ion with the 
USSR, 
Arms s a l e s to Iran shot up dioring the 1970s from 
1950 to 1971, U.S. s a l e s were l i m i t e d t o a t o t a l of $ 1,2 
b i l l i o n , but during the next seven years the cumxilative 
t o t a l Juperl t o about $ 2 l b i l l i o n . For 1977 alone the 
11, Henry Kiss inger , White House Years (Bostoni L i t t l e , 
Brown and c o , , 1979) p ,1254 . 
/ ( 
12 f igure was $ 5,7 b i l l i o n , This made the American 
s a l e s programme to Iran the l a r g e s t in the world. 
About 80 F-14S and 160 F_i6S were sold t o Iran, there 
being among the most advanced of the 2)atest generation 
of American fighters. The Shah had planned to make 
Iran a reg ional super-power by the Mid 1980s, 
The b a s i c premise underlying America's almost 
unquestioning s t^port f o r the Shah of Iran was that he 
was a rock of s t a b i l i t y in a h ighly n o t a t i l e region of 
increas ing importance t o the u ,S , The s a l e of arms to 
Iran in unprecedented amounts was primarily for the 
purpose of enhancing American inf luence in that country. 
The U.S, in f a i l i n g to examine the po;?sible long term 
consequences of i t s arms s a l e s t o Iran, exh ib i ted a 
degree of i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y or shorts ightedness seldom 
matched in the p o s t war p e r i o r . 
The infltjence the t r a n s f e r of afms whs intended 
to provide was uncertain and f i n a l l y t r a n s i t o r y . Ttie 
U.S. did not make Iran a m i l i t a r y power capable of 
maintaining the s t r a t e g i c equi l ibrium in i t s part of 
13 the world. ©le b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , in which arms 
transfer played an important r o l e , created counterpressures 
12, U . S , , Department of defence . Foreign Mi l i tary Sa le s 
and M i l i t a r y Ass is tance Facts , December 1978, 
13, Andrew J , P i e r r e , The GlcA)al p o l i t i c s of Arms S a l e s , 
Pr inceton, N,J« Princeton Univers i ty Press , f«'-'»•»< 
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in Iran which made the U.S. far l e s s welcome. 
S t i l l , U.S. arms remain in I ran in l a rge q u a n t i t i e s , 
Ifechnology has outliheta the p o l i t i c a l r&latiisnship^. In 
t r a n s f e r r i n g weapons the long term r i s k s and dangers taust 
be weighed as careful ly as the ehort term b e n e f i t s and 
p r o f i t s , 
I s r a e l t I s r a e l ' s fundamental i n s e c u r i t i e s which have deep 
roo ts in the h i s to ry and experience of i t s people, hafe 
been countered by pu t t ing the emphasis on offensive forces , 
notably a i r and armous, which are designed t o d i s rup t and 
destroy an enemy quickly , and t o keep the b a t t l e a t a 
d i s t a n c e . Now, I s r a e l i s m i l i t a r i l y by for the s t ronges t 
country in the Middle ^ East , I s r a e l s s t r e n g t h i s in 
subs t an t i a l measure due t o the U.S. , which since I s r a e l ' s 
c r ea t ion , has been a major suppl ie r of economic and m i l i t a r y 
a s s i s t a n c e . In many ways America has been I s r a e l ' s sponsor 
and protec tory even though the l a t t e r r o l e has not been 
eirbodiedL in a wr i t t en guarantee. 
I s r a e l has been a f t e r the 1967 war, increas ing ly 
dependent on United S t a t e s , arms, Spec ia l ly for higher 
14 performance j e t Ai rc ra f t , The U.S. arms suppl ies t o 
I s r a e l i s accelera ted a f t e r the yon kdpper War of 1973. 
14. William B, ovandt. Influence Throxigh Arms Supply: 
The u. S."^experience in ihe Middle' faladt, &a.'T5y-grl 
R»« anem Robert L, P f a t t igrert j r . and Geoffery 
Kemp, Praeger Pi is l isher We^t view P r e s s , 1978,PP.120-130. 
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Mil i ta ry a s s i s t ance from the U.S. r i s e from 
$ 307»5 mil l ion in 1973 t o 2.48 b i l l i o n in 1974 
following the yom kipper War, and arms to $ 1.5 b i l l i o n 
in 1976 and approximately $ 1 b i l l i o n in each of the 
15 
next two yea r s . 
Despite t h i s c lose arms r e l a t i onsh ip there has been 
a longstanding difference between American and I s r a e l i 
defense planners regarding the Arab I s r a e l i mi l i t a ry 
balance in the middle e a s t and the seale of militairy 
t h r e a t to I s r a e l e . Often the U.S. has found I t s e l f 
arguing t h a t the Arab t h r e a t has been overstimated and 
decis ing t h a t the l i s t of reques ts should be pared down 
without harming Is rae l* s a b i l i t y t o win a war, A sec re t 
pentagon study in 1979 repor ted ly concluded t h a t I s r ae l 
bad enough m i l i t a r y power to repel any Arab attack,between 
them and 1984, and t h a t any increase in the t r ans fe r of 
American arms to I s r a e l beyond those already aiithoriaed 
would be d e s t a b i l i z i n g . 
Any American P re s iden t before adopting a tough stance 
towards I s r a e l would be condit ioned in h i s approach by the 
existence, of the American Jewish community and domestic 
15, P i e r r i e , o p . c i t . 
16. "11,3. confident on Israeli Arms", New York Times, 
November 18, 1979. ~ 
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p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . 
Egypt: Following the P a l e s t i n e War of 1947-49 Egypt 
sought arms from the U.S« a search that was reinforce<t 
a f t e r Nasser came to power in 1952. However, Nasser 
never rece ived the arms he f e l t he needed for the 
confrontat ion with I s r a e l , I t was t h i s f r u s t r a t i o n 
t h a t l e d t o arms accord with Mescai»r, 
Sadats o b j e c t i v e was to rely ins tead on the wes^ 
for arms,However, he rece ived very l i t t l e from the U.S. 
as the American administrat ions were r e l u c t a n t to begin 
a true arms r e l a t i o n s h i p with egypt even a f t e r the S o v i e t 
were c u t , because of tShe view that Congress, always 
s e n s i t i v e t o I s r a e l i concerns would not permit i t . Hence 
desp i t e Sadat ' s repeated reqviest only i n s i g n i f i c a n t 
"nonlethal" arms were approved by the Washington. 
Between 1976 and 1979, West Exiropean Countries were 
the l a r g e s t suppl i ers of arms to egypt . Yet i t was the 
American arms that Sadat reoZ l y wanted. The reasons were 
not merely that they might be technological l / superior in 
some c a s e s , or they might be had with more favourable 
terms. More important was t h e i r pol>it icf l symbol. 
Sadat took a major gamble in i n v i t i n g S o v i e t s and 
planning a l l confidence on the Americans, a gamble whose 
ni 
s e r i o u s n e s s and r i s k were magnified when he s igned 
the camp Oavld agreement a g a i n s t the wishes of the 
most of the other Arab S t a t e s , thereby i s o l a t i n g himsel f . 
American arm-would be a v i s i b l e proof t h a t the United 
S t a t e s had become Egypt's "partners" as he wanted i t 
i s to be in the Middle East , B'inally f o l l o w i n g the 
revo lu t ion of Iran, Sadat suggested t h a t Egypt might 
l o g i c a l l y repalce Iran as Americas surrogate in the 
Middle Eas t . Sadat was not shy about asking for U,S# 
arms. He argvted t h a t they would be used not t o a t tack 
I s r a e l , but to give Egypt "equivalent bargaining power". 
What may have appeaxred as brawado in 1978 looked 
more l i k e r e a l i t y in 1980, Aftser s ign ing of the Camp 
David accords , Egypt became an ever i n c r e a s i n g b e n e f i c i a r y 
of U.S. arms« As part of the camp David package, Egypt 
rece ived $ 1.5 b i l l i o n in m i l i t a r y c r e d i t s , in e a r l y 1980 
the c a r t e r administrat ion presented the Congress with 
Pro jec t 'Peace Vector* under which Egypt was t o rece ive 
?•!» add i t i ona l $ 1,1 b i l l i o n in m i l i t a r y c r e d i t s in the 
17 fo l lowing two f i s c a l y e a r s , ' By for the more s i g n i f i c a n t 
element of t h i s , however, was the announced i n t e n t i o n t o 
allow Cairo to purchase both the P-15 and F-16 i n the 
future , Th^s wotild "open the door* in the words of 
egypt ian minis ter of Defense, L t , . general Kamal Hasan 
17, P i e r r i e o p , c i t . 
rt^ 
All« to What was es t imated a s a needed $ 5 b i l l o n to 
18 $ lO b i l l i o n arms modeenising programme, a» the U.S. 
reportedly no longer restrict*^ the typs of weapons that 
Egypt could choose,Egypt has thus achieved systematic 
equal i ty with I s r a e l and Saudi Arabia, •nius Sadat haA 
succeded in using cooperation wi th the U.S. in the Camp 
David process t o achieve eqxial r i g h t s in the Americans 
a ens market. 
A far reaching defenee r e l a t i o n s h i p appeared to 
be in the making. The U,S, concered by developments in 
the pers lan Gulf and South West Asia, began looking 
for bases in the Middle East tha t could be used to 
pro jec t I ta m i l i l a r y power. Egypt of fered the use of 
naval f a c i l i t i e s a t Ras Banas on the Red Sea and an 
a i r base a t Cairo west t o whichU,S,Air Force vmits were 
deployed in a ro ta t iona l bas i s ,The Reagan administrat ion 
short ly a f t e r coming i n t o o f f i c e agreed t o explore the 
development of a f i v e - year plan for upgrading Egypt's 
armed force s s . 
The quest ion that t h i s caused, however WQ[S 
whether Some day the U.S. could f ind i t s e l f in a 
s i t u a t i o n comparable to i t s experience in Iran, The 
U.S. involvement in Egypt has become incr<kSlngly open 
18. I b i d . 
i^O 
ended. Yet Egypt does not have a clearly established 
method of transfering power from one leader to another. 
No one can fore t i le the future turn of Egyptian po l i t i c s 
or fereign policy. 
Saudia Arabiat Ttie U.S. has been accorded a special role 
in safegarding the Security of Saudi Arabia for over a 
quater-century. Empliciti i t has been the nat ion 's 
protector.©lis was i n i t i a l l y the nattiral concomitant of 
the arrangement with the Arabian American o i l Company 
made in 1938 for developing the countiry*s o i l production. 
To esAist the Saudi government a U.S. mil i tary training 
mission was established in 1953, ^ e next year the U,S, 
Army Corps of Engineers completed construction of a 
mili tary a i r f i e ld a t Dhabran. Since then the corps of 
Engineers has been deeply involved in superivising 
construction a c t i v i t i e s in saudia Urabia with the purpose 
of creating a mili tary, infrastructure for the nation. 
s A large part of what i s dlasif ied by the U.S, government 
as i t s foreign military sales to Saudia, approximately 
60% i s actually in the form of construction, log i s t i ca l 
19 f a c i l i t i e s and traning. 
AS the same time the U.S. has also been the largest 
Supplier of weapons in the wake of the Iranian revalation-
19. Pierre , OP. citp. 
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Secretary of Deffence Harold Brown made a t r i p t o Saudia 
in 1979 a f t e r which the U.S. agreed to s e l l add i t iona l 
miss i l e s and to cons t ruc t a $ 1,5 b i l l i o n system of 
s h e l t e r s for a r i c r a f t . And on i t s l a s t day in o f f i ce , 
the Car te r adminis t ra t ion approved another arms deal of 
$ 2 b i l l i o n in assor ted mi l i t a ry equipment & services ^, 
By the end of 1970*s Saudia Arabia had far surpassed 
I ran as the l a r g e s t peace time recepien t of U.S. arms 
( in s a l e s r a t h e r than d e l i v e r i e s ) . 
By fa r the most important & con t rove r s i a l American 
s a l e to Saudia Arabia (p r io r to the Regan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s 
proposed sa le of AwwACS) was tha t of sixtqr P-15 Eagle 
F igh te r s , which were p a r t of the Middle East "plane 
package" of 1978. ^his a a l e acqutred treamendous 
syntoolic s ign i f i cance . In Saudi minds, the recotiKnendation 
of safces by the executive branch and i ts approval by the 
Congress, (or more co r r ec t l y , the unwill ingness of the 
Congress to exercise i t s r igh t* to veto) became the 
l i tmus t e s t for the exis tence of what many perx:eiwed to 
21 be a "spec ia l r e l a t i o n sh i p" , *^or t h i s reason i t meri ts 
close examination. 
20, I b i d . 
21 , P i e r r e , Andrew j , , "Beyond the 'P lane Package'jArms 
and P o l i t i c s in the Middle East", I n t e rna t i ona l 
s e c u r i t y . 3, Winter 1978/1979,PP,138-92, 
rt J 
The Ford a d m i n i s t r a t i o n followed t h e Nixon 
D o c t r i n e ' s s t a t e d p r e f e r e n c e fo r b u i l d i n g of the 
power of f r i e n d l y s t a t e s i n impor tan t r e g i o n s so as 
t o pe rmi t a more s e l e c t i v e American wor ld wide 
engagement. "^^ Saudia wanted the l a t e s t F-15 and 
Ford a s s u r e d than t h a t t hey would have the f i g h t e r 
of t h e i r c h o i c e . 
Accord ing ly , t h e C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n came i n t o 
o f f i c e wi th i t s o p t i o n s s u b s t a n t i a l l y c i rcumvented by 
t h e pledge made t o t h e S a u d i s . A l t h o u ^ t h e p ledges 
f u l f i l m e n t would c o n t r a d i c t a t l e a s t i n s p i r i t . P r e s i d e n t 
( J a r t e r ' s new arms t r a n s f e r p o l i c y , the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
concluded a f t e r much I n t e r a a l debate t h a t the i n c r e a s i n g l y 
impor t an t S a u d i - u , S , r e l a t i o n s h i p could n o t s t and a p o l i c y 
r e v e r s a l on the F-15 and t h a t such a s t e p would a d v e r s e l y 
a f f e c t the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s enrtrging p o l i c y wi th r e s p e c t 
of t h e c r u c i a l A r a b - i s r a e l i peace n e g o t i a t i o n s . However, 
the Arms Con t ro l and Diarmament Agency opposed t h e s a l e 
on the grounds t h a t i t would l e a d o t h e r c o u n t r i e s i n t h e 
Middle B a s t t o s e a l comparable a i r c r a f t t h u s c o n t r i b u t i n g 
t o an a s c e l e r a t e d arms competion in t h e r e g i o n . Anyway t h e 
P r e s i d e n t aucceeded in conv inc ing t h e Congress t h a t the 
22 pacage would no t upsac t the m i l i t a r y b a l a n c e in the r e g i o n . 
22. P i e r r e Op. c i t . P . 212, 
rto 
A new controvercy came to the fojre in 1981 over 
the Reagan administration* s in ten t ion to s a l e the 
Saudis e x t r a fuel tanks, advanced a i r - to -A±r Sidewinder 
m i s s i l e s , and possibly bomb racks for F-15 f i g h t e r s , 
4n addi t ion to f ive AWACS Elect ronic su rve i l l ance plane 
& some a e r i a l tanker a i r c r a f t . I t was argreed t h a t i t 
was necessary becauseof the increaded i o v i e t t h r e a t t o 
the o i l f i l e d s of the Persian Gulf, Cr»tics of the s a l e 
were pr ig i iar ly concerned by the addi t ionul t h r e a t t h i s 
would p resen t to the s e c u r i t y of I s r a e l , But to see in 
favour of the sa le underscored i t s desir^bilfy' for 
paving the way fojc even t i a l ly placing i/.S, fo rces -or , 
shor t of t h a t s tockpi les of U.S. ^ u l p m e n t in Saudla to 
be used in case of aiyemergency, 
Arns & Oil have r a re ly been e x p l i c i t l y l inked I t i s 
not necessary, i t Is understood. An exception occured during 
the weak of the Senate hear ings on the ' p l ane pacakge", 
when Shaikh Ahmad Zaki Yaroani, the Saudi o i l Minis te r , 
warned t h a t a refusal to sa le the F-15 ^'ould have an 
adverse a f f ec t on the count ry ' s o i l production p61±9y 
£c i t s support for theDollar , Given tha t the Saudis were 
being asked t o pump more dLi than t h e i r revenues required , 
h i s commoBts tha t Saudi f r iendship & wi l l i ngness t o he lp 
23 the U,S, were not to be disregarded. On another , occasion 
23. "Yamani Warms o i l po l icy i s l inked t o the s a l e of F-IS" 
Washingtofc Post, May, 1978. 
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on announcement by Saudi Arab! In J\aly 1979 t h a t i t 
<ould Increase I t s o i l production by a m i l l i o n Iterrels 
a day was quickly fol lowed by an American approval of 
a $ 1.2 b i l l i o n add i t iona l arms request f o r the Saudi 
Nat ional Guard. A Link between the tvo was w i d e l y 
24 
perce ived , desp i t e o f f i c i a l d e n i a l s . 
In the Reagan Administration t o t a l "fMS a id 
request for the M«E. t o t a l e d $ 3.09 b i l l i o n i n FY 1985, 
and $ 646 b i l l i o n in FY 1986, and $ 3.635 proposed for 
FY 1987. V i r t u a l l y a l l o f these aid i s in the form of 
grant a i d t o two countr i e s" . Egypt and I s r a e l w i l l g e t 
"65% in FY 85 , 60J6 in FY 8 6 , and 8556 in FY 87". 25 
Jordan Tunis ia , and Cknan are the only o ther s i g n i f i c a n t 
recelp^itsof FHS a id in the Middle East , aa they rece ive 
only taken amounts. Morrocco has a l s o become c h a r i t y 
customer in recent y e a r s . I t i s no longer r e c e i v e s FMS 
c r e d i t s and r e l y h a v l l y on MPA grants , satoe i s the case 
26 
with Tunis ia and Y^nen. 
24, "U.S. to S e l l Saudis $ 1,2 b i l l i o n in Arms" New York 
Tiroes , Jtily 14, 1979; "Oil b«tts Get a b i g g e r Bang*" 
for the Barre l , "New York Times, J u l y 15, 1979, 
25, U.S. Middle East-Aids Some Question, Defense and 
Foreign Af fa i r s 14(6) i June 1986 PP, T5-18 . 
26, I b i d , p . 17. 
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ASlAt Asia i s the second l a r g e s t armw r e c e i p i e n t in 
the developing world. According to ACDA S t a t i s t i c s , arms 
t r a n s f e r s t o Asia between 1969 and 1978 came t o $ 3 4 , 4 , 
b i l l i o n o f which $ 18.2 b i l l i o n went to the two Vietnams, 
27 Cocnbodia, Laos and Thailand, There a r e very imporant 
arms s a l e s i s s u e s in the reg ion , the impact of Sa l e s to 
the p e o p l e ' s Republic of China and Taiwan on S o v i e t -
American and Sino-America r e l a t i o n s ; the maintanene oi 
the two Koregis, and the prevention of e s c a l a t i o n in the 
indo-pakistan arms arms race . 
South Koreat Korea has been the l a r g e s t r e c i p i e n t of 
arms, wi th the except ion of the two Vietnams, and has 
r e l i e d a lmost e x c l u s i v e l y for i t s more advanced weap>ons 
on the U, S, Prom the beg in ing of Korean War to 1970 
28 the u , s , provided more than $ 7 ,8 b i l l i o n in m i l i t a r y 
a s s i s t a n c e in the form of Govt, a id e x c e s s , defensec:9rtlc2;e^» 
fore ign m i l i t a r y s a l e s c r e d i t s and m i l i t a r y education and 
t r a i n i n g . By the end of 1978, the South Korean armed 
forces had s e n t 34,225 o f f i c e r s and men t o the U.S. for 
t r a i n i n g . In add i t ion , Seoul has b e u i f l t e d from U*S, 
t echno log ica l a s s i s t a n c e in the es tabl i shment of an 
indigenous arms noanufacturing industry . 
27, ACDA, World Mi l i t ary Expoiditure and Arras Transfer 
1969-1978, PP, 117-158. 
28, P i e r r e , Oie Global P o l i t i c s of Arms S a l e s , 
Despite the close t i e s interest in th i s security 
relationship. South Korea's relation with the U,S# have 
been for from trouble free . The authoritarian nature of 
President Park Ching Hee's government and i t s al leged 
violat ion of hixnan rights and suppression of the 
opposition, as well as the Korean internal inte l l igence 
Agency attempt to bribe U.S. Congressmen, perturlted many 
Americans, Conuaersely, South Korea could not understand 
or accept the early decis ion of the Carter Administration 
to withdraw American grand combat force from the country, 
argxaing that i t was understiraating the magnitude of mi l i taty 
threat fr^m the North, However President Reagan promised 
tiiat U«S« forces would remain dlndefinitely. 
Nevertheless, as a resu l t of the withdrawal i n i t i a t i v e 
the U«S« comnitted I t s e l f to a vast program of arms s a l e s . 
To preserve the mil itary balance on the Korean peninsula, 
the U.S. agreed in 1977 to modernize and strengthen Republic 
29 
of Korea forces with $ 2 b i l l i o n in equipment. As part of 
the "con^ensatory measure* for the U.S. withdrawls, Seoul 
was promised military sa l e s credits over a five-year 
period. In addition, s tockpi les of equipment with the U.S. 
forces in Korea were to be turned over to Korean forces. 
Here, e«S*has>4in instance of a receipient country, long 
dependent upon outside supplier, that had substantial ly 
29. Pierre, o p . c l t . 
improved i t security and i t s economic conditions-yet , 
i ron ica l ly , the "price* of that progress was a s t i l l 
greater sale of azrms to f a c i l i t a t e a partial U.S. with-
drawl, 
Wve U.S. roust ^however,carefully cal iberate i t s 
arms stiles to Seoul so as to maintain the regional 
balance of power and not allow North Korea to feel 
threatened by the p o s s i b i l i t y of South Korea launching 
as of fens ive . I f the South Korean were to become overarmed, 
i t might give pyong yong leverage over Moscow suff ic ient 
to induce Moscow to resolve the ir differences and resume 
large sca le arms shipments; th i s time of highly advanced, 
arms, A competitive arms ra<^ e on the peninsula would not 
be in the i n t e r e s t of U.S. V- South Korea or China, Thus 
co-production of arms a ircraft and missiles-which Seoul 
Wants should be approched with caution, 
Taiwan» The next largest recipient in Asia i s Taiwan, I t 
i s economically prosperious and mi l i tar i ly we11-equipped, 
Ostensively, Tairawan*s s trateg ic goals i s to attack the 
mainland and recover the l o s t terr i tory, r e a l i s t i c a x l y , 
its arms forces need only be adequate to deter or defend 
against an invasion of Taiwan. I t s armed foirce have for 
many years been generally'equipped by the U.S. with $ 5 .2 
31 b i l l i o n in grants or sa les frt>ra 1950 to the end of 1979, 
30. Pierre, o p . c i t . p,218, 
31, Ibid. 
American planners have carefu l ly r e s t r i c t e d ass i s tance 
to defensive arms, with emphasis on naval and a i r 
weapons defensive, in qunan t i t i e s more than su f f i c i en t 
to prevent an invasion or a i r a t t ack from mainland. 
The normalization of r e l a t i o n s between Beij ing 
and Washington a t the end of 1978 c r e a t e r a new p o l i t i c a l 
s i t u a t i o n for Taiwan. To a grea t e x t e n t the question of 
Americijn Arms sa les to Taiwan was an Important dimension 
of both the process of normalization and ife consequence*. » 
Bei j ing had long i n s i s t e d upon these condi t ions for normali-
za t ion t a s h i f t in fiormal diplomatic r e i a t i o n s with China 
from Talped to Bei j ing, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from 
Taiwan, and the obrogatlon of 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty 
between the U#S, and Taiwan. After s igning of the Shangal 
communique in 1972 U,S« forces on the i s l and were reduced 
32 from 10,000 to nominal 750, who were performing non 
combatant funct ions. The Cariser adminis t ra t ion was 
prepared not only to s h i f t recogni t ion from T^lped to 
Bei j ing but a l so to withdraw the remaining U,S, mi l i t a ry 
personnel and end the t r e a t y . The C a t t e r was done a f t e r 
normalizat ion by giving one years no t i ce as provided in 
the t r e a t y i t s e l f , r a the r than through abroga t ion . But 
an Impose remained since the U.S,^ i n s i s t e d t h a t i t 
would continue the sa l e of arms to Taiwan, This was 
32. I b i d . 
li ^ 
e s s e n t i a l t o avo id the appearance and r e a l i t y of 
abondonlng the Iv land, The breakthrough t h a t u l t i m a t e l y 
made p o s s i b l e the n o r m a l i z a t i o n process was the 
concess ion by B e i j i n g fso p roceed even though i t 
r ecognized t h a t t he U.S. i n t e n d e d t o con t inue supply 
of de fens ive arms t o Taiwan in t h e face of PRC o b j e c t i o n s 
Bel l in iv^enounced the u . S , s a l e of weapons t o Taiwan w h i l e 
the U.S. i t s u b s e q u e n t l y was r e v e a l e d , ag r eed n o t t o make 
any f r e s h commltinent f o r s a l e of arms fo r one y e a r u n t i l 
J e r m i n a t l o n of the t r e a t y . Meanwhile, however, t h e 
s u p p l i e s i n t h e p i p e l i n e , which came to about $ 800m 
would c o n t i n u e t o f low, and Washington made c l e a r t h a t 
new s a l e s would be made a g a i n , s t a r t i n g a t t h e end of 
33 1980 a t end of t h e n o r a t o r l x m . 
The management of t h e arms r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e 
U.S. and Taiwan h a s been and w i l l ccaitinue t o be c l o s e l y 
l i n k e d t o the e v a d u t i o n of Uni ted S t a t e s Calcx i la t ions w i t h 
aoes Be i j ingrWashing ton^s concern i s t h a t TaiwanVnot r e c e i v e 
o f f e n s i v e weapons c a p a b l e of be ing used a g a i n s t the 
mainland, y e t p a s s e s s e s adequa te arms to ensu re i t s 
s e c u r i t y . Taiwan*s i n t e r e s t s - on the o t h e r hand, a r e 
l i k e l y t o l e a d i t towards reduc ing i t s h i t h e r t o a lmos t 
complete dependence upon t h e U.S. for a rms . 
33 , "Peking Concession on Arms t o Talpefl l e d t o U.S . Accord* 
New York Times, December 17, 1978, 
J o 
SOl/TH ASIA: From the U.S. po in t of view s e c u r i t y problem 
in South As ia were p e r c i e v e d t o f a l l i n t o two c a t e g o r i e s ; 
i n t r y s i v e t h r e a t s emanat ing from acroas the s u b c o n t i n e n t 
because of Chinese and s o v i e t involvement i n the r e g i o n ; 
and c o r e t h r e a t s w i t h i n t h e subcon t inen t e s p e c i a l l y those 
34 between I n d i a and P a k i s t a n , The importance of the core 
s e c u r i t y t h r e a t s was b o t h dependent and supord ina t e t o 
the U.S. g l o b a l s t r a t e g y . 
Thus, U.S. S e c u r i t y p o l i c y in Southern Asia was 
i n i t i a l l y fo rmula ted i n t h e l a r g e r framework of a monola th ic 
communist t h r e a t t o the " f r e e word". Attempts were made i n 
the 1950s t o draw bo th I n d i a and Pak i s t an i n t o an t icommunis t 
a l l i a n c e n e t w o r k s , P a k i s t a n responded p s i t i v e l y and j o i n e d 
the 1954 SEATO and 1955 B a g h d a d ( l a t e r SENTO) defense p a c t s . 
On the o t h e r hand, I n d i a undrir Nehru r e j e c t e d t h e American 
o f f e r , which was p e r c e i v e d t o carve the world i n t o two 
armed capips. I n s t e a d , Nehru i n s i s t e d t h a t s e c u r i t y was b e s t 
ma in t a ined th rough a p o l i c y of non a l i enmen t and d e c l a r a t i o n 
35 * 
of peace fu l c o e x i s t e n c e . 
34 , Brands C a t e g o r i e s the involved S t a t e i n Southern Asia 
i n t o "core•*, " ^ e r i p h e r i a l " , and " i n t r u s i v e " members. 
The c o r e members a r e I n d i a , P a k i s t a n , and Bangladesh; 
t l ie p e r i p e h n i a l members a re S r i Lanka, Nepal , Bhutan, 
and A f g h a n i s t a n ; and t h e i n t r u s i v e roent>ers a r e t h e 
S o v i e t Union, China and the United S t a t e s , See , Wil l iam 
J , Brands , "Regional Syst^nt South A s i a " , i n RoSeno%«, 
Thompson, and Boyd, e d s , world p o l i t i c s , PP. 504-512. 
35 , For a d i s c u s s i o n . See Raju G,C, Thomas, "Non a l i gnmen t 
and I n d i a n S e c u r i t y j N e h r u ' s Ra t iona le and Legacy", 
J o u r n a l of S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s 2,2 ( S e p t , 1979) PP, 
15^171. 
:vt 
The p o s i t i v e P a k i s t a n i response enab led i t t o r e c i e v e 
some $730 m i l l i o n in o f f e n s i v e m i l i t a r y equipment which 
inc luded M-47|48 p a t t o n t a n k s , and P-a6 Sabre and P-104 
3 6 S t a r f i g h t e r combat a i r c r a f t . Another $ 1.3 b i l l i o n 
was p rov ided i n l o g i s t i c s u p p o r t systems in the form of 
comonunications equipment and t r a i n i n g programs . Subse-
q u e n t l y , the 1962 S i n o - I n d i a war b r i e f l y drew Ind ia i n t o 
the O r b i t of when the Kennedy a d m i n i s t r a t i o n provided 
I n d i a w i t h some $ 85 m i l l i o n in m i l i t a r y a i d i n t h t form 
of l i g h t mountain guns, t r a n s p o r t p l a n e s and h e l i c o p t e r s 
37 
and w i n t e r c l o t h i n g . 
S t rong o b j e c t i o n from Pak i s t an k e p t U.S. m i l i t a r y a i d 
l i m i t e d , and wi th the a u t b r e a k of the 1965,, I n d o - p a k i s t a n 
war, m i l i t a r y a i d to b o t h c o u n t r i e s was d i s c o n t i n u e d . 
Before t h e Indo-pak war of 1965, P a k i s t a n r e c e i v e d most 
of i t s arms from the U*S, under the SEATO and. CENTO 
38 deffense p a c t s to coun t e r t h e S i n o - S o v i e t Commxinist t h r e a t . 
3$ , Testimony given by Townsend Hooper p r i n c i p a l Deputy 
A s s i s t a n t Secre^fcty of Defense for I n t e r n a t i o n S e c u r i t y , 
t o the Senate Subcommittee on Near E a s t e r n and Sovrth 
Asian A f f a i r s , U.S, S e n a t e , 19th Congress , F i r s t Sess ion 
(Washington D,C,: Government p r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1967.) 
37, The f i gu re of $ 85 m i l l i o n was o b t a i n e d from w i l l l o t t 
J , Brands ; India* P a k i s t a n and Grea t B Powers, New York: 
p r a e g e r P u b l i s h e r , 1972, P , 3 2 3 , 
38 , Rajan G,C, Thomas; S e c u r i t y R e l a t i o n s h i p In Southern 
Asia : Doff«renceecln_ Jxidian. aod ;Aner ican p e r c e p t i o n , 
Asian Survey Vol . XXI (7) J u l y , 1981, PP. 689-709. 
AS a member of SEATO and CENTO, Pakistan was seen 
a s a bx:dwork of anticommxanism, A3 India in t h a t War 
received arms mainly from B r i t a i n , U.S:, and Br i t i sh 
arms then to sane extend used aga ins t each other in 
t h a t war. Hence London and Washington decided to improve 
39 on ar«s embargo on both the p a r t i c i p a n t s . This embargo 
l a s t ed u n t i l l 1975, during which time Pakistan had s t a r t e d 
developing an arms indus t ry , even though on a far more mode-
s t scale than India , I t asked the U.S.for an intermediate 
l eve l J e t - f i g h t e r - t h e Af-7, but i t s irequest were turn 
down by the Car te r admin is t ra t ion on the ground tha t i t 
would give too great an offensive capab i l i t y aga ins t 
40 India . Hie U.S. was however, recept ive to supplying a 
shor te r range a i r t^raf t . After 1976, the Symington Amendment 
to the Foreign Assis tance Act, which forbids mi l i t a ry and 
economic a s s i s t a n c e c r e d i t to count r ies bel ieved to be 
developing a nuclear weapons c a p a b i l i t y , was a l so a 
l imi t ing f ac to r . 
After the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war the bas ic antagonism 
and t h r e a t s to each o ther were percieved to defy United 
Statues mediation^ bu t unfoxtunatly t o be of minor relevance 
to problems of global s e c u r i t y , I h i s a t t i t u d e prevai l 
u n t i l l the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 when 
the importance of the region was svtostant ial ly revalued. 
39. P i e r r e , o p . c i t . p , 215 
40. Ib id . 
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S h o r t l y a f t e r the Sov i e t i nvas ion of Afghanistan^ the 
C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , p e r c i e v i n g the Russian t r o o p s 
on the b o r d e r of P a k i s t a n a s a new t h r e a t t o the r e g i o n , 
u r g e n t l y sought t o p r o v i d e , a s s i t a n c e t o P a k i s t a n , and 
prov ided $ 4 00 M i l l i o n in immediate economic and 
41 42 
m i l i t a r y a i d . And wi th more t o come. At the same 
t ime C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a l s o sought t h e c o o p e r a t i o n 
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and u n d e r s t a n d i n g from I n d i a , 
A new page was t u r n e d , however, a f t e r t h e Regan 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , came i n t o o f f i c e . Whereas the C a r t e r 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n had l i m i t e d i t s m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e o f f e r 
t o " d e f e n s i v e " arms P a k i s t a n was nc3W o f f e r e d a l a r g e f i v e 
44 y e a r package wor th $ 3 b i l l i o n t h a t i nc luded the F-16, 
a s a l e t h a t h a v e pre l r ious ly been r e f u s e d . Even the U.S, 
A i r f o r c e had r e s e r v a t i o n a b o u t the F-16 , However, p o l i t i c a l 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s appear t o have been peramount, a s the Re«gan 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n gave p r i o r i t y t o c o u n t e r i n g the Sov io t 
t h r e a t emana t ing from t h e Hindu Kush & Indus Val ley In 
Afghan i s t an , 
41» Asian Survey, op . c i t , , PP.689-709, 
4 2 , P i e r r e , Op. c i t . , P . 2 1 7 , 
4 3 , See New York Times, J a n u a r y 1 and 6, 1980; and Times of 
I n d i a , J anua ry 8, 1980, P r e s i d e n t Z i au l Hague, who c a l l e d 
t h i s o f f e r "peanun ts" Subsequently r e j e c t e d -die o f f e r on 
t h e grounds t h a t i t would only i n v i t e t h e h o s t a l i t y of 
S o v i o t union w i t h o u t bx ing ing P a k i s t a n much s e c u r i t y . 
44 , P i e r r e , Op, c i t . , P , 2 1 8 . 
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Apart from these ca se s , there were specia l and 
occasional U.S. i n t e r e s t in Pakistan because of i t s 
l inks with the Islamic World and close t i e s with China. 
These connections have ca r i ed some benef i t s to the United 
S t a t e s . Pak i s t an ' s t i e s with Chaina, for ins tance , provided 
Secretary of S t a t e Kdssinger and pres ident Nixon the 
Diplomatic channel to Be i j ing in 1971-19 72. 
Isladaic revival ism and growing s o l i d a r i t y between 
Pakistan and some of the o i l - r i c h s t a t e s of the Middle 
East, the f a l l of the Shah and the general f a i lu re of 
U.S. in I ran , and the Sovie t invasion of Afghanistan have 
a l l suddenly increased the importance of the subcontinent , 
and e spec i a l l y Pakis tan , In theca lcules of U.S. global 
s t ra tegy to counter Sovie t move in the region. 
The Caret«r admin is t ra t ion i n i t i a l l y percleved the 
invasion as the prea:ude t o a wider Soviet design in South 
West Asia, a b e l i e f t h a t i s more firmely held by the Reagan 
adminis tea t ion. According to some U.S. assesments, Soviet 
backing of the Balauchi S e p a r a t i s t movement would bring 
i t within the reach of the India Ocean through Afghanistan, 
while the continued subjugat ion of Afganistan would 
f a c i l i t a t e a Soviet m i l i t a r y th rus t towards the o i l f i e l d s of 
the Persian ^ulf^^. 
45, See various assesments by Drew Middleton, Richard Burt, 
Bernard Gwertjanan, Terrence Smith, and Eric Pace, in 
Thp New York ^iroea, ^ecentoer 20,23, and 27, 1979, J a n , 9 , 
i i ,2 '4 , and ?? , 1980, and Febnuary 2 , 1980. 
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Gorbachev 's i n i t i a t i v e has r e s u l t e d in the 
wi thdrawl of Sov ie t t r o o p s from Afghan i s t an , a^at the 
U.S. i n t e r e s t in P a k i s t a n w i l l con t inue t o p e r s i s t , 
because of P a k i s t a n i s l i n k wi th Saudi Arabia and o t h e r 
i m p o r t a n t U.S. f r i e n d s in the Arabian peninsx:ila w i th 
10,000 t r o o p s in Saudi Arabia and S e i z a b l e con t i nqens 
46 i n Kuwait , Oman and t h e UAE, Pak i s t an makes an 
impor tance c o n t r i b u t i o n t o m i l i t a r y p r e p e r d n e s s in a l l 
of those c o u n t r i e s and a l s o t o i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y i n 
Saudi A r a b i a . Al thou t P a k i s t a n p u b l i c l y t a k e s the 
o p p o s i t i o n t h a t i t i s pppesed t o the m i l i t a r y p r e s e n s e 
of bo th super powers i n t h e ^u l f and t h e r e i s , t h e r e f o r e , 
no q u e s t i o n of a s t r a t e g i c consensus w i th t h e United 
47 S t a t e s i n t h a t r e g i o n . 
I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , indkl i ted t h a t d e a l i n g w i t h 
P a k i s t a n ' s i n s e c u r i t i e s by s e l l i n g c o n v e n t i o n a l weapons 
& r e e s t a b l i s h i n g a r e l a t i o n s h i p of conf idence was t h e 
b e s t way i n t h e long run , t o r e s t r a i n I s l a m a b a d ' s n u c l e a r 
a m b i t i o n s , and fo r t h e f u l f i l l m e n t of U.S. i n t e r e s t i n 
that r e g i o n . 
4 6, I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e of S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s , ^ l e 
M i l i t a r y Ba lance ,1986-87 . London, 1986, 
47 , See then fo re ign M i n i s t e r Agha S h a i ' s speech t o news-
pape r e d i t o r s i n Lahore , June 30, 1981, reproduced i n 
R.K. J a i n , e d . , U .S . South Asian B e l a t i o n s , 1 9 4 7 - 1 9 8 2 , 
Vol , 2 (New De lh i : Radiant Pi±>l ishers , 1983) , 
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LATIN AMERICAt P r i o r t o t h e mid 1960 's the U.S. 
dominated t h e arms s a l e s marke t i n Lain America, b u t 
now t h e d i v e r s i t y of s u p p l i e r i s g r e a t e r t h e r e . Now 
the West European c o n t i n u e d t o s e l l twice as much a s 
48 the U.S. t o L a t i n American c o u n t r i e s . 
Under t h e C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n human r i g h t s were 
the prime c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n U , S , d e c i s i o n s on arms s a l e s 
t o L a t i n America & t h i s accour^ts fo r the 14iw l e v e l of 
t r a n s f e r s . A number of r e s t r i c t i o n s i n i t i a t e d by the 
l i b e r a l Democrats , were mandated by the Congress p r i o r 
t o the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , i n r e a c t i o n , to the p r e v i o u s 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o n t i n u i n g c l o s e t i e s w i th some of the 
most r e p r e s s i v e regimes i n South America, But i t was 
p r e s i d e n t C a r t e r who b r o u ^ ^ t t h e human r i g h t i s a u e t o 
the f o r e , h e r e a s e l s e w h e r e , A s t a t e depar tment r e p o r t 
in t h e s p r i n g of 1977, c r i t i c a l of t h e human r i g h t s i n 
B r a g i l s bed t h e coun t ry t o suspend a l o n g s t a n d i n g m i l i t a r y 
a s s i s t a n c e agreement and r r e j e c t $ 50 milkion in c r e d i t s 
for arms (due t o be c o n c e l l e d i n any c a s e ) , With accompaning 
c r i t i c i s m s of U.S, mora l i z ing and i n t e r f e r e n c e in Domestic 
A f f a i r s , S i m i l a r r e sponses came from Argen t ina , C h i l e , 
urg«ttoy. El Sa lvador Guatemala , Under e x i s t i n g l e g i s l a t i o n . 
4 8 , ACDA, World M i l i t a r y Expend i tu re s and Arms T r a n s f e r s , 
1969-1978, P ,162 . 
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a s f o r c e f u l l y i n t e r p r e t e d by the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 
these c o u n t e r e d were no l o n g e r e l i g i b l e t o r ec i eve U.S 
arms. Very s p e c i f i c p r o h i b i t i o n s were a l s o enac ted by 
49 the Congress w i t h r e g a r d t o Argent ina and Ch i l e , 
In L a t i n America i t has been the development of 
i n f l uence and good r e l a t i o n s wi th the count ry , r a t h e r 
than s e c u r i t y c o n c e r n s , t h a t has been the t r a d i t i o n a l 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n fo r U.S. arms t r a n s f e r s . M i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e 
programmes have been seen a s an e f f e c t i v e way of 
• a i n t a i n l n f p r o f e s s i o n a l c o n t a c t s and a c c e s s to 
Impor tan t e l i t e s , ^OSie new American p o l i c y ob iv ious ly 
angered and a l i e n a t e d the t a r g e t s c o u n t r i e s . I t was seen 
by many c o n s e r v a t i v e s c o u n t r i e s no t only a s an a c t of 
fore ign i n t e r f e r e n c e in t h e i r i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s b u t a l s o 
as an a f f r o n t t o t h e i r n a t i w i - s d i g n i t y , d i s was s p e c i a l l y 
trxae of the m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s , who c o n s i d e r themselves 
n a t u r a l f r i e n d s of t h e U.S . And more than one American 
Ambassador i n t h e f i e l d p r i v a t e l y Bemoaned the l o s s of i 
arms s a l e s a s an i n s t r u m e n t of i n f luence and l e v e r a g e , 
Washington can be f a u l t e d fo r i n c o n s i s t e n c y in 
app ly ing the human r i g h t s s t a n d a r d . L a t i n American c o u n t r i e s 
49, U,S, Congre s s , House, Committee on I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
ftelations. Arms t r a d e i n the Western Hemisphere 
Hear ings be fo r e the Subcommittee on In ter -American 
A f f a i r s , 95th Congress , 2nd s e s s i o n . , Jxine-Aug, 
1978, P P . 3 - 4 , 
50. See John Samxiel F i t c h , "The P o l i t i c a l Impact of U.S. 
M i l i t a r y Aid t o L a t i n Americai' Armed fo rces and S o c i e t y 
(Spr ing 1979) PP, 360-386, 
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has been deprived of the opportunity to purchase arms, 
but other countries with regrettable prac t ices , such as 
South Korea, Iran tinder Shah and Phi l l i^ ines , have not 
had similar d i f f i cu l t i e s . This may well be perfectly 
j u s t i f i ab l e , given the broader p o l i t i c a l , economic and 
security considerations that affect U.S. policy towards 
those countries, but i t i s nonetheless true that Latin " 
America thereby tends to become the repository for 
ideals tha t cannot be carried elsewhere. The "big st ick" 
approach of human r ights has been applied far more to 
Latin America than to any other region thus creating 
understandable resentment. 
The Reagan administration as i t came into office 
approach Latin America from a different perspective. The 
primary concern was hemispheric security and the competition 
for influence with the USSR rather than human r ights or 
economic development, A new strategic importance was given 
to the Atlantic coast of South America. This would' require 
closure cooperation with the military of those two 
countries to stregthen naval and a i r control of the South 
Atlantic Sea lanes. Another percieved th rea t which was 
given great weight was Soviet-Cuba sponsored expantiondst 
and subversive ac t i v i t i e s in Central America and the 
Caribbean, 
Given these p r i o r i t i e s , t h e approach towards arms 
s a l e s and c o n t a c t s wi th L a t i n American m i l i t a r y regimes 
was c o n s i d e r a b l y d i f f e r e n t than t h a t i n t h e C a r t e r 
y e a r s , Washington now sough t t o improve r e l a t i o n s wi th 
t he se r e g i m e s , Hie Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n asked the Cong-
r e s s t o l i f t t h e errisargoes which had s e e n a p p l i e d t o a 
member of L a t i n American n a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g Argent ina , 
Ch i l e , and Guatemala. As o f f i c i a l s t u rned t o the need fo r 
hemispher i c defense p l a n n i n g , t he p a s t r e s t r i « t i o n s in weapons 
t r a n s f e r s seemed l i k e an anachronism, 
U.S, ARMS AID TO ALLIES 
J u s t a f t e r the World War I I , when s e c u r i t y a s s i s t a n c e 
Programe s t a r t e d , U.S, po l i cymakers viewed s e c u r i t y a s s i s t a n c e 
a s a impor t an t and f l e x i b l e i n s t r u m e n t f o r t h e p u r s u i t of U,S, 
fo re ign and defense p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s . I t has been used t o 
h e l p f r i e n d l y and a l l i e d n a t i o n s a c q u i r e and main ta in the 
c a p a b i l i t y t o defend t h e m s e l v e s , s e r v i n g b o t h s p e c i f i c U.S, 
n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s and c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y of t h e fo rce 
wor ld . I t has been used t o demons t ra te t a n g i b l e U,S. s u p p o r t 
for n a t i o n s whose defense wad deemed v i t a l t o U,S. s e c u r i t y . 
S e c u r i t y a s s i s t a n c e has a l s o been used t o supplement economic 
a i d when U,S. pol icymakers judged t h a t a coun t ry backed t h e 
5 1 , Richard F, Grimmet, "The Role of S e c u r i t y Ass i s t ance in 
H i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e . In E r n e s t Graves ,S teven A, 
H ide r th e d s . U.S, s e c u r i t y of a s s i s t a n c e : The P o l i t i c a l 
P r o c e s s , Lexington Book, 1985, P . 2 , 
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means to provide for i t s own defense, or tha t dimension 
of i t s resources from economics development to defense 
spending would prove counter product ive. I t has a l so been 
"employed in conjuction with a conmitnient t o use U,S# mi l i t a ry 
power i f need be t o de t e r regional c o n f l i c t or to keep such 
c o n f l i c t a t the lowest poss ib le l eve l when i t occured. 
To understand the ro le played by the secur i ty a s s i s t ance 
program in U.S. foreign po l i cy . I t i s necessary to examine 
the o r ig in of the concept of co l l ec t ive seciority in the 
period immediately a f t e r World War I I and the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
of t h a t concept to s e c u r i t y a s s i s t ance . 
The concept of c o l l e c t i v e secur i ty in the port World 
War I I per iod had i t s o r i g i n in the sha t te red hopes for 
a l a s t i n g i reconci l la t ion between conmunist and non communist 
Worlds, I f a l so stenmed from the "lessons'* leaimed from 
World Wars I and I I , That "preemptive" a l l i a n c e s could 
de ter c o n f l i c t and tha t to r e f r a in from enter ing i n t o 
a l l i a n c e s u n t i l l c o n f l i c t had begun increased the r i s k 
of War, United Nations had not f u l f i l l e d the expecta t ions 
of i t s founders to serve as a major bulwork of i n t e rna t i ona l 
order . The Soviet union began to exp lo i t the economic and 
p o l i t i c a l d i s loca t ion in SjarojMS.. and A94A.(aftos^d by- t l ^ W a r 
to advance i t s own foreign pol icy ends, which, were c l e a r l y 
a t variance with those of United S t a t e s . 
The f i r s t phase in the Soviet Union's expansion of 
i t s power in Eastern Europe was the consol ida t ion of i t s 
e f fec t ive au thor i ty in such count r ies as Hundary, Poland, 
Romania and Bulgaria. With Soviet t roops already in these 
count r ies i t was easy to c r e a t puppest governments sub-
se rv ien t to Moscow, In 1946 and 194 7 the Soviet Union 
attempted to press i t s i n t e r e s t s in the Mediterranian 
52 
and Near East through a s e r i e s of th rea ten ing ac t ions . 
In e a r l y 1948 the USSR i n i t i a l l y refused to withdraw i t s 
troops from I ran , haping to maintain a presence in t h a t 
s t r a t e g i c a l l y located s t a t e . The strong response of the 
United S ta tes and Great B r i t a i n indica ted t h a t they were 
prepared to use force to p ro t ec t I ran and led the Soviets 
to withdraw t h e i r forces . 
In August 1946 the Soviets demanded t h a t Turkey rev ise 
the 1936 Montreux convention governing passage through the 
Turkish s t r a i t j ^ in to the Aegean from the Black sea. Acquies-
cence to t h i s demand would have given t h e Russians domination 
over Turkey as well a6 adminis t ra t ive Control of Turkey s trai«ts 
The United Sta tes responded t o t h i s Soviet demand by sending 
a naval task force to the Mediterranean, Two weeks l a t e r the 
United S ta tes re jected the Soviet demand. In the face of 
t h i s firm Opposition, the Soviets backed off from t h e i r 
i n i t i a t i v e . 
52. Ib id , p .3 
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In February 194 7 the Br i t i sh infcrmed the United 
Sta tes t h a t they could no longer be responsible for the 
burden of p ro tec t ing Greece from ongoing communist 
gue r i l l a a t t acks or for general m i l i t a r y and economic 
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support of e i t h e r Greece or Turkey, At the time Greece 
was in ser ious d i f f i c u l t y and on the verge of economic and 
mi l i t a ry c o l l a p s e . I t seemed evident t h a t should Greece 
f a l l to communist subversion, the pos i t ion of the free 
would throughout the Mediteranean, near East and Europe 
would be gravely threatned. 
The response of U«S« policymakers to t h i s oamulative 
evidence of Soviet expans ion is t s in tens ions was t o seize 
the immediate c r i s i s in Greece to launch bold new pol icy 
i n i t i a t i v e s . The aim of these i n i t i a t i v e s was to r e s to re 
p o l i t i c a l and economic s t a b i l i t y to they regions of the 
world, e s p e c i a l l y Europe which could h a l t the p o t e n t i a l 
for Soviet domination of theiji. The f i r s t of these i n i t i a t i v e s 
was pres iden t Harry Truman's request for $ 400 mil l ion for 
a program of mi l i t a ry and economic ass i s t ance for Greece 
and Turkey, 
On March 12, 1947, Pres ident Truman, regarding h i s 
aid request for Greece and Turkey Stated t h a t " I t must be 
53. Harold, A, Hovey; "United S ta tes Mi l i t a ry Assistance: 
A Study of p o l i c i e s and prac t iced , praeger . New York, 
1965, p , 4 . 
] i ) 
the pol icy of United Sta tes to support free peoples 
who are r e s i s t i n g attempted subjugation by armed 
54 minor i t i e s o r by outside pressure" , pres ident Trriman 
argued t h a t i f the United Sta tes fa i led to support the 
cause of the free peoples of the World, i t would very 
l i k e l y endanger world peace and the welfare of the 
United S t a t e s . 
The Pres iden t speech became the corners tone , I t o a l s o 
was the begin lng of a policy of active^containment** of the 
Soviet Union, This policy in the broader sense, envisaged 
r e s i s t ance t o the expansion of Soviet influence and power, 
using whatever means were necessary whenever such an 
expansion threatened tt undermine the independence of 
non communist nat ions of the wor ld ,e i ther through d i r e c t 
aggression or i n t e rna l subversion. In p r a c t i c e , the pol icy 
of containment led to the establishment of severa l U.S. 
s ecu r i t y a s s i s t ance programs and, u l t imate ly , to a s e r i e s 
of mutual defense pacts to give i t force and e f f e c t as 
the percep t ion of d i r e c t Soviet mi l i t a ry t h r e a t to the 
West inc reased . 
Immediately following passage of the Greek-Turkish 
aid program in May 194 7, the Truman adminis t ra t ion began efforts 
to provide massive economic ass is tance to much of War-torr 
54. I b i d , , p , 5 . 
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European c o u n t r i e s , George C, M a r s h a l l , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , 
s e t f o r t h t h e p lan d u r i n g a speech a t Harimrd Un ive r s i t y 
on June 5, 1947, Re o u t l i n e d the a i d program a s an e f f o r t 
t o rev ive g l o b a l economy "so a s to pe rmi t t he emergence 
of p o l i t i c a l and S o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s i n which f ree i n s t i t u t i o n 
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can e x i s t " 
The economic impact of World War I I on Europe was 
profound. I n d u s t r i a l c e n t r e s had been d e s t r o y e d , vmemployment 
was h i g h , and g e n e r a l l i v i n g s t a n d a r d s had been reduced 
n o t a b l y , making Europe v u l n e r a b l e t o communist subvers ion 
and i n f i l t r a t i o n , U.S. po l i cy -make r s saw t h e r e j u v e n a t i o n 
of Europe ' s economy a s v i t a l t o U*S*national s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t 
Although the c a i c e p t of d i r e c t economic a s s i s t a n c e t o fo r e ign 
governments had been h i s t o r i c a l l y unpopular in the Unitaed 
S t a t e s« t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s passed such a c l e a r t h r e a t t o 
U.S . S e c u r i t y a s s i s t a n c e t h a t Truman a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f f i c i a l s 
and t h e i r a l l i e s i n Congress argued t h a t a depa r tu r e from 
prev ious p r a c t i c e s was w a r r a n t e d . 
The Trxoman a d m i n i s t r a t i o n soon concluded t h a t 
economic a s s i s t a n c e by i t s e l f woxild n o t be s u ^ ^ i c i e n t t o 
f o r e s t a l l S o v i e t expans ions im i n Eurxjpe^ •forEuropean n a t i o n s 
d id not a l s o have a c r e d i b l e m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y t o r e s i s t i t . 
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Thus, i n March 1948, w i t h t h e United S t a t e • » 
encouragements , t he United Kingdom, Prance and the 
Benelux c o u n t r i e s s igned a t r e a t y of c o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t y 
t h a t came t o known as t h e B r u s s e l s P a c t , 
A sena te r e s o l u t i o n , fo r the purpose of U.S. 
e s s o c i a t i o n w i th such r e g i o n a l and o t h e r c o l l e c t i v e 
arrangements and s u p p o r t i n t h e i r development for " i n d i v i d u a l 
and c o l l e c t i v e s e l f d e f e n a e " , was i n t r o d u c e d , in the 
Spring o^ 1948, by* the Chairman of the Senate committee 
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on Foreign R e l a t i o n s , 
This r e s o l u t i o n was unaniuously agreed t o by the 
committee- on May 19, 1948, and passed}^the Senate on June 1 1 , 
The Vanderberg R e s o l u t i o n p layed a key r o l e in ' 
developing U.S . commitment t o p a r t i c i p a t e in a European 
c a l l e c t i v e defenoe system and i t was t h e b a s i s fo r U.S. 
a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h Eurd>pe i n the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the North 
A t l a n t i c Trea ty O r g a n i z a t i o n (NATO) in 1949, 
An impor t an t Impetus fo r c l o s e r a s s o s i c i a t i o n between 
Europe a nd the Uni ted S t a t e s i n defense was the S o v i e t 
blockade of B e r l i n t h a t began i n June 1948, In response 
t o the B e r l i n b lockade , t he Uni ted S t a t e s organized a 
massive a i r l i f t t o p rov ide necessa ry s u p p l i e s t o the c i t i z e n s 
56. Rober t osGood, , A l l i a n c e s and Amercian fo re ign P o l i c y , 
The Johns Hopkings P r e s s , Ba t t imore , 1968, PP.45-49, 
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of west Be r l i n , The a i r l i f t was an ovejrwheljning 
success , and a f t e r a year the Soviets ended the land 
blockade. The episade served however, to h igh l igh t 
continued Soviet wi l l ingness to exp lo i t any po t en t i a l 
European or Western Weakness and provided a powerful 
argument for s t ronger e f fo r t s in the west to contain 
Soviet Power, 
I t Was in t h i s context tha t the f ina l act ion to 
brea«k the longstanding t r a d i t i o n in the United Sta tes 
of ; avoiding "entangling al l iances '* with foreign powers 
- e spec i a l l y European - took p lace . On April 4 1949, the 
United S t a t e s and eleven other European nat ions signed 
the North A t l a n t i c Treaty, e s t a b l i s i n g NATO, ^ e c rea t ion 
of NATO Was a turning po in t in post World War I I 
deplomatic h i s t o r y , demoBstrating tha t the United S ta tes 
had accepted the ro l e of an act ive agent for the 
p re se rva t ion of p o l i t i c a l and mi l i t a ry s t a b i l i t y in the 
World whereever i t s v i t a l na t iona l i n t e r e s t s were placed 
a t r i s k , Thrfijugh the North At lan t i c Treaty the United 
S t a t e s and twelve other nat ions comibitted themselves to 
consider an "•armed a t t ack agains t one or more of them, 
an a t t ack aga ins t them a l l " , "The pa r t i e s agreed tha t in 
such an event they would c o l l e c t i v e l y aid the nat ion or 
nat ions a t tacked through such act ion as each of the p a r t i e s 
57, Hi lde r th , Cp. c i t , , P ,5 . 
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deemed necessajry,"including the use of armed forces". 
The formation of NATO, in 1949, with the United 
States as the leading member, was consider<it by the 
U.S. policy makers, a log ica l extension of the e f fo r t 
to contain Soviet expanSdsonism and re inforce the 
economic r e s t o r a t i o n of the European a l l i e s , A p a r a l l e l 
i n i t i a t i v e was taken by the United S ta t e s to provide 
s t rength t o the n6w-col lect ive defence system through a 
major programme of m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e . This programme 
was created through the passage of the Mutual Defence 
Assistance Act (MDAA) of 1949, in the f a l l cf t h a t year . 
Mi l i t a ry ass i s tance programme was a necessary 
element to $ive c r e d i b i l i t y to the new NATO a l l i a n c e . 
I t s i n t e n t was to add m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y where i t was 
lacking as an adjunct to the economic ass i s t ance programme 
tha t aimed a t s t imula t ing European recovery. I t f ina l 
approval by Congress was f a c i l a t e d by Pres ident Truman's 
announcement in l a t e September 1949 tha t the Soveit Union 
had exploded an atomic device, thus ending the Apnerican 
monopoly in the unclear weapons sptere. 
The Mutual Defence Assis tance Act of 1949 was 
s i g n i f i c a n t for two reasons . F i r s t , i t gave the United 
S ta tes au thor i ty to provide subs t an t i a l mi l i ta ry a s s i s t ance 
to NATO count r ies as well as Greece, Turkey, Iran, Korea, 
58, I b id . 
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and the p h l l l l p i n e s . Second, i t es tabl ished the legal 
badis for the major s e c u r i t y ass is tance program element 
t\tt e x i s t to t h i s day. The Mil i tary Assistance programe 
(MAP), which stemmed from the . MDAA of 1949, provided 
for the loan or o u t r i g h t grant of mi l i t a ry equipment 
mate r ia l s , and s e r r t c e s t o E l ig ib le na t ions . In p r a c i t c e , 
nearly a l l MAP items were provided on a grant b a i l s , 
Trainging was p a r t of the bas i s MAP programme u n t i l l 1976, 
when the I n t e r § t i o n a l Mi l i t a ry Education and Training 
(IMET) progaairene was e s t ab l i shed as en independent secur i ty 
ass i s t ance component, ^he Foreign Mil i ta ry Sales (RiS) 
cah:^ and c r e d i t progranme a l so had i t o r ig in in the MDAA 
of 1949, 
^ e scope and na ture of grant MAP, grant t ra in ing 
and FMS cash and c r e d i t programmes changed s ign i f i can t ly 
from 1949 to the p r e s e n t . 
While the c o l l e c t i v e secur i ty system was being 
es tab l i shed in Europe, add i t i ona l challegges componted 
the Uhited S ta tes in Asia , In l a t e 1949, the f a l l of 
<^hina to Mao Tse- tung 's communist forces and the f l i c ^ t 
of Chiang Kai-Shek's n a t i o n a l i s t force to Taiwan raiseifl 
concerr) among U,S, policy-makers about the secur i ty of 
other non communist s t a t e s in the region. These concertis 
I J . 
were g r e a t l y i n t e n s i f i e d a f t e r the i n v a s i o n of South 
Korea in .7une 1950 by f o r c e s from communist North 
Korea, In Korean was t h e U.S. p layed t h e major conibat 
rolh, he lped c o n s o l i d a t e U.S. commitment t o suppor t 
programmes t h a t f a s t e r e d c o l l e c t i v e s u c u r i t y no t only 
i n Europe b u t in Asia as w e l l , 
^ e Korean War r a i s e d concerns among U.S. p o l i c y -
makers because i t was a d i r e c t m i l i t a r y c h a l l e n g e by 
communist fo rces t o the p o s i t i o n of the Uni ted S t a t e s 
i n As ia , Should Korea f a l l , Japan would be d i r e c t l y 
exposed t o t h r e a t s from the Sov ie t Union and i t s North 
Korean a l l y , The s e c u r i t y of P h i l l i p i n e s , Taiwan, and 
o t h e r U,S, f r i e n d s and a l l i e s and Sour th West Asia and 
59 t h e p a c i f i c wovild a l s o be p l aced i n J e o p a r d y , 
S e c u r i t y a s s i a t a n c e programmes t h a t orginAtdd i n 
p o l i c i e s des ingned t o c o n f r o n t a S o v i e t t h r e a t i n EurxD|Je 
had because much more g l o b a l i n natfafe a f t e r t he c r e a t i o n 
of b i l a t e r a l and raujttilatral mutual s e c u r i t y t r e a t i e s 
between Asian n a t i o n and U n i t e d S t a t e s , These t r e a t i e s 
inc luded t h e U,S , J a p a n e s e t r e a t y of 1951, the U,S, P h i l l i p i n e s 
Trea ty of 1951, the ANZUS p a c t of 19 51 between A u s t r a l i a , 
Hew Zealand, and the Uni ted S t a t e s , and t h e U,S , _ Republ ic 
of •'S^rea Trea ty of 1953, The e s t a b l i s h m e n t of these mutual 
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Securi ty t r e a t i e s with f r i end ly s t a t e s in Asia served 
the same U.S. foreign pol icy purposes in tha t region 
as NATO did in Europe, 
Several other c r i a i s in Asia led the Eisenhower 
administrat ion to take s t eps to s t rengthen the posi t ion 
of the free nations there through add i t iona l t r ea ty 
corrmitments. There s p e c i f i c s treatjes was ' the South 
East Asia Treaty Creating SEATO# signed xn Septerrtoer 
1954, -he concerns for the s t a b i l i t y of fr iendly States 
in the South East Asian region in the wake of Frencb 
War in Indo Qiina led the United States to sponser the 
^outh East Asia Treaty, The United S t a t e s , France, Great 
Br i t i an , the p h i l l i p i n e s , Aus t r a l i a , Newzealand, Pakistan 
and 'niailand joined in t h i s t r e a t y which provided the 
bas i s for a U, S, s ecu r i t y auarantee for most of South 
East Asia and the near&y Sputh pac i f i c a r e a s . 
In a s imi la r fashion, the United S t a t e s responded 
in l a t e 1954 to Chinese communist a t t ack agains t two 
isla-.ds con t ro l l ed by the n a t i o n a l i s t s , Qvemoy and M%tsu, 
by concluding a b i l a t e r a l secur i ty t r ea ty with Taiwan, 
60, ^arold A. Haveyj United Sta tes Mi l i t a ry Assistance; 
A Study of P o l i c i e s -and p r a c t i c e s . Appendix* A' , 
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The then U.S. Pres ident asked Congress for au thor i ty 
to use U.S. Mi l i t a ry forces to p ro tec t Taiwan and 
rearby t e r r i t o r i e s as he deemed necessary,which was 
approved by Congress, This the co l l ec t ive s ecu r i t y 
s t r u c t u r e t h a t had begen under President Truman with 
NATO had been extended to most of Asia, ^ e programmes 
of secur i ty a s s i s t ance to support t h i s s t ruc tu re had 
become an i n t eg ra l p a r t of American foreign pol icy . 
After the Suez c r i s ed of 1956 the influence of 
USSR in West Asia increased , Naseer was a t the height 
of h i s power and he through t h e i r he lp wanted to remove 
Western influence from the region. Naseer t r i e d to overthrow 
the pro-western governments in Jordan - lebanaiand I raq , 
His e f f o r t s were f r u s t r a t e d because of timely Western 
help in Jordan and Labanon but the government of I raq 
was overthrown and the U.S. policymakers r ea l i zed tha t 
d i r e c t in termint ion in the area might be required to 
preserve Western i n t e r e s t s . These events led to c lose r 
U.S. a s soc i a t i on with f r i end ly s t a t e s in the region. 
After t ha t «he United S t a t e s , through an executive 
agrement, formally adhered to the newely created Central 
Treaty Organisation (CENTO) , whose members included the 
United Kingdom, I r an , rPak i s t an and Turkey, The t r ea ty 
lio 
group announced t h e i r i n t e n t to maintain t h e i r co l l ec t ive 
s e c u r i t y and to r e s i s t d i r e c t or i n d i r e c t agaression, ^ e 
United S t a t e s pledged a t the time t o give force to i t s 
commitment by Increasing mi l i t a ry aid for Pakis tan, Iran 
and Turkey. I t also recomunited i t s e l f to provide 
s e c u r i t y ass i s tance to nations th^ t had been viewed since 
the begining of the MAp prograntne as key bulwarks aga ins t 
the spread of communist influence in the s t r a t e g i c Middle 
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Eas t , Pers ian Gulf, and Sout West Asian Area. 
United s t a t e ' s e f f o r t s towards decreasing USSR 
influence and increas ing i t s own in the reigion continued. 
And i t s economic and Mi l i t a ry ass i s tance to the count r ies 
of the region, p a r t i c u l a r l y I r a n , I s rae l^ Jordan, Saudi 
Arabia, furkAy,:i»:continued. All t h i s r e su l t ed In to the 
induct ion of Egypt in to the U.S. camp which was supported 
to be a c lose Russian a l ly ,She camp David accord of 1978 
r e su l t ed i n t o the i s o l a t i o n of Egypt in the iregion and 
i t s a l l ingment with U,S, was increased. In 1979 I ran , 
a f t e r the revolut ion, became the enemy of U.S. which 
before the revolut ion was a c l o s e t a l l y . This was a 
c l e a r s e t back to the U.S. i n t e r e s t in the region. Since 
then to balance the l o s s united s t a t e s s t a r t e d a s s i s t i n g 
Pakis tan , with much vigour, both economically and M i l i t a r i l y , 
6 1 . Richard F. Grimtnett, The Role of Secur i ty Assistance 
in H i s t o r i c a l perspec t ive , in U.S. secur i ty Assis tance: 
The p o l i t i c a l process , edi ted by E m e s t Graves, STEvena. 
H i ld re th , Lexington Book, 1985, 
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P a k i s t a n , t oday , i s s a i d t h e c l o s e t a l l y of America 
through which US i s t r y i n g t o o b t a i n and s a t i s f y i t s 
g lobal i n t e r e s t p a r t i c u l a r l y i n South and West As ia , 
To s u s t a i n and m a i n t a i n i t s i n t e r e s t , t he m i l i t a r y 
a s s i s t a n c e s u p p l i e d by U.S . t o i t s d i f f e r e n t a l l i e s a r e 
a s f o l l o w s : -
Leading Program P a r t i c i p a n t s 
CHioufiands of Cur ren t U.Si Dol l e r s ) 
MAP PROGRAM® FMS ( S a l e s ) PROGRAM AGREEMENTS 
FISCAL YEARS 1964-1973 
Turkey 
Greece 
Spain 
Norway 
1,674,853 
720,491 
196,727 
123,006 
West fiermany 
United Kingdom 
I t a l y 
Canada 
A u s t r a l i a 
Japcin 
New Zealand 
I s r a e l 
South Afr ica 
3. 
1. 
1 
,382,743 
,665,475 
488,197 
438,651 
922,650 
283,143 
105,602 
,525,235 
2,223 
li 
P o r t u g a l 
Tirkey 
Greece 
Spain 
I s r a e l 
Egypt 
347,137 
211,832 
147,621 
112,052 
5 ,500 ,000 
204,540 
FISCAL YEARS 1974-1982 
United Kingdom 
Nether lands 
west Germany 
Belgium 
A u s t r a l i a 
j a p a n 
I s r a e l 
Egypt 
5 ,251,219 
3 ,266,439 
3,094,318 
1,948,830 
5,093,758 
2 ,476,777 
8,240,243 
5,369,169 
@ MAP Program i n c l u d e s : MPA Program, MAP Excess , IMET, 
—«— Data on defense Department Budget a u t h o r i t y taken 
from N a t i o n a l Defense Budget E s t i m a t e s f o r FY- 1982, 
Off ice of c o m p t r o l l e r , March 1981, P .5 and I b i d , N a t i o n a l 
Defense B u d ^ t Es t ima te s f o r FY 1983 March 1982, p , 4 , 
MRP Program a p p r o p r i a t i o n gata taken from c o n g r e s s i o n a l 
P r e s e n t a t i o n Document, S e c u r i t y A s s i s t a n c e Programs, 
FY 1983, DOD, P . 1 1 . 
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I n i t i a l l y the U.S. Secur i ty ass i s tance programe 
was mostly d i rec ted towards Europe, Because, Europe 
wgs a t the top of U.S. foreign pol icy p r i o r i t i e s : And 
so, o ther areas were low down in the l i s t of benef ic ia-
r i e s of MAP Prograin, 
As far as U.S.aiiii<is are concerned, Turkey Greece 
Spain and I s r a e l were the main MAP r e c i p i e n t s . While 
Aus t ra l i a , United Kingdom, Japan, New Zealand, I s r ae l 
and West Germany were the main FMS programe purcfiasers. 
These countr ies were very important in r e l a t ion with 
U.S. global s t r a t egy , and they were the main par tners in 
the u.S* Securi ty t r e a t i e s . As the European countr ies 
slowly and gradually became economically s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t 
major arms sa l e s were done through FMS s a l e s . 
Important a l l i e s of U.S. received weapons which 
were more than U.S. m i l i t a r y needs, the primary considerat ions 
of which count r ies should get what types of areas were the 
rec ' i ip ients l eve l of m i l i t a r y soph i s t i ca t ion and absorption 
capacity and i t s immediate defense needs. 
By 1963, a s h i f t was v i s i b l e from the MAP programe 
to the FMS program in U.S. s ecu r i t y ass i s tance pol icy. 
The Marshall plan had helped Americans European a l l i e s in 
rebui ld ing t h e i r economies. These count r ies were now 
ranked second behind United Kingdom and West Germany, 
S ta r t ing with the FY 1974 aid b i l l a la rge amount 
of I s r a e l i s FMS c r e d i t purchases were wained. Since 
them 1^3 5*5 b i l l i o n have been waived, Egypt was a lso 
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given $ 200 mil l ion in t h i s type of waiver . 
From 1976, I s r a e l was a l so given the p r iv i l ege to 
service i t FMS debts through a system of concessional 
f inancing. Later on t h i s concessional formula was also 
extended to o ther f r iendly countr ies l i k e Turkey, Greece 
and Egypt, Such s teps were i n i t i a t e d to help nat ions 
which were considered v i t a l for U.S. s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s 
and were shor t of necessary funds to pay for the reqxiired 
weaponry. 
In the e a r l y 1950s during the s t a r t period of NATO 
and the process of rearming Europegn the grant program 
was a t i t s height . After t h i s period i t came down slowly. 
La t e r an increase was seen in the ea r ly 1980s, Today the 
grant programme i s s u b t a n t i a l l y smaller than tha t of the 
ea r ly 1950s. 
The FMS c r e d i t program has also followed the various 
ups and down in U.S. po l i cy . I t was small u n t i l the FY 1970, 
64, Graves, Ernest , and Hi ld re th , Steven A, U.S« Security 
Assis tance: The p o l i t i c a l process . Lexington. Books 
1985, p ,23r 
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b e t t e r equipped to pay for the required weapon, and 
the U.S. pol icy makers a l s o requested them to do so. 
Such a trend of a d i s t i n c t s h i f t towards the PMS 
Program became moi:« prominent in the ear ly 1970s, 
As far as Spain and Portugal a re concerned 
ass i s tance to these c o u n t r i e s , "was not cut off when 
other European nat ions stopped receiving new commitments 
for a id in the e a r l y 1960s, p a r t l y because these count r ies 
were l e s s capable of paying the ful l cos t s of adequate 
defense". ^ -^  
In 1959 Pres ident Nixon announced the "Kixon Doctrine", 
under which the "U.S. use i-^s secur i ty ass i s tance resources 
to b o l s t e r the m i l i t a r y power of key regional s t a t e s to the 
ea t en t these s t a t e s were w i l l i ng and able to preserve 
regional peace without d i r e c t U,S, mi l i t a ry involvement* 
I*ie increased American commitment from then onwards was 
c l ea r ly guided by t h i s p o l i c y . 
Between the period 1973-82, Ttie Europe and Canada 
ranked t h i r d in MAP Program and t ra in ing funding behind 
some South-East Asian c o u n t r i e s . The p r inc ipa l r e c ip i en t s 
were Turkey and portugal which provided the U.S. with 
important mi l i t a ry bases . In IMS purchases t h i s region 
63, Harold A, Hovey, o p ^ c i t . p . 84, 
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But a f t e r the Fy 1979^ i t showed a sharp increase because 
of the la rge amounts given for I s r a e l and Egypt which 
were the major U.S* a l l i e s in West Asia. 
Hence, the Securi ty a s s i s t ance program could be 
seen "as a viable means t o help others help the United 
Sta tes to support the u l t imate objec t ive of preserving 
wourld peace, as well a s a l e s s cos t ly a l t e r n a t i v e to 
d i r e c t mi l i t a ry involvement both f i nanc i a l l y and p o l i t i c a l l y ^ 
65. Ib id , p .39 . 
CONCLUSION 
B e f o r e World War I I t h e U .S . r a n k e d t h i r d i n a rms 
e x p o r t s b e h i n d F r a n c e a n d G r e « t B r i t a i n , Bu t a f t e r t h e 
ViJar a rms t r a n s f e r s become a major t o o l of U . S . f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y . The f i r s t s t e p i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n was t he r e v i s i o n 
of t h e N e u t r a l i t y Act i n 1939 and l a t e r t h e l e n d - l e a s e 
p rograme of 1 9 4 1 , D u r i n g t h e World War I , t h e u , S , had 
b e e n a a i a jo r a rms s u p p l i e r , b u t i n t h e i n t f i r - w a r y e a r s 
t h e p r o c e s s s lowed dovm. B u t i t a g a i n p i c k e d momentum 
a f t e r t h e Second World War , With t h e e n u n c i a t i o n of t h e 
Truman D o c t r i n e i n 194 7 . 
M a i n l y weapons were e x p o r t e d t o t h e European a l l i e s 
unde r t h e M i l i t a r y A s s i s t a n c e Programme (MAP) which was 
f r e e of c h a r g e . I n t h e 1950s and e a r l y 1960s w i t h t h e 
e x p a n s i o n o f t h e p o l i c y o f c o n t a i n m e n t t h e m i l i t a r y 
a s s i s t a n c e a l s o e x p a n d e d t o o t h e r g e o g r a p h i c a l r e g i o n s . 
I n t h e 1960s a c h a n g e was made i n t h e form of U, S, 
arms e x p o r t s . The U, S, s e c u r i t y a s s i s t a n c e changed from 
MAP g r a n t s t o a rms s a l e s u n d e r t h e F o r e i g n M i l i t a r y S a l e s 
(FMS) p r o g r a m s . 
The u s e of g r a n t m i l i t a r y a i d c o n t i n u e d t o d e c l i n e 
i n t h e 19 7 0 s , and c o m m e r i c a l s a l e ' s i n c r e a s e d d u r i n g t h a t 
t i m e . 
IZu -
With the passage of the Nelson Amendment in 1974 
Congress secured Veto power over major arms sales. 
Though it had been exercising authority over government 
aid but until then it had none over government approved 
sales. 
The International Security Assistance and Arms 
exports control Act were designed to control the sales 
of arms and it included specific congressional guideline 
for U.S. artns sales policy. In addition, it took many 
steps to control arms traffic. 
Since World War II, the U.S. foreign policy-makers 
have used arms transfers as an important insturment of 
their foreign policy. These arms exports have been 
traditionally done in the form of grant aid and weapons 
sales for credit or cash. Till the mid 1960s arms transfers 
were a controversial component of U.S. national security 
policy. It was generally accepted that weapons exports 
not only were helpful to recipient countries but contributed 
to U.S. security as well,Providing weapons to allies and 
friends was justified by the perceived Soviet threat and 
constituted a key element of U.S. containment policy. 
In the late 1960s increasing reliance on weapons 
exports by successive administrations began to cause 
concern among members of Congress and segments of U, S, 
public. Initially arms transfers were mainly directed 
1^^ 
towards European a l l i e s and o ther close f r iends of the 
U.S., but more t r ans fe r s in the 1970s were made to 
the Third World through government to government s a l e s . 
By mid 1970s Congress had s t a r t e d exerc i s ing increasing 
control over U.S, arms t r a n s f e r s . Ihe pol icy under Pres ident 
c a r t e r was to l i m i t u n i l a t e r a l l y , U.S. arms sa l e s to the 
Third World and to negot ia te m u l t i l a t e r a l r e s t r a i n t s with 
other major arms suppl ies . I t t r i e d to discourage regional 
arms competition based on the acqu i s i t i on of higher l eve l 
of weapons technology. In addi t ion , i t said t h a t the U.S. 
would not permit co-production agreements for s ign i f i can t 
weapons, equipment and major components with Third World 
coun t r i e s . 
The Reagan adminis t ra t ion , however, adopted a 
d i f ferent Bourse. I t emphasized on the global th rea t 
posed by the Soviet Union; a t h rea t t h a t required the 
U.S. to supply arms to i t s f r iends and a l l i e s to ensure 
mutual s e c u r i t y . 
The goals of Reagan adminis t ra t ions policy was to 
demonstrate the enduring i n t e r e s t t ha t the U.S. has in 
i t s a l l i e s and friends and tha t i t would not allow them 
to be a t a disadvantage, i t endeavoured to strengthen 
the mutual secur i ty r e l a t i o n s h i p s of the U.S. and to help 
de t e r aggression by enhancing preparedness of friends 
and a l l i e s . 
u 
The main aim of U.S. arms t rans fe r policy in the 
Third World i s to maintain regional s t a b i l i t y . The Middle 
East i s the major arms importer in the Third World, Between 
1976 and 1980^ 46% of major weapons sent to the t h i r d World 
went to t h i s arGa. In add i t ion to arms, U.S. sa les to these 
areas include mi l i t a ry cons t ruct ion equipment, services e t c . 
U.S. arm sa les in th i s region has been guided by c e r t a i n 
factors which a r e , s ecu r i t y of I s r a e l , prevention of Arab-
I s rae l armed c o n f l i c t , to a v a i l a b i l i t y of o i l and l imi t ing 
of Soviet influence t h e r e . 
U.S. arms a id and suppl ies to o ther Third World 
countr ies l ike those in South and South East Asia has 
been guided by the United S t a t e s global s t r a t egy . The 
crea t ion of CENTO and SEATO m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s was 
concluded to counter Soviet influence in these areas and 
to save them from communism, 
AS regards Latin America, |>rior to the 1960*s the 
U.S. dominated the Arms s a l e s market, t h e r e , but now the 
d ive r s i ty of suppl ie rs i s g r ea t e r the re . There i t has been 
the development of influence and good r e l a t i o n s with the 
countr ies r a the r than s e c u r i t y concerns t h a t have been the 
t r a d i t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n for U.S. arms t r a n s f e r s . Pres ident 
Carder brought the human r i g h t s issue t o the fore here as 
elsewhere. But the Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s primary concern 
1 ^u 
was hemispheric secur i ty and the competition for 
influence with the USSR r a the r than human r i g h t s . 
Secur i ty ass i s t ance program have a l s o been used 
to help f r iendly and a l l i e d nat ions acquire and maintain 
the c a p a b i l i t y to defend themselves, serving both spec i f i c 
U,S, na t iona l i n t e r e s t and co l l ec t ive secur i ty of the"free 
world". 
The concept of co l l e c t i ve secur i ty in the post second 
World War period was based on the idea t h a t preemptive 
a l l i a n c e s could deter c o n f l i c t . The Bnussels pac t of 1948 
was conducted keeping in view t h i s idea. 
In t h i s period the pol icy of containment of communism 
led to the establishment of several U.S. secur i ty a s s i s t ance 
programs, and u l t imate ly to a s e r i e s of mutual defense pacts 
to give i t force and e f fec t as the perception of d i r e c t 
Soviet m i l i t a r y th rea t to the West increased. 
The BeS-lin Blockade done by the USSR in June 1948, 
served t o h igh l igh t continued Soviet Willingness to e r p l o i t 
any p o t e n t i a l European or Western Weakness and provided a 
powerful argument for s t ronger e f fo r t s in the West to 
contain Soviets-power. I t wns in t h i s context t ha t the 
f inal ac t ion to break the longstanding t r a d i t i o n in the 
U.S. of avoiding entangling a l l i ances with foreign powers 
u. 
took place. On April 4. 1949, the U.S. and eleven 
others European nations signed the North Atlantic 
treaty, forming the NATO, The creation of NATO was 
a turning point in world diplomatic history, demonstrating 
that the U.S. had accepted the role of an active agent for 
the preservation of political and military stability in 
the World, wherever its vital national interest were at 
stake, 
A paralle? initiative was taken by the U.S. to 
provide strength to the new collective defense system 
through a major program of military asllstance. This 
program was created through the passage of a Mutual Defense 
Assistance Act of 1949, 
Several bilateral and multilateral mutual sectirity 
treaties beWeen the U.S. and Asian nations served the 
same U.S. foreign policy purpose in the concerned regions 
as NATO did ±n Europe, These traties included the US-
Japanese treaty of 1951, the U.S.- philipines treaty of 
1951 , the ANZfj pact of 1951, and the U.S.-Republic of 
Korea Treaty of 1953, 
Later, the creation of SEATO in 1954, provided the 
basis for a U.S. security guarantee.for most of South ~ 
East Asia and the nearby South Pacific areas. The CENTO 
1 ^ 
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served as a key bulv/ark a g a i n s t the spread of 
Commiinist influence in the s t r a t e g i c Middle-East , 
Persian Gulf and South West Asian a r e a s . 
Thus the c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y s t ruc tu re t h a t had 
begun in 1947 had been extended to most of Asia, The 
program of Securi ty Assistance to support th i s s t ruc ture 
had become an i n t e g r a l p a r t of American Foreign pol icy. 
In the end, i t can be said t h a t the U.S. global 
i n t e r e s t s have throughout been the motivating factor for 
arms sa l e s to i t s close a l l i e s and other Third World 
coun t r i e s . After the World V/ar I I containment of communism 
was the most intportant f ac to r in U.S. s t ra tegy , and so 
arms a id was mainly given t o countrl^is under the perceived 
threa t of the USSR, With America's new found role of a 
Super Power in World a f f a i r s i t was necessary for i t to 
ensure the secur i ty and ex is tence of i t s a l l i e s and to 
see t ha t o ther flhird world count r ies do no come under 
the Soviet inf luence . Hence, a l l forms of arms exports 
both as g ran t a id and weapons sa l e s for c red i t or cash 
have throughout been an important fac tor in U, S» global 
s t r a t egy . 
1 c^ 
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